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1Introduction
Hansjörg Herr, Jan Priewe, Andrew Watt
The authors of this book are united in the view that the legal 
and institutional design of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) in its original form is severely flawed. In addition, 
and related to this, macroeconomic policies in some of the 
member states before the Great Recession in 2008-9 and 
even more so from 2010 on were misguided and desta-
bilising. At the same time, most of us do not share the 
widespread critique that the Euro as a common currency was 
doomed to fail at birth because a currency union of hetero-
geneous economies, without flexible labour markets and 
cross-country labour mobility, can never work. We believe 
that the period following the introduction of the common 
currency should have been, but was not, used to make EMU 
workable. Substantial institutional changes can still make 
EMU successful. 
EMU was a semi-complete house before the Great 
Recession of 2008-9 and remains quite unfinished after the 
sovereign debt crisis in the Euro Area post-2010, despite a 
number of reforms. The Euro was and still is an historical 
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experiment. There is no blueprint, no successful predecessor. 
Most of the authors in this book share the view that some 
kind of political union is ultimately necessary, though not 
in the form of what tends to be derogatorily called a “super-
state” – more like a federally structured state like the US. 
EMU’s key shortcomings are rooted in the lack of active 
macroeconomic policies, especially a prudent and coop-
erative mix of monetary and fiscal policy and in a lack of 
at least a certain degree of wage coordination. Some kind 
of fiscal capacity, be it centralised, decentralised or a mix of 
both, is necessary, beyond the often pro-cyclical straitjacket 
of the “Stability and Growth Pact” (SGP). 
The so-called “Five Presidents’ Report” (European 
Commission 2015) has been helpful in indicating that 
the heads of the EU institutions agree that Euro Area 
governance must be developed and deepened if the single 
currency is to survive. To that extent, there is a shared under-
lying view with the essays in this book. However, in many 
regards the report lacks ambition. It represents ”business as 
usual” regarding even stronger enforcement of the prescrip-
tions of the Stability & Growth Pact (SGP) as well as 
the “Fiscal Compact”, aiming at almost balanced struc-
tural budgets and targeting the debt ratio at an (arbitrary) 
60 per cent of GDP. Behind this focus stands the belief 
that a – or even the – key problem of EMU is fiscal prof-
ligacy. National fiscal policy space, the argument goes, is to 
be further constrained and stricter discipline imposed on 
member states. In our opinion this will likely evolve into a 
pro-cyclical fiscal policy with counterproductive results. The 
Five Presidents also leave no doubt that internal devalua-
tions via lowering unit labour costs in current account 
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deficit countries, hence flexibilisation of labour markets plus 
other “structural reforms”, cuts in social policy standards 
and privatisation of state-owned enterprises, are important 
to stabilise EMU. However, the report was one of the first 
official documents to at least mention a responsibility 
among surplus countries to contribute to adjustment as well. 
There are also proposals going in the direction of deepening 
governance in novel and potentially helpful ways, including 
the establishment of a European Treasury, a central “fiscal 
capacity”. However, these issues are addressed in a long-run 
perspective and in rather airy words.  
After Brexit, it became clear that the Euro crisis is only 
part of a broader crisis, a crisis of the European Union 
(EU). There are threats of further exits; if not exits, there 
is broad discontent among large swaths of citizens across 
almost all member states with the course of European inte-
gration, albeit for different reasons. Partly in response to 
this discontent, the European Commission has outlined 
five possible scenarios for the EU-27 for the year 2025 
(European Commission 2017). The short names for these 
scenarios are “Carrying on” (1), “Nothing but the single 
market” (2), “Those who want more do more” (3), “Doing 
less more efficiently” and “Doing much more together” (5). 
So far, the Commission has not made its own position clear. 
We believe that a functioning monetary union needs 
more and not less common policy coordination, well beyond 
the scope of “intergovernmental coordination” which all too 
often ends up in decision-making stalemates owing to the 
unanimity rule in key policy areas. Not in all but in some key 
functions of governance, EMU requires joint policy-making. 
It should be accepted that membership of a currency union 
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necessitates a strong degree of economic, social and political 
integration, but not a full-blown new federal state with 
all its typical features. This should imply more suprana-
tional democracy, including greater use of majority rule in 
more areas, and a shift in power to a parliament deciding 
politics and policies relevant for the Euro Area, taking it 
away from the Council and influential informal institu-
tions like the Euro Group. This kind of two-speed Europe 
has existed since the Euro’s inception and should encompass 
more spheres if further integration is implemented in EMU. 
In other words, we see deeper integration (Scenario 5) as a 
necessity for the Euro Area countries, implying recognition 
of the validity also of Scenario 3: some countries doing 
more without others. There are some key EU policy areas 
where common and uniform action is needed for the sake of 
coherence, and others where some countries may do more or 
less than others. But the delineation between more and less 
integrated countries cannot be simply a matter of choice: 
it is determined by membership (or not) of the common 
currency.
Acknowledging this means that the traditional notion 
that all EU members sooner or later take part in EMU and 
follow the path of ever deeper integration towards a “United 
States of Europe,” with nation states withering away, is 
grossly misleading. It should also be accepted that those EU 
members which do not want EMU membership or do not 
fulfil the preconditions may remain in a different but well-
accepted status, temporarily or forever. 
This book’s focus is on the Euro Area and hence largely 
disregards EMU’s embeddedness within the EU, although 
the salience of this distinction is declining with Brexit. The 
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15 essays discuss by and large similar reform ideas (with 
a few exceptions). They are written – some more, some 
less, accentuated - with a Keynesian mind-set as guiding 
economic reform principles. All reflect on how the Euro 
system can be reformed, not on whether and how it should 
be abandoned. But there are no uniform reform proposals. 
Earlier versions of the papers presented here were discussed 
at a symposium in November 2016 in Berlin, organised by 
the Macroeconomic Policy Institute (IMK in Hans Böckler 
Foundation, Düsseldorf ), the Forum for Macroeconomics and 
Macroeconomic Policies (FMM within IMK), the German 
Social Science Journal Leviathan and the Institute Inter-
national Political Economy (IPE) at the Berlin School of 
Economics and Law. 
Our aim is to write for a broader readership, beyond 
professional economists. Therefore, we refrain mostly from 
using formulae, models and insider terms only under-
standable for those in the know. Reference lists are kept 
short. Even so, some articles are heavier on theory, others 
more tilted toward policy. Admittedly, our prime question 
was not the one most policy-makers ask as soon as discus-
sions begin – is it feasible, is it enforceable? Most essays ask 
what needs to be done, not what we have on our wish-lists 
but what is considered a precondition for the functioning 
and economic success of a currency union. Many proposals 
require amendments of EU Treaties, but not all. Remaining 
within the scope of the Treaties provides insufficient leeway. 
Given the need to change treaties or make new, additional 
ones, we are aware that deep reforms will take more than a 
few years. Although not addressed in the essays (apart from 
one), we believe that a return to national currencies for all 
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or several members would create huge short-term and long-
term problems for both “Remainers” and “Exiteers”, bigger 
than managing reforms. However, one essay – sceptical 
regarding the governance of a large and heterogeneous EMU 
– pleads for establishing the preconditions for a feasible and 
socially tenable break-up of EMU.
Finally, here is a brief overview of what readers will find in 
this book.
The first seven essays attempt to identify EMU’s general 
design flaws and present comprehensive solutions for the 
functioning of a common currency system. The first six 
articles hold that solutions within a currency union like 
EMU are possible, albeit much more complex than the blue-
print of the Maastricht Treaty and the later amendments 
and supplements suggest. The last essay in this bloc proposes 
a new mode for exiting the Euro.
Hansjörg Herr traces a short economic history of EMU, 
especially the period after the financial crises, and analyses the 
divergent developments with a focus on policy failures that 
have exacerbated the euro crisis. Sebastian Dullien reviews the 
reforms undertaken to fix the EMU’s shortcomings. Even 
with redressive acts, a number of issues of concern remain 
unaddressed, leaving the Euro Area akin to a half-finished 
house. Eckhard Hein argues that the EMU architecture suffers 
from the flaws of the New Consensus Macroeconomics. He 
proposes a comprehensive reform package based on post-
Keynesian macroeconomic theory. Thomas Palley holds that 
EMU is built on a neoliberal concept of monetary and fiscal 
policy., outlining instead Keynesian reforms. Jan Priewe 
analyses the Euro Area’s performance against the backdrop 
of optimum currency area theories (and their shortcomings) 
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and derives five reform packages, both from the theories 
analysed and the critical points of Euro Area performance – 
with the benefit of hindsight. The team embracing Christophe 
Blot, Jérôme Creel, Bruno Ducoudré, Raul Sampognaro, Xavier 
Timbeau and Sébastien Villemot criticise the macroeconomic 
performance in the Euro Area after the financial crisis and 
propose, besides a centralised fiscal policy, national golden 
rules for fiscal and wage policy as well as “investment plans” 
in peripheral countries for promoting exports. Fritz Scharpf 
envisages a “Flexible European Currency Community”, 
meaning the option of a break-up of EMU into two inter-
related currency areas, based on a new two-tier system: the 
Euro and a reformed and extended “Exchange Rate Mech-
anism II” which would allow weaker countries a soft exit and 
devaluation of their currency. 
Seven further contributions deal with specific policies. 
Maik Grabau and Heike Joebges look at the zero-interest-
rate monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) 
which has come under severe criticism from German authors 
and politicians. They find that most critiques are not well-
founded and not rooted in a European perspective. Helene 
Schuberth analyses Banking Union, one of the most urgent 
reforms initiated and already partially implemented, and its 
limitations. She points to the pro-cyclical shadow banking 
activity of large banks on the repo market. To avoid the high-
risk sovereign/bank nexus she proposes “European Safe 
Bonds” (ESBies). Willi Semmler and Brigitte Young discuss 
the institutional requirements for fiscal capacity building 
and the introduction of a Eurozone Treasury, supporting a 
Social Union as an updated European version of the German 
model of a Social Market Economy. Achim Truger elabo-
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rates on a pragmatic policy for swiftly re-booting growth 
by institutionalising the traditional “Golden Rule” for 
debt-financing of public investment; this could be a lowest 
common denominator among policy-makers in Europe. 
Three essays deal with current account imbalances among 
Euro Area members. Stefan Collignon argues that the EU’s 
“Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure” leads to austerity 
measures in deficit countries which do not improve compet-
itiveness. He says that current account balances differ 
strongly in a currency union from those in countries with 
their own currency, detects sectoral disequilibria behind 
the current account balances and considers national imbal-
ances as regional imbalances. Ronald Janssen traces divergent 
wages policies in the Euro Area, but confirms that wage 
coordination is important to maintain economic and social 
cohesion within EMU. He warns against internal devalu-
ation now being pursued as entailing deflationary risks. In 
the same vein, Torsten Müller reviews European trade union 
attempts to implement an alternative model of collective 
bargaining coordination as the basis for a broader macro-
economic re-orientation towards a more demand- and 
wage-led growth model in EMU.
In the concluding essay, Willi Koll and Andrew Watt focus 
on the need to establish institutions and procedures that 
ensure balanced growth among all member states, over-
coming the centrifugal forces unleashed by differing real 
interest rates in a monetary union and avoiding damaging 
imbalances. They sketch out a pragmatic institutional devel-
opment process to achieve the required mix of monetary, 
fiscal and incomes policies.
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A history of the crises of the 
European Monetary Union
Hansjörg Herr
1. Introduction
Germany, Europe’s biggest economy, accounted for 20% of 
the nominal gross domestic product (GDP) of the European 
Union (EU) in 2015, followed by the United Kingdom (UK) 
(17%), France (14%), Italy (11%) and Spain (7%). As for 
the European Monetary Union (EMU), Germany’s share – 
29% – is even higher (IMF 2016). However, the German 
economic position cannot be correctly estimated only by 
looking at its GDP shares.
Germany has been playing a dominant role due to its export 
success and its “stability culture” which has also been followed 
by some smaller northern EMU countries. Before the EMU’s 
creation, the D-Mark dominated the European Monetary 
System (EMS), which was created in 1979. Member coun-
tries of the EMS (and other European countries) pegged 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
14
their currencies to the D-Mark. The German Bundesbank 
dictated the interest rate level of the EMS whereas Germany 
had the lowest nominal interest rates. Central banks of other 
EMS countries had to enforce higher interest rates to keep 
their exchange rates stable vis-à-vis the D-Mark. The system 
worked because exchange rates were frequently adjusted. In 
1992, the UK left the system, while Italy depreciated substan-
tially and temporarily left the exchange rate mechanism. 
In 1993, further turbulences led to a widening of the band 
around the agreed fixed exchange rates from +/− 2.25% to +/− 
15%. Overall the EMS showed many tensions and fragilities 
which in the end led to several appreciations in the D-Mark. 
The major problem for EMU is that these tensions and 
fragilities did not disappear after the creation of the Euro in 
1999 – despite the fact that exchange rate adjustments and 
other national policies were no longer possible. In Section 
2 developments in the EMU before and after the Great 
Recession in 2009 are discussed. Section 3 analyses policies 
to solve the crisis. Section 4 concludes. 
2. The overall development in the Euro Area
Real GDP growth rates differed substantially within the 
EMU (all data if not otherwise noted come from OECD 
2017). Between 1999 and 2008 countries like Spain and 
Greece realised much higher growth rates than the average; 
France was close to this average; Italy, Portugal and Germany 
underperformed. All EMU countries were severely hit by 
the Great Recession. The recovery in 2010 was relatively 
quick, but the Eurozone slid into a double-dip depression 
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with shrinking GDP in 2012 and 2013. Since then there 
has been no significant recovery – a unique situation since 
World War II. The next cyclical downturn will hit the zone 
in a very poor condition. After the Great Recession, in terms 
of GDP Germany became one of the best performing coun-
tries. Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain suffered massively 
from the crisis (see Figure 1). Ireland showed high GDP 
growth before 2008, a deep recession and quick recovery. But 
Ireland is a special case economically dominated by multina-
tional companies and aggressive tax dumping.
Figure 1: Real GDP growth in selected EMU 
countries, 1999-2015, 1999 = 100
Source: OECD (2017)
The official EMU unemployment rate in 2016 was above 
10%, in Greece around 25%, Spain 20%, Italy 13% or 
Portugal 12%. For these countries, the figures show a lost 
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decade. In Germany, the unemployment rate was slightly 
above 4%. However, the volume of hours worked did not 
increase by much in Germany, only from an index value of 
101.7 in 2000 to 103.5 in 2015 (Stat 2016).
One factor to explain the different economic performance 
within the EMU until 2007 is the development of interest 
rates. Since the announcement of the European Council in 
1992 that the Euro would come into being, short- and long-
term interest rates began converging towards the low level 
obtaining in Germany. For the southern EMU countries low 
interest rates were a big birthday gift from the Euro.
Figure 2: Real estate prices in selected EMU 
countries, 1999 – 2015, 1999 = 100
Source: OECD (2017)
The low interest rates together with available credit 
and lax regulation triggered in most EMU countries real 
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estate bubbles. Between 1999 and 2007 real estate prices 
in Spain almost tripled, in Greece, France and Italy they 
more or less doubled. In Portugal, they increased slightly 
more than 20%. The bubble imploded when the shock of 
the US-subprime crisis hit the world economy. Spain and 
Greece in particular suffered from falling real estate prices, 
but also Italy and Portugal (see Figure 2). In countries with 
bubbles before the crisis the real estate sector had become 
an important engine of growth. Not only the construction 
sector was booming but also consumption was driven by 
income created in that sector and the positive wealth effect 
of increasing real estate prices.
Germany did not experience a real estate bubble following 
the Euro’s birth. Only after the Great Recession did real 
estate prices in Germany start to increase. This has to do with 
the fact that there was no interest rate shock in Germany 
and the German financial system is relatively conservative 
(Detzer et al. 2017). Most importantly, Germany followed 
policies which did not stimulate domestic demand that 
could then spill over into a higher demand for real estate. 
Germany suffered rather from a lack of domestic demand. 
The red-green government (1998 -2005) under Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder implemented a number of labour market 
reforms given the name of Agenda 2010. In essence, these 
reforms enabled a sharp expansion of precarious jobs and of 
a low-wage sector and a decrease in social benefits for the 
unemployed. Only in early 2015 did Germany introduce 
statutory minimum wages. 
In Germany demand was almost exclusively driven by 
increasing exports. Coming from a constellation of current 
account deficits, an exceptional outcome caused by German 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
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unification in 1990, with the start of the EMU the country 
quickly began generating increasing current account 
surpluses. It manoeuvred itself into a mercantilist constel-
lation with current account surpluses as a main growth 
engine (Hein et al. 2016). Current account imbalances in the 
EMU increased sharply until 2007 (see Figure 3). Greece, 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland in particular produced high 
current account deficits measured in per cent of GDP. But 
Italy slid too with EMU into high current account deficits. 
There are several factors which explain the imbalances.
Figure 3: Current account imbalances in selected 
EMU countries, 1999-2015, (million Euro)
Source: OECD (2017)
First, growth differentials. Germany with its relatively 
poor growth performance was characterised by relatively 
low imports whereas high growth in Spain and Greece, for 
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example, led to high imports and current account deficits. 
The reduction in the current account deficits of the crisis 
countries after 2008 has been mainly caused by lower 
imports as a result of low growth. 
Second, price competitiveness explains partly the perfor-
mance of exports and imports. In a Monetary Union to a 
large extent this depends on the relative development of 
nominal unit labour costs. Figure 4 reveals that German unit 
labour costs stagnated from the mid-1990s until the Great 
Recession. Indeed, between 1998 and 2007 the increase in 
German unit labour costs was zero. To realise the target 
inflation rate of the central bank, unit labour costs should 
have increased according to trend productivity development 
plus the target inflation rate – which is in case of the ECB 
(close to but below) 2%. In contrast to Germany, with its 
ultra-low wage increases, in southern European countries 
these were too high, while for example French wage increases 
were very much in line with the ECB inflation target. Until 
2007, for the EMU as a whole, average wage increases 
followed more or less the inflation target of the ECB which 
led to an EMU inflation rate of around 2% (Herr and 
Horn 2012). These developments increased German price 
competitiveness within the EMU substantially and reduced 
it for other EMU countries. In 2001, nearly 45% of German 
exports went to the Euro Area. This means the changes 
of price competitiveness within EMU fundamentally 
affected German trade. After the Great Recession, mainly 
as a result of the crisis in the southern European countries, 
this percentage dropped to around 36% in 2015. Germany 
managed to shift part of its exports to the rest of the world, 
largely thanks to a weak Euro.
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
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Figure 4: Development of nominal unit labour costs 
in selected EMU countries 1999-2016, 1986=100
Source: AMECO (2017)
Third, non-price competitiveness plays a role. Based on 
its high-quality products, Germany is seen as a country 
with low price elasticity in international trade. However, it 
has been calculated that a 10% reduction in price compet-
itiveness reduces German exports by 6%. For imports, the 
reaction might be higher (Thorbecke and Waseda 2012).
Current account imbalances are only possible with corre-
sponding net capital flows. Not surprisingly, before the 
Great Recession, current account deficit countries realised 
high net capital inflows and current account surplus coun-
tries high net capital outflows. Between 2003 and 2007 
German net capital outflows were 45% of GDP, compared 
to net capital inflows in Spain of 29.1%, in Portugal 36.6% 
and Greece 37.5% of GDP. Most of the capital flows were 
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credit. In 2007 EMU countries had accumulated very high 
gross stocks of foreign debt in relation to GDP, for example 
Italy 111.4%, Greece 144.2%, Spain 144.8% and Portugal 
202.1%. Germany and the Netherlands, as platforms of 
international capital flows, had gross foreign liabilities of 
135.7% and 290.4% of GDP respectively. The boom phase 
of cross-border private capital flows (intra-area flows and 
extra-area flows) in the EMU peaked in 2007 with 40% 
of area GDP. Then it collapsed to below 5% in 2009 and 
remained below 10% the following years (Lane 2013). This 
means that debtors in current account deficit countries were 
suddenly cut off from credit supply and could not roll over 
due credits. In emerging markets, where boom-bust cycles 
became frequent from the 1980s onwards, such a situation 
leads to twin crises – an exchange rate crisis and a domestic 
financial crisis. In EMU current account deficit countries 
cannot utilise devaluation. However, economic units in 
these countries (financial institutions, firms, governments, 
private households) were brutally affected by a freeze in 
capital inflows. 
Not only did the cross-border financial flows stop working, 
crisis countries like Spain and Greece were additionally 
affected by asset price deflation in the real estate sector that 
brought about non-performing loans. Financial institutions 
in the Euro Area which had invested in debt securities and 
other products that turned toxic with the sub-prime crisis 
(for example US mortgage-backed debt securities), had 
their balance sheets adversely affected on top. Finally, the 
Great Recession and the long stagnation or even shrinking 
of economies added to non-performing loans. As a result of 
these developments, financial markets in most EMU coun-
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tries did not start working again. Crisis countries suffered 
from a so-called balance sheet recession (Koo 2011). Figure 
5 shows that credit expansion in the EMU to the private 
sector after a period of high growth stagnated from 2008 
onwards. Especially in Spain and Portugal, credit to the 
private sector as a per cent of GDP decreased substantially. 
Figure 6 shows that since 2008 gross capita formation in per 
cent of GDP in most EMU countries has been shrinking or 
stagnating while, at the same time, Germany’s investment 
performance has not been good. This to a large extent also 
explains why credit expansion as a share of GDP has been 
decreasing there. 
Figure 5: Credit to the private sector in per cent of 
GDP in selected EMU countries, 1999 -2015
Source: World Bank (2017)
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Figure 6: Gross capital formation in per cent of 
GDP in selected EMU countries, 1999 -2015
Source: World Bank (2017)
In Germany, in contrast to many other EMU coun-
tries, the financial system continued to function normally. 
Banks ran up losses abroad, but were quickly bailed out by 
the federal government. There was no debt problem inside 
Germany. Investment there after 2008 was not good, but it 
did not suffer from any disastrous development as in other 
countries. After 2011 German real estate prices started to 
increase substantially, adding to demand. Together with the 
high current account surpluses this explains the country’s 
relative good growth performance.
Low growth rates after the end of the internet boom in 
2001 led to increasing budget deficits in most EMU countries 
of between 3% and 4% of GDP. During the economic recovery 
deficits had dropped below 1% of GDP in 2007. There were 
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some outliers. Spain, for example, was a model pupil with high 
budget surpluses. Greece had high budget deficits despite high 
GDP growth, as did Portugal (Figure 7). Except for Greece 
and a certain extent Portugal there was no fiscal misbehaviour 
in EMU’s first phase. In 2009 and 2010 budget deficits in the 
EMU sharply increased to a level over 6% of GDP, in Greece 
to over 15% and Portugal and Spain to over 10%. 
Figure 7: Budget deficits in per cent of GDP 
in selected EMU countries, 1999-2015
Source: Eurostat (2017)
In contrast to the rest of the world, the “Keynesian phase” 
in the Eurozone was relatively short. In 2010 policies 
changed completely and followed strategies in the tradition 
of the Washington Consensus, including fiscal austerity. 
Budget deficits in the EMU were slowly reduced but it has 
been a long and rocky road. Government debt to GDP, 
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meanwhile, increased in the EMU from around 65% in 2007 
to over 90% in 2016.
Figure 8: Consumer price index, 1999 – 2016, 1999=100
Source: OECD (2017)
Let us come to the last important indicator, the inflation 
rate. Unit labour costs are the most important factor deter-
mining the price level (Herr 2009). This is the explanation 
why Germany for most of the years achieved the lowest 
inflation rate in the EMU whereas Spain or Greece with 
relatively high increases of unit labour costs saw relatively 
high CPI inflation rates. Until 2008 the EMU inflation 
rate was around 2%, then in 2009 it dropped sharply, but 
recovered quickly again to 2%. After 2012 inflation rates 
became very low and stagnated below 1%. Some member 
countries – Spain and especially Greece – have seen falling 
price levels (see CPI development in Figure 8). The EMU 
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as a whole stood on the edge of deflation. In 2017 CPI 
inflation increased, but core inflation rate remains below 1%.
3. Policies adopted to solve the crisis in the EMU
Financial systems in some of the EMU countries were 
affected by high-risk and speculative activities in the 
global financial system and their consequences, including 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
Europe suffered from the negative financial effects and by 
a shrinking global economy. But there were homemade 
problems, too. Real estate bubbles came to their end and 
burdened financial systems. High budget deficits were 
caused by decreasing tax revenues, higher public spending 
related to the crisis, bailout costs of financial institutions 
and programs to stimulate demand. 
Expansionary fiscal policy in the EMU was challenged by 
the sovereign debt crisis. In early 2010, refinancing costs for 
public households increased, especially in Greece, Portugal 
and Ireland. To a lesser extent interest rates for government 
bonds also increased in Italy and Spain. In Greece it became 
clear that past budget deficits were higher than officially 
reported. Confidence in the ability of the Greek and other 
EMU governments to remain liquid and solvent eroded. No 
clear statement that EMU governments or the ECB would 
bailout governments in trouble emerged. The opposite was 
the case; there was officially a no-bailout-clause as part of 
EMU fiscal rules. Help for Greece was delayed and only in 
May 2010, shortly before the collapse of the Greek public 
budget, was the European Financial Stability Facility 
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(EFSF) created with a volume of €690 billion by the EMU 
countries as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism. Greece 
was bailed out with a €110bn package. Negotiations with 
crisis governments were carried out by the so-called Troika 
which represented the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the ECB and the European Commission. However, final 
decisions were taken by EU finance ministers or government 
leaders. In November 2010, Ireland was bailed out to the 
tune of €85bn, followed by Portugal with €78bn in May 
2011. Meanwhile, in early 2011, in addition to the EFSF, 
the European Stability Mechanism (EMS) was planned as a 
permanent bail-out fund – worth about €500bn – and estab-
lished in 2012 (later its firepower was increased to €800bn). 
In July 2011, a second bail-out package of €109 billion was 
required for Greece. Interest rates on Spanish and Italian 
government bonds increased sharply. Both countries passed 
far-reaching austerity measures. In February 2012, the 
second Greek bail-out package was increased to €130bn. In 
June 2012 Spain was helped with €100bn. In February 2013 
Cyprus received €10bn. It is clear even now that Greece 
in particular will require further help. The leading role in 
deciding under which conditions governments should be 
bailed out was taken over by Germany. All these measures 
were unable to prevent the sovereign debt crisis and convince 
financial markets that governments will not fail. 
In the following section we discuss how, beyond these 
afore-mentioned bailout measures, the crisis in the EMU 
was handled (see also Dodig and Herr 2015). Three 
policies are in the focal centre: the policy of the ECB as 
lender of last resort, the policy of internal devaluation and 
fiscal austerity.
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a) The ECB as lender of last resort
A financial system can hardly exist without a lender of last 
resort. This was already made clear by Walter Bagehot (1873). 
A lender of last resort is required in the normal daily activities 
on the financial system, but also during any financial crisis. 
Of course, a central bank can decide to let some unsound 
bank or even segments of the financial system go to the wall, 
but in the end it has to stabilise the relevant financial system 
to prevent fundamental distortions of the economy. Central 
banks also take over the function of lender of last resort for 
public budget entities, at least for the federal government 
which then helps local budget entities. Central banks must 
do this as otherwise vital government functions erode. Think 
of governments not paying policeman, closing hospitals or 
stopping pension payments. A central bank can help govern-
ments if it directly finances the budget, or, if there are legal 
restrictions, buys government bonds in the secondary market 
and refinances banks which provide funding for governments. 
Looking at the ECB handling of the EMU crisis, judge-
ments are mixed (see Bibow 2016). The ECB, following 
the tradition of the Bundesbank, oriented monetary policy 
towards achieving its inflation target. Compared with the 
US Federal Reserve (Fed), interest rates in 2008 were cut 
relatively late. However, via several reductions in May 2009, 
the main refinancing rate reached 1%. A mistake was the 
increase in the main refinancing rate in 2011 in several steps. 
However, in July 2012, rates were cut in stages again and 
gradually reached in 2014 0.05% and in March 2016 0%. 
ECB interest rate policy can be criticised in detail but has 
been overall functional.
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The ECB also took over a comprehensive function 
as lender of last resort for the financial system. From 
October 2008 banks in the EMU could refinance them-
selves at the main refinancing rate without any limit. The 
quality of needed collateral for refinancing was reduced in 
such a way that banks had sufficient room to get central 
bank money. Special liquidity programs, for example the 
purchase of (private) covered bonds or long-term credit to 
banks, were added.
When in 2008 cross-border credit markets in the EMU 
froze, financial institutions in crisis countries were affected 
by huge outflows of funds. First, households and firms 
bought foreign goods and services, paid interest to foreigners 
etc. and thereby simply transferred deposits of banks in crisis 
countries to foreign banks. Second, wealthy people in crisis 
countries were afraid of systemic financial crises in their 
countries and transferred their financial assets to countries 
considered to be stable, for example Germany. Such capital 
flights could be carried out without any exchange rate risk 
and at low costs. The problem for banks in crisis countries 
was that they had to balance every evening their cash flows 
via the TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-
time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System). In the 
boom phase banks could get the funds they required via the 
money market. But after the outbreak of the crisis this was 
no longer possible. Banks in need of funds had to finance 
themselves via the national central bank. Money created 
by central banks in crisis countries was booked in the ECB 
as assets of the central banks in the countries receiving the 
cash flows. Net TARGET2 balances of Germany reached in 
2012 €600bn, and of a combined Finland, Luxemburg and 
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the Netherlands over €1 trillion. This huge sum is around 
the same as the total balance sheet of the ECB at end-2007. 
The other EMU countries had corresponding negative net 
balances. In the following years, these balances reduced 
slightly, but then increased in 2016 to the old levels (ECB 
2017). Via TARGET2, financial systems in surplus coun-
tries were flooded with central bank money which they did 
not use for credit expansion but which were kept as excess 
reserves with the ECB. 
In June 2014, the ECB started its unconventional 
monetary policy. The interest rate for bank deposits at the 
ECB (deposit facility) became negative and, in a series of 
steps, reached -0.4% in March 2016. A year earlier, quanti-
tative easing (QE), already used by other central banks since 
2009, was introduced. On average the ECB bought public 
and private sector securities amounting to €80bn monthly. 
From April 2017 the amount was reduced to €60bn a month. 
This unconventional monetary policy was mainly motivated 
by the poor economic development in the Euro Area and an 
inflation rate far below the 2% target. In fact, the Euro Area 
was in danger of slipping into a deflationary development 
comparable to that of Japan or even worse. QE could have 
been an opportunity to cleanse the balance sheets of banks 
of non-performing loans or to help governments in crisis 
countries. Such a policy, followed for example by the Fed, 
was not implemented, however. 
Let us come to the central bank as lender of last resort for 
public budgetary authorities. The Fed took over this function 
without hesitation and without causing any sensation or 
drama, as did the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and 
other central banks. In these countries, no sovereign debt 
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crisis developed despite the fact that some of the countries 
had much higher public debt than, for example, Greece. 
It was a major mistake that the ECB only took over this 
function incompletely and very belatedly (De Grauwe 2013). 
This does not mean that countries like Greece could not 
have been pressured into undertaking the necessary reforms. 
But to use the bankruptcy of states and send a Troika to 
enforce far-reaching neoliberal reforms against the will of 
governments and parliaments in crisis countries is not an 
acceptable crisis-solving mechanism. 
In periods of severe financial market turbulence and in 
the framework of the Security Markets Program (SMP), 
the ECB bought in May and July 2010 government bonds 
mainly from crisis countries with a value of around €60bn 
and between early August and January 2012 of around 
€140bn. This was not enough to calm financial markets. 
Finally, on July 26 that year, Mario Draghi, ECB President, 
announced in a speech in London: “Within our mandate, 
the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the 
Euro. And believe me, it will be enough.“ (Euronews 2012) 
The ECB promised to bail out governments if they got help 
from EFSF/ESM and followed the requirements of the 
Troika. In September 2012, the SMP program was substi-
tuted by the so called Outright Monetary Transactions 
(OMT) Program which permitted the buying of bonds from 
EMU crisis countries without limit if they are controlled by 
EFSF/ESM. The ECB’s commitment proved credible and 
has not been put to the test by financial markets so far. These 
actions ended the sovereign debt crisis. German repre-
sentatives at the ECB strictly opposed policies of allowing 
the bank to become at least a partial lender of last resort 
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to EMU. Bundesbank President Axel Weber resigned in 
February 2011 and ECB chief economist Jürgen Stark in 
September 2011. 
b) Internal devaluation to restore competitiveness
The Troika was right to care for the competitiveness of 
current account deficit countries in the EMU. But it did 
not in the slightest way push for a symmetric adjustment 
mechanism to restore competitiveness. It would have been 
more functional to push current account surplus countries 
like Germany towards substantially higher wage increases 
and fiscal expansion and deficit countries like Greece, Spain 
or Portugal towards lower wage increases. Instead, deficit 
countries were pushed into enforcing nominal wage cuts 
to increase their price competitiveness. Wage cuts were 
combined with the complete set of Washington Consensus 
policies, including flexible labour markets, privatisation and 
deregulation of public utilities. These policies were imposed 
by the Troika to change societies in a neoliberal fashion (see 
Scharpf in this volume) – even though in so many cases they 
had failed in developing countries. 
With falling wage costs, consumer price levels in countries 
such as Greece, Portugal or Spain decreased especially after 
2012 – producer price indices fell even down to minus 5%. 
To a lesser extent, similar developments happened in Italy 
and France. But in Germany too, inflation rates were very 
low with the result that the price competitiveness of crisis 
countries only increased slightly. And there were no focused 
policies to help these to increase productivity via industrial 
A history of the crises of the European Monetary Union
33
policy or other measures. It must therefore be expected that 
as soon as growth recovers in these countries high current 
account deficits will return. 
Policies to cut the level of wages are never fair. When 
Britain in 1925 went back to the Gold Standard with an 
overvalued exchange rate, seeing the way to make itself 
competitive as cutting wages, Keynes (1925: 3f.) wrote: 
“Those who are attacked first are faced with a depression of 
their standard of life, because the cost of living will not fall 
until all the others have been successfully attacked too (…). 
Nor can the classes which are first subjected to a reduction 
of money wages be guaranteed that this will be compen-
sated later by a corresponding fall in the cost of living (…). 
Therefore, they are bound to resist so long as they can; and 
it must be war, until those who are economically weakest 
are beaten to the ground.” Wage cuts failed and in 1931 the 
Gold Standard collapsed when Britain left it.
The Troika’s key strategy was to abolish sectoral 
bargaining, weaken trade unions in general, freeze or cut 
minimum wages, reduce social transfers and pensions, 
erode job protection, allow precarious employment and so 
on (Hermann 2014). Indeed, its policies of bringing down 
nominal wages in the crisis countries were a kind of “war” 
and led to extremely unfair and unjust results. 
The policy of internal devaluation implies – in addition 
to social injustice and the loss of social cohesion – deep 
economic contradictions. It is one of the great puzzles of 
European crisis management that it was not understood that 
deflationary policies permanently reproduce non-performing 
loans. Irving Fisher (1933) and many subsequent economists 
made clear that deflation increases the real debt burden and 
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destroys the financial system. It should not be a surprise that 
financial systems in crisis countries did not start working 
again and widespread over-indebtedness of economic units 
characterize their economies. And the ECB inside the 
Troika must have been acting as a kind of schizophrenic: 
Pushing for wage cuts and deflation in one half of the EMU 
and at the same time fighting deflation with QE programs 
seems an incoherent policy. 
c) Fiscal austerity
In 2010, fiscal policy in the EMU changed from an expan-
sionary orientation towards strict austerity. Germany above 
all pushed for hard fiscal discipline and cuts in government 
spending. The Troika imposed fiscal austerity on countries 
dependent on its aid. Other countries, which were afraid to 
be punished by financial markets, also followed restrictive 
policies. After 2010, in Greece, Spain and Portugal public 
spending in absolute terms decreased – in Greece, the 
most extreme case, around 25% by 2014. In Italy public 
expenditures almost stagnated, whereas in Germany and 
France they continued to grow moderately but showed no 
sign of substantial expanding. The outcome of this far too 
premature switch to restrictive fiscal policy was a second 
EMU recession in 2012 and 2013. 
When countries suffer from shrinking investment and 
consumption demand and, at the same time, have current 
account deficits and cannot easily increase exports, with 
shrinking government demand on top, a crisis must 
deepen. The hope of the Troika that neoliberal struc-
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tural reform might trigger growth in a stagnating or even 
shrinking economy is built on sand. Even necessary struc-
tural reforms will not lead to spontaneous growth but 
can have only potential medium- and long-term positive 
effects. If there are no demand drivers, stagnation can last 
theoretically forever even if required structural reforms are 
implemented. If investors’ expectations are depressed, animal 
spirts disturbed and finance not available, there will be no 
tendency for an economy to grow. The neoclassical hope of 
a bail-in of fiscal austerity in such a constellation seems to 
be not only illusionary but also cynical. And, of course, the 
question is which reforms are needed. The Troika interfered 
in an extremely harsh way in the democratic institutions of 
countries and enforced reforms which were not accepted by 
the majority of the population and are certainly not linked 
positively to growth.
In essence, the crisis countries, including those such as 
Italy not under Troika control, were forced to follow a policy 
comparable to that of US President Herbert Hoover from 
1929 to 1933. Stiglitz (2016: 18f.) writes about the EMU: 
“Herbert Hoover fails again (….); his policies of austerity 
converted the crash into the Great Depression. Since 
Hoover, such policies have been tried repeatedly, and have 
repeatedly failed. (…). Why the Troika would have thought 
that this time in Europe it would be different is mystifying.” 
One could add: Heinrich Brüning, head of the German 
government from 1930 until 1932 – just before Adolf Hitler 
came to power – failed with his austerity policies as well. 
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4. Conclusion
An astonishing point is that institutions like the European 
Commission or the ECB did not discuss the evolving 
fragilities shown up in the first phase of the EMU. One 
can follow Queen Elizabeth II when she asked at a briefing 
by academics at the London School of Economics on the 
turmoil on the international financial markets: “If these 
things were so large how come everyone missed it?” (Tele-
graph 2008). She could have also asked: Why did nobody 
see the EMU crisis coming? All this does not speak up for 
the quality of the macroeconomic management of the EMU. 
From 2005 at the latest the development of real estate prices 
in some of the countries, incoherent wage developments, 
high current account imbalances as well as the state of the 
global financial system, all should have been at the centre of 
economic policy debates in the EMU. By the way, Professor 
Luis Garicano, one of the LSE directors, answered the 
Queen: “At every stage, someone was relying on somebody 
else and everyone thought they were doing the right thing.” 
(Telegraph 2008).
EMU crisis management was from 2010 onwards largely 
misguided. The EMU was unable to organise a lender of 
last resort for governments and thus let the sovereign debt 
crisis unfold needlessly. Separating fiscal and monetary 
policy in the way the EMU authorities did was a disaster 
that could have been avoided. However, the ECB must be 
considered as the institution that kept the EMU together, 
stabilising it during periods of extreme stress.
Internal devaluation, fiscal austerity and neoliberal struc-
tural reforms were at the centre of the Troika’s strategy. 
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Internal devaluation via wage cuts implies deflation. Deflation 
in countries with high domestic debt, as in the EMU crisis 
countries, leads to high non-performing loans and to the 
permanent erosion of a healthy financial system. Restrictive 
fiscal policy in the context of shrinking demand intensifies a 
crisis. And in the case of structural reforms one has to decide 
which reforms are needed. And even necessary reforms do not 
lead to quick economic results. Policies post-2010 pushed the 
EMU very close to a Japanese-style deflationary stagnation 
scenario which might continue for decades (Dodig and Herr 
2015a). However, the political context and dynamics of a 
stagnating EMU is different to Japan’s situation and could 
even destroy the European project. 
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How crisis-proof has the euro 
area become? Assessing 
seven years of reforms
Sebastian Dullien
Introduction
In the seven years since the outbreak of the Greek debt 
crisis in 2010 (which then quickly turned into a crisis of 
the whole currency area), the Eurozone has seen a flurry 
of reforms. Not only were fiscal rules tightened repeatedly 
and new rules and potential sanctions for persistent macro-
economic imbalances introduced, but also the architecture 
of financial and banking oversight completely overhauled. In 
addition, lending facilities with volumes of several hundred 
billions were created which can now be tapped by countries 
with liquidity problems. Finally, the European Central Bank 
(ECB) introduced the “Outright Monetary Transaction” 
framework under which it can buy bonds of embattled coun-
tries to help these countries retain access to financial markets.
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And, yet, the reform process is not at an end. Several 
further reform proposals are still in the legislative process 
while others remain under discussion. The “Five Presidents’ 
Report” (drafted by the presidents of the European Council, 
the European Commission the Euro-Group, the European 
Central Bank and the European Parliament) foresees a 
permanent reform process, spanning until 2025, before the 
euro-area will be “completed” ( Juncker et al. 2015).
This contribution gives an overview of the reforms already 
implemented and currently still being negotiated and 
analyses how far these changes are sufficient to prevent a 
replay of the crisis which has haunted the euro area since 
2010. In order to conduct this analysis in a structured way, 
it will first take a look at the underlying causes of the euro 
crisis. In a second step, it will describe the reforms imple-
mented in detail and analyse how far these address the 
different factors which have contributed to the crisis.
Origins of the Crisis
Even though there has sometimes been the perception 
among the general public that the euro crisis has been a 
simple sovereign debt crisis, its origins have in fact been 
much more complex and multi-dimensional. While Greece, 
the first crisis country, indeed had problems with excessive 
government debt and large government deficits, the story for 
Ireland and Spain has been very different: In both, public 
finances were in excellent shape before the outbreak of the 
global financial and economic crisis of 2008/9. Both coun-
tries were running fiscal surpluses prior to 2008, and both 
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had public-debt-to-GDP ratios far below the Maastricht 
threshold of 60 percent. The end of a real estate boom and 
the meltdown of their national banking system plunged 
them into the crisis. Italy, in contrast, seems to have been 
mostly a victim of legacy debt and a stagnating economy.
Consequently, the emerging consensus among economists 
is that the euro crisis had a number of interacting origins. 
Broadly, one can identify seven crisis elements (Dullien 2014):
1. Shaky public finances: While the crisis has not every-
where been primarily a public debt crisis, at least in some 
cases, unsustainable public finances were an important 
element in the genesis of the crisis. In Greece, fiscal 
deficits had been persistently above 3 percent of GDP 
and debt-to-GDP ratios above a 100 percent of GDP. In 
Italy, debt-to-GDP ratios have also been high, primarily 
as a consequence of high deficits in the period before the 
introduction of the euro (even if deficits since then have 
been rather moderate).
2. Boom-and-bust cycles in the periphery: With falling 
borrowing costs after the introduction of the euro, many 
countries in the euro periphery experienced an economic 
boom. As inflation in Spain, Ireland or Portugal was 
higher than in the euro area core, but the nominal interest 
rate was roughly the same, real interest rates in these 
countries were much lower than in Germany or the Neth-
erlands. This boosted investments, especially in housing, 
which in turn boosted economic growth, employment, 
wages and inflation. The boom ended when real estate 
price increases came to an end and the periphery coun-
tries found themselves in a situation of a vastly diminished 
price competitiveness.
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3. Problems in the banking sector: As a result of these 
boom-and-bust cycles, but also because of the engagement 
of some of them in the securitized U.S. subprime mortgage 
sector, banks in several euro countries had to write down 
assets and saw their capital buffer dramatically shrink, 
prompting governments to bail out banks. The banking 
sector became a drag on economic growth (because banks 
became more careful in their lending decisions) and a 
burden for public finances.
4. Toxic link between banks and sovereign debt: In most euro 
area countries, banks hold a significant share of their assets 
in domestic bonds. This created a vicious circle of escalating 
bank balance sheet problems and sovereign debt problems. 
When investors became wary of problems in a country’s 
banking sector, they began anticipating that large bail-outs 
would become necessary. As a result, they started doubting 
the sustainability of public debt and sold government bonds, 
pushing down prices and forcing the banks to write down 
their holdings, exacerbating those balance sheet problems.
5. Self-fulfilling market panics: Doubts about governments’ 
ability to service their debt have exacerbated the sovereign 
debt problems. Falling confidence in some governments 
led to a sale of their bonds, pushing down prices and 
increasing yields. These rising yields made it difficult for 
the countries in question to access markets and service 
their debt. As discussed in the literature on self-fulfilling 
crises (Cole/Kehoe 1996), some euro area countries were 
thus pushed to the brink of insolvency simply by deterio-
rating investor confidence.
6. Structural divergence of price competitiveness: In 
the first decade after the euro was introduced, euro area 
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countries experienced a dramatic divergence in price 
competitiveness, inter alia caused by structural differences 
in wage setting institutions. In countries such as Germany, 
Austria or the Netherlands, unit labour costs grew much 
more slowly than in the euro area as a whole, while coun-
tries such as Ireland, Greece and Spain experienced much 
higher unit labour cost increases. When the euro crisis hit, 
the latter group of countries found themselves in a position 
of very weak price competitiveness. They experienced 
subsequently an extended period of poor economic growth.
7. Loss of the population’s trust in existing (European) insti-
tutions: The long period of high and rising unemployment, 
of low economic growth and falling or stagnating disposable 
household incomes has led to a crumbling of the popula-
tion’s trust in existing national and European institutions. 
As a result, support for populist parties has grown in many 
euro area countries. This support has started to interact 
with the economic dimension of the crisis: As populists 
question their country’s euro membership or at least their 
country’s adherence to European fiscal rules, investors start 
selling government bonds as soon as a country experiences 
a populist surge, pushing up yields and hence creating new 
problems of debt sustainability for the countries concerned.
Reforms implemented since 2010
As a reaction to the crisis, policy makers have introduced a 
number of changes to the euro-area’s governance framework. 
The main reform areas implemented since 2010 have been 
the following:
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1. Reform of fiscal rules: European policy makers 
significantly tightened fiscal rules in the two legis-
lative packages dubbed “six pack” and “two pack”. Most 
importantly, the new rules force euro member states to 
abide by a synchronised budget cycle under which draft 
budgets have to be submitted already in the prior autumn 
for vetting by the European Commission. In addition, 
medium term budget targets are defined as well as the 
speed with which euro area countries have to correct 
excessive budget deficits. Moreover, countries with debt-
to-GDP ratios above 60 percent are now obliged to bring 
down the debt level by one twentieth of the difference 
between their actual debt level and the 60-percent 
threshold each year. Excessive deficit procedures can 
now be initiated even when the deficit itself is below 
the 3-percent-threshold, but if the debt-to-GDP ratio 
is not reduced with sufficient speed. The voting rules in 
an excessive deficit procedure have also been fundamen-
tally changed: In order for such a procedure to progress, 
a qualified majority is no longer necessary. Instead, 
countries need a qualified majority to stop the process. 
With the fiscal compact, an additional multilateral 
treaty separate from the EU treaties, euro area members 
agreed to codify some of the EU’s basic rules on deficit 
and debt reduction in national law, preferably within 
their constitutions. If member states fail to fulfil these 
commitments, they can be sued by other member states 
and fines can be imposed.
2. Introduction of mechanisms to deal with excessive 
macroeconomic imbalances: A formal procedure has 
been implemented to deal with macroeconomic imbal-
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ances. In many aspects, this works similarly to the one 
that deals with excessive deficits. Potential imbalances 
are monitored, countries may be warned, and if a country 
persistently fails to correct macroeconomic imbal-
ances, fines can even be imposed. Yet, the mechanisms 
to evaluate macroeconomic imbalances are much more 
complicated than those for an excessive deficit: Instead of 
focusing on single indicators, macroeconomic imbalances 
are evaluated using a scoreboard with more than a dozen 
indicators (including current account imbalances, growth 
in private indebtedness and growth in unit labour costs) 
and a discretionary process to make the final judgement.
3. Creation of large lending facilities for govern-
ments in financial trouble: The no-bail-out clause found 
in the Maastricht Treaty, which prohibited other coun-
tries and the EU from assuming liabilities for individual 
member states, has been softened. With the escalating 
crisis, European policy makers first created the temporary 
European Financial Stability Mechanism (EFSM) and 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), which 
was then replaced by the permanent European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). With pay-ins and guarantees from 
the euro area member states, the ESM is able to lend up 
to €500 billion to euro member states which have lost 
or are about to lose access to financial markets. As ESM 
programs usually come with conditionality, its lending 
facilities now work similar to those of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).
4. Reform of the ECB’s monetary policy framework: 
Independently of the heads of state and government 
and the European Commission, but nevertheless very 
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important for the broader question of crisis-resilient 
euro area architecture, the European Central Bank has 
changed its operating framework and moved closer 
to becoming a true lender-of-last-resort for euro area 
governments. Under the term “outright monetary transac-
tions (OMT)”, it has announced that it would be willing 
to buy government bonds in the secondary market with 
maturities of up to three years from countries which are 
threatened with no access to financial markets, provided 
these countries have agreed on a conditional loan package 
with the ESM. As the ECB is not constrained in its money 
creation, this new tool effectively allows the central bank 
to indirectly lend as much liquidity as might be needed to 
a government under pressure, thus greatly increasing the 
financing volume effectively available for countries under 
ESM programmes.
5. Reform of the financial oversight structure: 
Within the framework of the newly created banking 
union, financial regulation and oversight has been moved 
to the ECB. It is now responsible directly for the oversight 
of larger banks in the euro area and indirectly (through 
national authorities) for the oversight of all banks in the 
currency union. In addition, capital requirements for 
banks operating in the EU have been greatly increased. 
Even prior to the inception of the banking union in 2012, 
the EU had started to centralize financial market over-
sight as a reaction to the 2008/9 crisis with the creation 
of oversight authorities for banks, markets and insurance.
6. Introduction of a common framework for bank 
resolution: Also within the banking union, a common 
framework for dealing with banks in trouble has been 
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created. Under these rules, the decision on how to resolve 
or rescue a bank is taken at a central level and supposedly 
under uniform rules. Banks are required not only to hold a 
certain amount of equity capital, but also of subordinated 
debt instruments which can be bailed in. Such a bail-in of 
private creditors is a requirement for the injection of public 
funds into an ailing bank. In order to shelter national 
governments from the fall-out of domestic banking crises, 
a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) has been created which is 
supposed to finance bail-outs, with the costs being mutu-
alized over the coming years.
Further reforms in the legislative process
In addition to the reforms already implemented, there are 
some proposals stuck in the legislative process. Among the 
issues still under active discussion are first and foremost a 
completion of the banking union and the creation of a 
capital market union. On the banking union side, one pillar, 
the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS), has not 
been implemented yet. Under such a scheme, all banks 
would pay a fee into such a common scheme. If a bank failed, 
retail depositors would be compensated up to the amount 
of €100,000 from this insurance scheme. EDIS is supposed 
to replace the existing national schemes which guarantee 
the same coverage, but are financed by contributions from 
national banks alone.
However, despite this proposal having a central role in the 
original banking union design, it is not clear when, if and 
how it will be implemented. The current dispute about the 
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implementation of the EDIS is that some countries, led by 
Germany, feel that the scheme could lead their banks having 
to pay for banking problems in other countries. A contentious 
issue is that national banking systems in some countries are 
still perceived as being far from sound and that the costs of 
future bank defaults as a consequence of these legacy issues, 
let’s say in Italy, might be mutualized. A second contentious 
issue is that rules for prioritizing claims in the case of defaults 
differ between European countries. While in Germany, in the 
case of insolvency, most claims are given the same priority, in 
some other countries wages are paid first from the defaulting 
bank’s assets. For a bank with similar risks and assets, this 
would lead to higher costs to the EDIS for a bank defaulting 
in Italy than for a bank defaulting in Germany.
Under the heading of capital market union, the European 
Commission is trying to harmonize a number of rules on non-
credit financial products across the EU to foster alternative 
financing of companies through venture capital, private equity 
and new sources such as crowd-funding as well cross-border 
investment. The hope is that capital markets can substitute 
for some of the bank financing lacking owing to banking 
problems, and that a reduction of home bias in portfolios will 
help bolster asymmetric shocks which hit just one country. 
The Commission’s action plan includes 33 items which are at 
different stages in the explorative or legislative process.
Evaluation of the reforms
After dissecting the causal factors having contributed to 
the genesis of the euro crisis and the reforms enacted in 
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reaction, we can now check how far the crisis causes have 
been addressed. These results are summarized in table 1. Crisis 
factors are listed vertically in rows, while reform areas are listed 
horizontally in columns. A plus sign in a cell signifies that 
reforms in a certain area have sufficiently addressed the cause 
in question. A plus sign in brackets means that the problem 
in question has been addressed, but that there are more or less 
serious questions about the sufficiency of these reforms.
First, the tightening of fiscal rules clearly addresses the 
problem of irresponsible fiscal policies. At least from a 
starting point of sound fiscal policies, the rules now in place 
should prevent over-indebtedness of governments due to 
irresponsive spending or insufficient taxation. If anything, 
the aim of a government budget structurally balanced over 
the cycle seems to be more strict than necessary. If countries 
were following this provision, it is difficult to come up with 
scenarios in which the level of government debt becomes 
problematic. At least in principle, the enforcement mecha-
nisms (including fines) should also be sufficient to make sure 
that national governments do not run reckless fiscal policies.
However, there remain some open issues: It is not clear 
whether the fiscal rules can truly guarantee that euro area 
countries with an already high level of public indebtedness 
will move back into the region of clear debt sustainability. 
While the rules prescribe that the debt-to-GDP ratio has 
to be reduced annually by 1/20 of the value exceeding 60 
percent, macroeconomic logic makes this difficult. Without 
sufficient economic growth, it is very difficult to bring down 
the debt level without actual budget surpluses. Yet, trying 
to achieve budget surpluses by austerity measures when the 
global economic environment is weak or when an economy 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
52
has lost price competitiveness, might simply lower economic 
growth (and even the level of GDP), hence jeopardizing 
attempts of bringing down the debt level and even increasing 
the debt-to-GDP-ratio.
Second, the problem of boom-and-bust cycles has been 
only partially addressed by the reforms. In principle, the 
procedures to prevent and correct excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances should prevent boom-and-bust cycles by forcing 
national governments to act upon a boom at an early stage, 
limiting further exuberances. Moreover, it could be hoped 
that a centralized financial sector oversight helps better 
to limit excessive lending during a boom. While national 
banking supervisors often seem to have been captured by 
their national banks’ interest, one could hope that super-
visors located within the ECB are more independent and 
can spot dangerous lending trends more soberly.
These reforms have several problems, though. The 
first is linked to the procedures to correct macroeco-
nomic imbalances. As a macroeconomic imbalance under 
EU-methodology is evaluated using a scoreboard plus discre-
tionary judgement, it is not clear whether dangerous trends 
are sanctioned. Usually, even in cases of strong booms, only 
some indicators suggest problems. As diagnosing a “macro-
economic imbalance” is at least partly a political process, it 
is evident that imbalances especially in large (and politically 
important) member states are not sufficiently tackled, but 
buried out of the way in the differentiated evaluation of a 
large number of indicators in the scoreboard. 
A second problem is that it is still not clear whether the 
budget rules are sufficient to prevent pro-cyclical fiscal policy, 
a factor which contributed to the boom-and-bust cycle in 
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some of the periphery countries. Especially when countries 
have a low debt-to-GDP ratio and low deficits, they will 
continue to be able to run a pro-cyclical expansionary fiscal 
policy in a boom.
The third problem is linked to banking supervision. While 
one could of course hope that centralized banking super-
vision would limit the worst excesses, it is questionable how 
reliably this can be done. History teaches that in federal 
systems even centralized supervisory authorities often miss 
dangerous credit booms, especially if a long period of time 
has elapsed since the last serious banking crisis. This is 
linked to the third factor causing the crisis: problems in the 
banking sector. While the new rules for banking have clearly 
made banks more secure and the new centralized oversight 
structure makes a lot of sense, the question remains how 
dynamically stable these regulations are. Historically, periods 
without banking crises have regularly led to calls for fresh 
deregulation which in turn has set the scene for new banking 
crises. Second, while rules in principle have been tightened, 
there are still legacy problems in the European banking 
system. In some countries (such as Italy), banks still have a 
large share of non-performing loans in their balance sheets 
and hence are operating with capital adequacy ratios close to 
the minimum. Even stricter supervision here does not help 
unless the banks are recapitalized. Yet, banking union is not 
providing a mechanism to neatly recapitalize ailing banks.
Fourth, the issue of a toxic link between problems in 
the banking sector and sovereign debt problems has been 
addressed: The centralized oversight should, it is hoped, 
prevent serious banking problems from the very beginning. 
In addition, the prohibition of bank bail-outs with public 
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money without prior bail-in of private sector funds and 
the common Single Resolution Fund should help to break 
the vicious circle of banking problems leading to more 
government debt and hence more problems because of 
falling bond prices. However, problems remain: The Single 
Resolution Fund is only filled over time and only mutualized 
with a delay. Were a new banking crisis to hit soon and large 
recapitalizations become necessary, the costs would still 
mainly weigh on an individual national government, and the 
financing requirements could still cause concerns about a 
government’s ability to serve its debt that might increase to a 
level where market access is threatened.
Yet, a related problem is a toxic link between a stag-
nating economy and the nation’s banking sector. Here, weak 
economic growth leads to an increase in non-performing 
loans which deter banks from lending which in turn further 
dampens economic growth. This link is alive and unad-
dressed, and the failure of having implemented a common 
deposit insurance might make this problem worse if a 
banking crisis hits: Under current rules, national deposit 
insurances are financed by contributions from the national 
financial sector. If bank failures now cause large compen-
sation payments by a national deposit insurer, this insurer 
will ask for more contributions from the other banks in its 
jurisdiction. This is likely to further reduce profitability and 
the capital buffer of these banks and will lead to continuing 
weakness in the economy in question. This problem would 
be mitigated with the introduction of the EDIS.
Fifth, the problem of self-fulfilling market panics has 
been addressed both with the creation of the ESM and the 
announcement of OMT by the ECB. Jointly, these two 
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instruments can be expected to tackle the problem adequately. 
In the models of self-fulfilling fiscal crises, it is the expectation 
of high financing costs which drives up expectations of a 
sovereign default, itself then leading to higher financing costs. 
If a third party in these models can provide ample loans at low 
interest rates, there is no reason to expect a default and hence 
no reason for increasing financing costs. As the ESM, together 
with the ECB and its OMT, can effectively provide unlimited 
liquidity to governments in financial dire straits, these two 
instruments should be able to prevent self-fulfilling fiscal 
crises in the future. Yet, even though this combination should 
be enough in principle, is it still open to questions whether 
OMT will ever be triggered for political reasons as, especially 
in Germany, this instrument meets strong resistance.
Sixth, the problem of structural divergences of price 
competitiveness is only partly addressed. For example, 
under the rules for preventing and correcting macroeco-
nomic imbalances, excessive increases in unit labour costs 
are monitored. However, given the discretionary character 
of this exercise (see above) it is questionable if this mech-
anism is really sufficient to prevent dangerous developments. 
Moreover, the macroeconomic imbalance procedure is 
applied in an asymmetric way: For the change in unit labour 
costs, for example, the scoreboard just prescribes an upper 
limit, but no lower limit. If one shares the analysis that diver-
gences between euro area countries are the main problem 
rather than only excessive unit labour increases in some 
countries, this asymmetric application carries the danger 
that an important reason for divergences (the undershooting 
of unit labour costs) is not being addressed. Similarly, current 
account surpluses are only examined more closely when they 
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exceed 6 percent of GDP (versus current account deficits 
which are already more closely examined if they exceed 4 
percent of GDP), and so far no action has been taken even 
in the case of Germany which has been running current 
account surpluses of more than 8 percent for several years.
Seventh, none of the measures passed has addressed the 
problem of popular discontent with dismal economic growth 
and employment outcomes. One can even argue that some 
of the reforms taken have had an initially negative impact on 
economic growth. For example, the spending cuts embodied 
in the new budget rules have dampened economic growth in 
the short and medium term. Similarly, the increased capital 
requirements for banks might make banking safer in the 
medium and long term, but limit lending in the short term 
which again weighs on economic growth.
There seems to be some hope among Brussels policy makers 
that the newly proposed capital market union will help to 
overcome economic stagnation in the euro area. However, 
there are several problems with this hope. First, it is completely 
unclear whether investors will really be willing to invest in 
countries in which the banking system is defunct and banks 
do not extend adequate credit. Usually, problems in the 
banking system lead to stagnating economic growth, which in 
turn also makes equity investments less attractive. Moreover, 
in the past, international capital flows (also into equity) have 
been observably very pro-cyclical. Second, problems of asym-
metric information and monitoring cost make it questionable 
whether especially small and medium enterprises will ever be 
willing to have adequate access to non-credit financing instru-
ments. Even in countries with very developed capital markets 
such as the United States, SME financing remains a challenge.
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To summarize: While a number of issues have been 
addressed with the reforms of the euro area governance 
framework since 2010, one can see in the table that important 
dimensions are still  inadequately addressed. Above all, the 
problems of boom-and-bust cycles, of structural divergences 
and of the loss of the population’s confidence in national 
and European institutions because of stagnating economic 
growth and high unemployment have not been sufficiently 
deal with. Moreover, in other dimensions which in principle 
seem well addressed by reforms, such as the banking sector, 
legacy problems remain. Rules in place now should plausibly 
prevent the deterioration of underlying fundamentals from a 
sound level to a crisis level. 
Overall, the problem is that the rules seem insufficient 
by themselves to guarantee a return to sound fundamentals 
and sustained growth. For example, the debt level in some 
countries remains high and the reforms do not provide a 
macroeconomic framework to bring the debt-to-GDP-
ratio down. Growth remains weak in many parts of the euro 
area which strengthens anti-EU political forces, yet no set 
of instruments has been provided to jump start economic 
growth. In short: Had the rules been in place prior to the 
run-up to the last crisis, they might have been able to prevent 
the euro crisis starting in 2010 or at least might have limited 
its depth. However, they might be insufficient to correct all 
the problems amassed by almost two decades of growing 
imbalances and crises.
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Conclusion
So, what does all this mean? Seven years of frantic reforms 
have clearly made the euro area more crisis-proof than it 
was in 2010. However, it is too early to declare victory over 
the euro crisis. If one wishes to prevent a (partial) replay 
of the crisis in the long-run, more work needs to be done, 
especially to limit divergences, both of the cyclical kind 
(in national boom-and-bust cycles) as well as of the struc-
tural kind. In addition, especially in the short run, it seems 
paramount that the issue of slow economic growth and 
high unemployment is addressed to prevent a new round 
of crisis in which political uncertainty triggers disruptive 
capital flows and swings in financing conditions. While it 
is possible that a positive global economic environment and 
a recovery of the banking sector in countries such as Italy 
will help the euro area to return to robust economic growth, 
and that a prolonged growth spell will solve some of the 
remaining legacy problems as well as the legitimacy issue 
caused by high unemployment without further changes to 
the euro area framework, it seems foolish to rely on such an 
outcome. After all, if the euro crisis erupts again, a break-up 
of the currency area might quickly be on the cards again, and 
fighting that crisis might become very expensive indeed.
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An alternative macroeconomic 
policy approach for 
the Eurozone*
Eckhard Hein
1. Introduction
The current macroeconomic policy approach in the Eurozone 
and the institutional setting on which it is based have obvi-
ously failed to prevent the global financial and economic 
crisis of 2007-09 from becoming a euro crisis, on the one 
hand, and to generate a rapid recovery from these crises in 
the Eurozone, on the other hand. After the Great Recession 
of 2008/9, the Eurozone was hit by another downturn in 
2012/13, and by 2016 it had only slightly exceeded the level 
of economic activity before the crisis in 2007, but not at all 
returned to the pre-crisis growth rate or even growth path 
* This contribution is based on previous collaborative work, in particular 
Hein/Detzer (2015) and Hein/Truger/van Treeck (2012). I would like 
to thank Christian Jimenez, Franz Prante and Jan Priewe for helpful 
comments. Remaining errors are exclusively mine.
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
62
(European Commission 2016). In several countries, like 
Spain, Finland, Portugal, Italy and most notably Greece, 
real GDP is still (considerably) below the pre-crisis level 
of 2007. Furthermore, several Eurozone member states 
and the Eurozone as a whole have turned towards the 
German export-led mercantilist model, running increasing 
net exports and current account surpluses as a major driver 
of demand and growth. This risky strategy is contributing 
to global imbalances and raises severe doubts regarding its 
sustainability, both economically and politically.
Given this record, the euro crisis cannot be considered 
to be resolved and a collapse of the single currency is still a 
major economic and political threat to European integration. 
Therefore, an alternative economic policy approach to the one 
which has prevailed since the preparation for and then the 
introduction of the euro, based on New Consensus Macro-
economics (NCM), needs to be discussed and considered.
In this contribution I will outline such an alternative 
macroeconomic policy approach, and I will try to link this 
approach to the existing macroeconomic policy institu-
tions of the Eurozone, i.e. centralized monetary policies but 
decentralized fiscal and wage policies at the member state 
level. The reason for this modesty is that I do not expect the 
most appropriate institutional preconditions for macroeco-
nomic policy-making in a currency union – some sort of 
United States of Europe with relevant fiscal federalism – to 
come true in the near future for political reasons. However, 
as will be seen below, the required shift in macroeconomic 
policies starting with given institutions is highly demanding, 
and it requires a serious rethink of the role of aggregate 
demand management and economic policy coordination in 
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a heterogeneous currency union like the Eurozone. In order 
to clarify this, I will start in Section 2 with a discussion of 
the failure of mainstream New Consensus Macroeconomics 
applied to the Eurozone that led to the current malaise. 
Section 3 will then provide a detailed outline of an alter-
native macroeconomic approach for the Eurozone based 
on post-Keynesian macroeconomics. Section 4 will briefly 
summarise and conclude.
2. The failure of New Consensus 
Macroeconomics applied to the Eurozone
The institutional framework for macroeconomic policies 
in the Eurozone, the assignment of macroeconomic policy 
actors and their main strategies have broadly followed the 
implications and recommendations of mainstream NCM, 
which had emerged as a synthesis of New Classical and New 
Keynesian economics at the end of the 1990s (Clarida/Gali/
Gertler 1999, Goodfriend/King 1997).
As summarised in Table 1, according to this approach, 
long-run equilibrium employment and economic activity 
are given by the NAIRU (Non-Accelerating Inflation 
Rate of Unemployment), which itself is determined by 
labour market institutions and the social benefit system 
affecting the flexibility of nominal and real wages. Since 
the NAIRU can be understood as an indicator of workers’ 
bargaining power and distributional aspirations, lowering 
the NAIRU requires liberalization and deregulation of the 
labour market and ‘employment-friendly’ adjustments of the 
social benefit system activating the idle labour force in order 
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to put competitive pressure on employees and trade unions. 
This has been the main focus of the European coordination 
of member state labour market policies, as contained in 
the Employment Guidelines, the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines, the Lisbon Agenda, the Europe 2020 Agenda, 
the Country Specific Recommendations of the European 
Semester, and in the Memoranda of Understanding with the 
crisis countries.
With the long-run equilibrium unemployment being 
given by the NAIRU, according to the NCM, inflation 
targeting monetary policies have to adjust actual unem-
ployment to its equilibrium level by means of raising interest 
rates when unemployment falls short of the NAIRU and 
inflation is accelerating and lowering interest rates when 
unemployment exceeds the NAIRU and inflation is decel-
erating. Therefore, in the long run, monetary policies will 
only affect inflation but have no impact on unemployment 
and economic activity. From this theoretical perspective it 
follows that the primary long-run objective of the central 
bank can only be stable inflation, as in the case of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). 
Since long-run employment and economic activity are 
given by the structural features of the labour market and 
the social benefit system, and any adjustment towards this 
long-run equilibrium is delegated to the central bank, 
there is no macroeconomic role left for fiscal policies in the 
NCM. Therefore, it has to be ensured that fiscal policies, 
i.e. government fiscal deficits or surpluses, do not interfere 
with inflation targeting monetary policies. The NCM hence 
requires balanced government budgets, at least over the cycle. 
This is what has been the focus of European coordination of 
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Table 1: Macroeconomic policy recommendations: 
New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM) and 
post-Keynesian models (PKM) compared 
NCM PKM
Monetary policy Inflation targeting by 
means of interest rate 
policies, which affect 
unemployment in the short 
run, but only inflation in 
the long run
Target low interest rates 
affecting distribution, and 
stabilise monetary, financial 
and economic sectors 
applying other instruments 
(LLR, credit controls, 
ABRR, etc.)
Fiscal policy Supports monetary policy 
in achieving price stability, 
balances the budget over 
the cycle
Real stabilisation in the 
short and long run, no 
autonomous deficit target, 
distribution of disposable 
income
Labour market and wage/
incomes policy
Determines the NAIRU in 
the long run and the speed 
of adjustment in the short 
run, focus should be on 
flexible nominal and real 
wages
Affects price level/inflation 
and distribution, focus 
should be on rigid nominal 
wages, steady nominal unit 
labour cost growth and 
compressed wage structure
International economic 
policies
Free trade, free capital 
flows, flexible exchange 
rates
Regulated capital flows, 
managed exchange rates, 
infant industry protection, 
regional and industrial 
policies
Co-ordination Clear assignment in the 
long run, co-ordination at 
best only in the short run
No clear assignment, 
economic policy co-ordi-
nation required in the 
short and the long run, 
both nationally and inter-
nationally
Notes: LLR: Lender of last resort, ABRR: Asset based reserve requirements
Source: Hein (2016, p. 23)
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member state fiscal policies in the Stability and Growth Pact, 
and it has been further tightened in the course of the euro 
crisis with the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, the Fiscal Compact, 
and the Memoranda of Understanding imposed on the crisis 
countries. The role left for national governments is then the 
implementation of those structural reforms in the labour 
market and the social benefit system which are thought to 
reduce the NAIRU.
From the NCM a clear-cut assignment and allocation of 
macroeconomic policy actors, their instruments and their 
targets can be derived, and there is no need for ex-ante 
‘horizontal coordination’ among monetary, fiscal and wage/
incomes policies. The only coordination which is required in 
this approach is ‘vertical coordination’ to ensure that fiscal, 
labour market and wage policies in the member states follow 
the NCM implications, as outlined above.
These NCM policies applied in the Eurozone have 
suffered from three major limitations and problems. First, in 
‘normal’ times, i.e. in the period before the crisis, from 1999 
until 2007, there was no mechanism which prevented rising 
current account imbalances and divergence among member 
states. The one and only Eurozone-level macroeconomic 
policy instrument, the nominal interest rate set by the ECB 
for the Eurozone as a whole, exacerbated things, since it could 
only be guided by Eurozone average inflation. This meant 
below average real interest rates in booming member coun-
tries with above average inflation and rising current account 
deficits, like Spain, and above average real interest rates in 
stagnating member states with below average inflation 
and rising current account surpluses, like Germany. This in 
turn contributed to even further divergence. Furthermore, 
An alternative macroeconomic policy approach for the Eurozone
67
the introduction of structural reform policies in stagnating 
countries, in order to reduce the respective NAIRU in line 
with the NCM, further weakened domestic demand in these 
countries, and thus contributed to stagnation tendencies – 
and rising current account surpluses due to the dampening 
effect on imports, in particular in Germany.
Second, when the Great Recession hit the Eurozone as a 
whole in 2008/9, it became clear that nominal interest rate 
policies by the ECB were insufficient to stabilise aggregate 
demand and economic activity. There are several well-known 
reasons for that. There is the zero lower bound for the 
nominal short-term ECB lending rate, the main refinancing 
rate, which imposes a downward constraint on interest rate 
policies. Furthermore, lowering the short-term policy rate in 
a deep recession with rising uncertainty and rising default 
risks, and hence with increasing risk and liquidity premia for 
commercial banks and other financial intermediaries, will not 
be sufficient to bring down long-term interest rates, which 
are important for investment decisions. And finally, even if 
central banks manage to reduce long-term interest rates, i.e. 
by means of direct intervention in financial markets (‘quan-
titative easing’), this is not sufficient to stimulate investment 
under the conditions of depressed demand expectations, 
since it is like ‘pushing on a string’.
Third, and the main reason why the financial crisis and 
the Great Recession turned into the euro crisis in 2010, 
the role of the ECB as a ‘lender of last resort’, not only 
for the banking sector, but also for member state govern-
ments, was unclear at the beginning of the crisis. Therefore, 
when governments went into debt in order to stabilise the 
financial sector, and also the real economy when the limits of 
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ECB monetary policies became obvious, some interest rates 
on member state debt started to rise and put these govern-
ments under the pressure of financial markets, in particular 
in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and then also in Spain and 
Italy. As a consequence, the ECB gradually moved towards 
becoming a lender of last resort and guarantor of government 
debt of member states. The major step, of course, was taken 
when the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, in 2012 
announced that “(w)ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready 
to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. However, this 
was later on qualified such that the ECB’s willingness to 
intervene in secondary government bond markets, in the 
context of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), was 
made conditional on the respective countries applying to the 
EFSF/ESM and introducing macroeconomic adjustment 
programmes, i.e. austerity policies. Linking financial rescue 
measures with austerity policies, however, is detrimental to 
recovery in the crisis countries, because it makes a recession 
worse and leads to (the threat of ) deflationary stagnation, 
and it undermines the intended reduction of government 
debt-GDP ratios (De Grauwe 2012, Hein 2013/14).
3. A post-Keynesian economic policy 
proposal for the Eurozone
An alternative macroeconomic policy approach for the 
Eurozone will have to address and tackle the three areas 
of limitations and problems of the NCM applied in the 
Eurozone. Such an alternative can be based on the post-
Keynesian macroeconomic policy approach (Arestis 2013, 
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Hein/Stockhammer 2011), which is summarised in Table 1. 
Following the post-Keynesian view, economic activity and 
employment are determined by effective demand, both in 
the short and in the long run. Each area of macroeconomic 
policy making has a direct or indirect effect on effective 
demand and employment, and therefore ex ante ‘horizontal 
coordination’ among monetary, fiscal and wage policies is of 
utmost importance, as is the ‘vertical coordination’ of decen-
tralised member state policies in the areas of fiscal and wage 
policies in the case of the Eurozone. And these coordinated 
demand management policies will have to be supplemented 
by effective regional and industrial policies in order to facil-
itate the sustainable catch-up of the Eurozone periphery 
with respect to the core countries. In principle, the European 
Union and the Eurozone have developed some required insti-
tutions for this purpose, with the Macroeconomic Dialogue, 
the European Semester and the financing institutions 
for regional and industrial policies, such as the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Investment Fund 
(EIF). However, this institutional framework needs to be 
linked with a new approach towards macroeconomic and 
development policies, as will be explained below.
3.1 Monetary policy
According to the modern post-Keynesian approach, central 
bank interest rate policies should abstain from attempting 
to fine-tune unemployment in the short run and inflation in 
the long run, as suggested by the NCM. Interest rate vari-
ations have cost and distribution effects. Therefore, central 
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banks may be effective in stopping accelerating inflation 
in the short run by raising the short-term nominal rate of 
interest, which will trigger rising long-term rates, finally 
choking investment and stopping the economic boom. 
However, in the long run, surviving firms will have to face 
higher interest rates, which will feed distributional conflict 
and hence inflation again, because firms will have to cover 
these rising interest costs. Furthermore, in the case of a 
recession with falling inflation rates, and possibly deflation, 
central bank interest rate policies will be ineffective in stim-
ulating the economy in the short run as has been explained 
in the previous section.
Therefore, central banks, and hence the ECB, should 
focus on targeting low real interest rates in financial markets, 
in order to avoid unfavourable cost and distribution effects 
on firms and workers. A slightly positive long-term real rate 
of interest, below the long-run rate of productivity growth 
or real GDP growth, seems to be a reasonable target. Real 
financial wealth will be protected against inflation, but 
redistribution of income in favour of the productive sector 
will take place, which should be favourable for investment, 
employment and growth. Furthermore, central banks have 
to act as a ‘lender of last resort’ during liquidity crises and 
should be involved in the regulation and supervision of 
financial markets using other tools than the short-term 
interest rate. These can include the definition of credit 
standards for refinancing operations with commercial banks, 
the implementation of reserve requirements for different 
types of assets, and even credit controls in order to channel 
credit into desirable areas and to avoid credit-financed 
bubbles in certain markets.
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Most importantly, the ECB should not only act as a 
lender of last resort for the banking system, but also uncon-
ditionally guarantee the public debt of Eurozone member 
states. The ECB as a lender of last resort for member state 
governments would allow these governments to issue debt 
in their ‘own currency’ again, and it would thus reduce the 
pressure imposed by financial markets. The ECB could 
simply announce that it will intervene unconditionally in 
secondary government bond markets and provide unlimited 
liquidity, as soon as the government bond rate of a specific 
country exceeds the risk-free rate – which is considered to 
be the rate on German government bonds – by 200 basis 
points, as De Grauwe (2013) has proposed. I would propose 
a more country-specific solution: The ECB should announce 
it will intervene in secondary government bond markets as 
soon as the nominal rate of interest on government bonds 
exceeds the medium-run nominal GDP growth rate of the 
respective country. This would imply country-specific caps 
on nominal interest rates on government bonds and, to 
the extent that government bond yields are considered as a 
benchmark, also for long-term interest rates in the respective 
countries in general. This should provide the conditions for 
fiscal policies of the member states to stimulate aggregate 
demand for the Eurozone as a whole and to contribute to 
internally rebalancing the Eurozone.
3.2 Wage and incomes policy
In a post-Keynesian macroeconomic policy mix, wage and 
incomes policies should accept responsibility for nominal 
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stabilisation in particular, that is for stable inflation rates. 
Nominal wages should hence rise according to the sum of 
long-run average growth of labour productivity in the national 
economy plus the target rate of inflation for the Eurozone as 
a whole. Following such a wage norm in each of the member 
states would contribute to equal inflation rates across the 
Eurozone, and it would prevent mercantilist strategies of indi-
vidual countries based on nominal wage moderation.
In order to contribute to the rebalancing of current accounts 
within the Eurozone at high levels of economic activity by 
means of re-adjusting relative price competitiveness, wage 
policies for an intermediate period of time would have to 
deviate from the norm outlined above. Nominal wage growth 
in current account surplus countries would have to exceed 
the norm, whereas nominal wage growth in deficit countries 
would have to fall short of this norm, however, without trig-
gering deflation in these countries. 
To achieve the nominal wage growth targets, a high degree 
of wage bargaining co-ordination at the macroeconomic 
level, and organised labour markets with strong trade unions 
and employer associations seem to be necessary condi-
tions. Government involvement in wage bargaining may be 
required, too. In particular, Eurozone-wide minimum wage 
legislation could be helpful for nominal stabilisation at the 
macroeconomic level, apart from its usefulness in terms of 
containing wage inequality. The European Trade Union 
Confederation has recommended setting the minimum 
wage at a level of at least 50 per cent of the average wage or 
60 per cent of the median wage in the respective member 
countries (Schulten 2012). This legal minimum wage would 
then have to rise according to the rules explained above. 
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Furthermore, legal extensions of wage bargaining agree-
ments throughout an entire industry or sector and other 
extension mechanisms, as well as public sector bargaining 
setting the pattern for private sectors, could be helpful for 
effective wage bargaining coordination. 
Although wage bargaining coordination across the 
Eurozone will have some merits in terms of reducing 
inequality within member countries, preventing further 
downward pressures on labour income shares exerted by 
competitive wage policies and beggar-thy-neighbour strat-
egies, and in terms of harmonising inflation rates in the 
Eurozone, there will be only limited effects on current 
account imbalances within the Eurozone. As has been 
briefly reviewed in Hein/Detzer (2015), several empirical 
studies based on different models and methods have found 
that the current account imbalances within the Eurozone 
have mainly been driven by non-price competitiveness and 
growth differences, and only to a lesser degree by diverging 
price competitiveness. This implies that the major burden 
for internally rebalancing the Eurozone should fall on fiscal 
policies in the short run, stimulating domestic demand in 
current account surplus countries in particular, and on struc-
tural and regional policies in deficit countries, improving 
their non-price competitiveness in the medium to long run.
3.3 Fiscal policy – and the role of European 
industrial and regional policies
In a post-Keynesian coordinated macroeconomic policy 
mix, fiscal policies should assume responsibility for real 
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stabilisation at non-inflationary full employment levels of 
economic activity and also for a more equal distribution of 
disposable income. Through these functions, fiscal policies 
can also contribute to rebalancing the Eurozone inter-
nally. Let me start with the aggregate role of stabilisation. 
From national accounting we know that ex post the excess 
of private saving (S) over private nominal investment (I) 
at a given level of economic activity and employment has 
to be absorbed by the excess of nominal exports (X) over 
nominal imports (M) (including the balance of primary 
income and the balance of income transfers, thus the current 
account balance) plus the excess of government spending 
(G) over tax revenues (T): S-I = X-M+G-T. Therefore, with 
balanced current accounts (X-M = 0), government deficits 
in the medium-run perspective have to permanently take up 
the excess of private saving over private investment (G-T 
= S-I) in order to maintain a desired level of economic 
activity and employment, following the functional finance 
view pioneered by Lerner (1943). Of course, if the private 
sector is in deficit and the current account is balanced, the 
government sector has to be in surplus.
From Domar (1944) we know that with a constant 
government deficit-GDP ratio, the government debt-GDP 
ratio will converge towards a constant value, which is given 
by the quotient of the government deficit-GDP ratio and 
nominal GDP growth, provided that the latter is positive. 
Furthermore, nominal interest rates falling short of nominal 
GDP growth and hence of tax revenue growth will prevent 
government debt services from redistributing income 
from the average tax payer to the rich government bond 
holders, which would be detrimental to aggregate demand 
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and growth. That is why targeting low interest rates on 
government bonds by the central bank is very important.
Permanent government deficits should be geared towards 
public investment in a wider sense (including growth-
enhancing public employment), providing the economy 
with public infrastructure and public education at all levels 
(pre-schools, schools, high schools, universities) in order 
to promote structural change towards an environmen-
tally sustainable long-run growth path. Apart from this 
permanent role of government debt, which also supplies a 
safe haven for private saving and thus stabilises financial 
markets, counter-cyclical fiscal policies – together with auto-
matic stabilisers – should stabilise the economy in the face of 
aggregate demand shocks.
Furthermore, governments should apply progressive 
income taxes and adopt relevant wealth, property and 
inheritance taxes, as well as social transfers, which aim at 
redistribution of income and wealth in favour of low income 
and low wealth households. On the one hand, this will 
reduce the excess of private saving over private investment 
at non-inflationary full employment levels and thus stabilise 
aggregate demand. Progressive income taxation and relevant 
taxes on wealth, property and inheritance thus also reduce 
the requirements for government deficits. On the other hand, 
redistributive taxes and social policies will improve automatic 
stabilisers and thus reduce fluctuations in economic activity 
and the required scale of short-run stabilising fiscal policies.
Applying this general approach to the Eurozone requires a 
revamped Stability and Growth Pact for the coordination of 
national fiscal policies, which should focus on medium-run 
expenditure paths for non-cyclical government spending, 
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and thus a variable which member state governments can 
indeed control (Hein/Truger/van Treeck 2012). The sum of 
these expenditure paths should be geared towards stabilising 
aggregate demand in the Eurozone at non-inflationary full 
employment levels. This full employment level of economic 
activity should be associated with a balanced current account 
with the rest of the world, abandoning the current tendency 
towards an export-led mercantilist regime in the Eurozone. 
For each Eurozone member state this would mean that, 
on average over the cycle and with the medium-run net 
tax rate in each member country given, the path for non-
cyclical government expenditure should be targeted at 
generating a medium-run or ‘structural’ government deficit/
surplus, balancing the medium-run or ‘structural’ private 
sector surplus/deficit at high levels of non-inflationary 
employment and a roughly balanced current account of 
the member states. Automatic stabilisers plus discretionary 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies could then be applied to fight 
short-run demand shocks.
Instead of the current ‘one-size-fits-all’ coordination 
with respect to target or maximum government deficit- 
and debt-GDP ratios, this new type of coordination of 
fiscal policies contains country-specific medium-run target 
government deficit-GDP ratios, given by the medium-
run national private sector financial balances. It would also 
lead to country-specific government debt-GDP ratios, 
depending on the respective government deficit-GDP 
ratios and the nominal GDP growth trends. The expend-
iture paths for non-cyclical public sector spending of each 
member country should be coordinated and monitored by 
the European Commission in the context of the European 
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Semester, and unwillingness to correct deviations should be 
sanctioned. Ultimately, if member states persistently exceed 
their country-specific target deficit-GDP ratios, triggering 
rising national inflation and current account deficits, and if 
they are unwilling to correct this in the face of fines imposed 
by the European Commission and the Council of Economic 
and Finance ministers (Ecofin), the ECB could tempo-
rarily suspend its readiness to intervene in the secondary 
government bond markets of the relevant countries. The 
threat of rising interest rates on government bonds of the 
respective countries should induce them to come back to the 
expenditure path consistent with coordinated fiscal policies 
in the Eurozone. If mature member states persistently fall 
short of their country-specific government deficit-GDP 
ratios, triggering current account surpluses, the relevant 
fines imposed by the European Commission and the Ecofin 
should be used for European investment projects, with a 
focus on the catch-up periphery countries.
Following these recommendations for coordinated fiscal 
policies should boost aggregate demand for the Eurozone 
as a whole, and it should also contribute to internally rebal-
ancing the Eurozone and prevent increasing current account 
imbalances in the future. Current account surplus countries 
would have to apply more expansionary fiscal policies than 
before and since the crisis, in order to increase domestic 
demand growth. Together with the temporary acceptance 
of higher than Eurozone average inflation rates, this should 
reduce their current account surpluses and reduce the current 
account deficits of the counterpart deficit countries through 
the stimulation of their exports. Current account deficit 
countries would have to reduce inflation in the short run, 
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without driving the economy into deflation and recession, 
of course. And most importantly, in the medium run, these 
countries should aim at improving their non-price compet-
itiveness, decreasing the income elasticity of their imports 
and increasing the income elasticity of their exports, by 
means of industrial, structural and regional policies.
The latter should be integrated within a European indus-
trial and regional policy strategy aiming at the sustainable 
catch-up of the periphery with respect to the core. For 
such an adjustment process, perfectly balanced current 
accounts between member states cannot be expected and, 
therefore, the rules for fiscal policy co-ordination outlined 
above would have to be modified. Catch-up countries 
will and should have a persistent tendency to grow faster 
than the more mature countries, which, cet. par., will make 
their imports grow faster than their exports. Therefore, 
with the Eurozone as a whole running a balanced current 
account with the rest of the world, internally there would 
be a tendency for catch-up member countries to run current 
account deficits, and for more mature countries to run 
current account surpluses. These current account deficits and 
surpluses should be tolerated and taken into account in the 
coordination of fiscal policies. Target medium-run public 
sector financial balances in the catch-up countries can hence 
be somewhat lower than implied above, and target medium-
run public sector financial balances of mature countries 
can be somewhat higher. The pre-condition for this is, of 
course, that higher growth in the catch-up countries can be 
sustained – and is not driven by financial or housing market 
bubbles as in the past. Therefore, the direction and the use 
of the capital inflows into catch-up current account deficit 
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countries should be part of an integrated European indus-
trial and regional development strategy for the periphery. 
This should include the efficient regulation of and inter-
vention in capital flows to avoid bubble growth, on the one 
hand, and ‘high road’ development strategies, on the other 
hand, making use of public investment, both national and 
European, in infrastructure and education, as well as public 
development banks and funds (i.e. EIB, EIF, etc.) to support 
private investment in the respective countries.
4. Conclusions
Starting from the observation that the mainstream macro-
economic policy approach based on the NCM has badly 
failed in the Eurozone, both in terms of preventing the 
global financial and economic crisis from becoming a euro 
crisis and in generating a rapid recovery from the crisis, I 
have outlined the elements of an alternative macroeco-
nomic policy approach for the specific institutional setup 
of the Eurozone based on post-Keynesian macroeconomics. 
This policy approach should address the main problems of 
the NCM approach before and during crises. It is able to 
deal with tendencies of divergence and imbalances within 
the Eurozone, it provides the tools to deal with short- 
and long-run aggregate demand problems, and it contains 
a solution for the lender of last resort and guarantor of 
government debt problem which has triggered the euro 
crisis. For this approach to become relevant, what policy 
makers in the Eurozone would have to accept and take 
on board is the need for aggregate demand management, 
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both at the Eurozone and at member state levels, and for 
coordination of macroeconomic policies, between the ECB, 
the Ecofin and the European trade unions and employer 
associations, as well as the integration of macroeconomic 
policies with industrial and regional policies so as to facil-
itate the successful catching up by the European periphery. 
In moving towards such an approach and contributing to 
the survival of the Eurozone in the short run, it is most 
important to break the link between the ECB’s stabilisation 
of member countries’ government bond yields, on the one 
hand, and the required austerity policies in the crisis coun-
tries, on the other hand. This should allow these countries, 
and the Eurozone as a whole, to apply more expansionary 
fiscal policies in order to accelerate the recovery process, as 
well as providing the economic and political conditions for 
further reforms.
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Fixing the Euro’s Original 
Sins: The Monetary – 
Fiscal Architecture and 
Monetary Policy Conduct
Thomas Palley
1. The euro’s twin original sins
The euro is afflicted by twin original sins: rupture of 
the money – fiscal policy link and adoption of neolib-
erally designed monetary policies. Those twin sins have 
contributed to generating dismal economic outcomes, which 
have fostered ugly political conditions that echo the 1930s 
and risk causing the euro to disintegrate. 
This paper shows the euro’s twin original sins can be 
fixed in a politically viable manner. As regards economics, 
the euro is a monetary phenomenon, which means that 
getting the monetary architecture right is the sine qua non 
for success. Other economic policy adjustments can then 
further strengthen euro zone (EZ) economic performance, 
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but without the right monetary architecture economic 
success will inevitably prove elusive. 
As regards politics, the fundamental problem is the EZ 
consists of national political sovereigns that have been 
required to surrender monetary sovereignty. However, those 
national political sovereigns need a degree of monetary 
sovereignty in order to defend their public finances and 
pursue expansionary fiscal policy in times of economic 
distress. The EZ’s architecture makes little provision for 
this, because of a combination of fears of moral hazard from 
country bail-outs and intellectual blindness. Fixing the EZ’s 
monetary architecture and restoring a degree of monetary 
sovereignty is essential for creating the policy space needed 
by national governments to make the euro politically viable. 
2. Diagnosing the EZ’s problems
The euro was introduced in January 1999. As shown in 
Table 1, the EZ’s macroeconomic performance was barely 
satisfactory prior to the financial crisis of 2008, but it has 
been dismal since. Since peaking in the 1960s, EZ average 
GDP growth each decade fell steadily through the 1990s. 
The introduction of the euro saw a brief uptick, but growth 
has collapsed since the 2008 financial crisis. That story is 
mirrored in the unemployment rate which steadily increased 
through to the 1990s, then fell slightly with the euro’s advent, 
but surged to sustained record highs after the financial crisis. 
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Table 1. EZ output growth and unemployment rate.
Region 1961- 
70
1971- 
80
1981- 
90
1991- 
98
1999-
2008
2009-
2015
Average GDP 
growth rate at 
2010 market 
prices (%)
EZ-12 5.3 3.4 2.4 1.9 2.1 0.1
EZ-19 2.1 0.1
Average 
unemployment 
rate (%)
EZ-12 2.3 4.0 8.5 10.0 8.5 10.8
EZ-19 8.7 10.8
Source: Statistical Annex of the European Economy, Spring 2016 
(Tables 3 and 10) plus author’s calculations.
Behind this data is a dismal economic policy history. That 
history begins with the adoption of tough anti-inflation policy 
in the late 1970s, which turned into neoliberalism in the early 
1980s. Consequently, Europe never fully recovered from the 
dislocations of the 1970s. The neoliberal turn was further 
locked in place in the 1990s with the first steps to monetary 
union via the Maastricht Treaty and its imposition of strict 
EZ economic convergence criteria, requiring a deflationary 
policy posture to meet them. Come the euro, there was a brief 
boom in the 2000s fueled by the intersection of low interest 
rates and speculation. However, when the bust arrived with the 
2008 crisis, the design flaws in the euro’s monetary architecture 
and policy conduct surfaced with a vengeance. Those flaws are 
systemic and remain largely unresolved. Consequently, they 
now pose an existential threat to the euro. 
The weakness of the EZ’s economic performance is signif-
icantly rooted in its monetary architecture and monetary 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
86
policy conduct. As regards architecture, the design of the 
euro’s monetary policy institutions has massively shrunk 
the space for national fiscal policy and also exposed 
government finances to market instability. Under the old 
system of national currencies, each country government had 
a central bank that acted as the “government banker”. Thus, 
national central banks helped governments finance their 
budget deficit, and also defended government bonds against 
speculative attack. This government banker function was 
completely and mistakenly ignored by the euro’s creators, 
thereby weakening governments’ ability to finance fiscal 
policy and giving financial markets massive power over them 
(Palley, 2011a, 2011b). 
Simultaneously, EZ monetary policy conduct has been 
sub-optimal. It was blind to asset price bubbles before the 
crisis; was slow to respond in the crisis; and the two percent 
inflation target risks being an unnecessary brake on perfor-
mance if the EZ escapes the current stagnation.
Figure 1 outlines the nature of the problem. It decomposes 
the challenge of EZ monetary reform into generic problems 
related to the neoliberal construction of monetary policy, and 
specific problems concerning the euro as a currency union. 
The currency union problems are then further decomposed 
into architecture problems and conduct of policy problems.
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Figure 1. A diagnosis of the failings afflicting 
the EZ’s monetary architecture and policy.
Euro zone architecture 
and policy failings
Generic problems from 
neoliberal monetary theory
Specific problems from 
EZ currency union
EZ architecture problems EZ policy conduct problems
3. New Classical economics and the origins of the euro 
zone’s monetary architecture and policy failings.
To understand the EZ’s failings and the case for reform, it 
is necessary to begin with new classical economics which 
inspired and underlies the EZ’s architecture and policy 
conduct. New classical macroeconomics (i.e. Chicago School 
macroeconomics) has under-pinned neoliberal economic 
policy, and it asserts:1
A) Money and inflation are neutral and have no effect on 
the real economy; 
B) Inflation is caused exclusively by money supply growth;
C) The real economy automatically and quickly returns to 
full employment in response to negative shocks via price and 
nominal wage adjustment;
D) Financial markets are efficient and stable and determine 
a natural interest rate that delivers full employment;
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E) Fiscal policy is ineffective.
Given the above theoretical framework, optimal policy 
involves having an independent central bank implement a 
credible transparent interest rate rule aimed at targeting stable 
low inflation. According to the policy rule, the equilibrium 
short-term interest rate should equal the inflation target 
plus the estimated natural real rate of interest. Furthermore, 
inflation targeting, implemented via the interest rate rule, 
is all that is needed to secure full employment because the 
economy goes there automatically and quickly.
This view of economic theory and optimal policy was 
hegemonic in the 1990s when the euro was designed and 
implemented, and it remains hegemonic today – albeit 
with less self-confidence. Its hegemonic standing meant 
that Social Democrats (like Jacques Delors and Wim 
Duisenberg) also accepted it. Consequently, it provided the 
theoretical template for designing the euro zone’s archi-
tecture and policy conduct.
3.a) Generic problems of new classical monetary policy
The new classical construction of monetary policy and central 
banking produces three grave generic problems that have 
afflicted monetary policy in both Europe and elsewhere. The 
first problem concerns mistakenly low inflation targeting. 
The problem stems from Milton Friedman’s (1968) natural 
rate of unemployment hypothesis which claims money and 
inflation have no permanent real effects. Consequently, there 
is no trade-off between inflation and unemployment so that 
the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. This contrasts with 
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the Keynesian view that a trade-off exists and the Phillips 
curve is negatively sloped because modest inflation helps 
grease the wheels of labor market adjustment (Tobin, 1972; 
Palley, 1994, 2012).  
Figure 2 shows the new classical and Keynesian Phillips 
curves. Neoliberal macroeconomics recommends an ultra-
low inflation target (π*). The argument is that inflation is 
undesirable and confers no unemployment gain because 
the economy always gravitates to the natural rate of unem-
ployment (u*). From a Keynesian perspective, that will cause 
significant unnecessary unemployment as inflation of π* 
implies a higher unemployment rate (u1 > u*) according to 
the Keynesian Phillips curve.
Figure 2. New classical (neoliberal) 
vs. Kensian Phillips curves.
Inflation 
rate, % New classical PC
Keynesian PC
Unemployment rate, %
π* 
u1Natural rate of 
unemployment, u*
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A second generic problem concerns central bank 
support for the so-called “labor market flexibility agenda” 
which aims to diminish workers’ rights, protections and 
bargaining power. Natural rate theory argues the natural 
rate of unemployment is determined by frictions and 
rigidities within the labor market. Those frictions and 
rigidities are argued to include trade unions, minimum 
wages, unemployment insurance, and worker rights and 
protections. Since central banks believe in natural rate 
theory, that explains why they have persistently and vigor-
ously lined up in support of the “labor market flexibility 
agenda” which has contributed to wage stagnation and 
increased income inequality.
The third generic problem of neoliberal economics is its 
belief that “flexible” labor markets and interest rate policy, 
targeted on low stable inflation, are all that is needed to 
secure full employment. This belief stems from the assump-
tions of new classical economics about the economy’s 
adjustment capacities and the character of financial markets. 
The important implication is it predisposes central banks 
against the need for financial market regulation or the need 
to intervene in asset markets to address asset price bubbles 
(Palley, 2003, 2006a). It also explains the retreat from and 
resistance to quantitative monetary policy (e.g. regulation 
of the asset side of banks’ balance sheets), which was an 
important component of policy in the “golden age” three 
decades after World War II.
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3.b) EZ monetary architecture problems: the 
rupture of the money – fiscal policy link
The major monetary architectural problem of the EZ 
concerns its divorce of the monetary authority from national 
fiscal authorities (Goodhart, 1998). From a new classical 
perspective, this divorce is inconsequential because fiscal 
policy is ineffective and increases in the money supply only 
cause inflation. Consequently, there is no need for money-
financed fiscal policy and a hard divorce of the monetary and 
fiscal authorities is desirable. 
According to new classical economics, if governments 
want to run budget deficits they should compete for finance 
with the private sector in financial markets. That is the effi-
cient way to allocate capital. Additionally, in the context of a 
currency union, divorce of the monetary and fiscal authority 
is needed to prevent fiscal moral hazard. If member coun-
tries know the central bank will step in and finance their 
deficits, that would provide an incentive for countries to run 
larger and larger deficits. 
The divorce of the monetary authority (i.e. the central 
bank) from the fiscal authority (i.e. the national state) is 
predicated on the assumptions that fiscal policy is ineffective, 
money financed deficits only cause inflation, and financial 
markets are stable and efficient. Once those assumptions are 
rejected, the new classical monetary architecture becomes 
dangerously dysfunctional.
The loss of national central banks and the divorce between 
monetary policy and fiscal policy leave national governments 
dependent on financial markets for their budget deficit 
financing needs. Consequently, governments may be unable 
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to finance needed expansionary fiscal policy (Goodhart, 
1998). Additionally, financial markets will have the power 
to veto fiscal policy via bond market sell-offs, and govern-
ments will also lack the means (i.e. a central bank under 
their control) to intervene and stabilize national financial 
markets in the event of financial panic (Palley, 1997). That 
is exactly what has happened in the EZ after the financial 
crisis of 2008. 
3.c) EZ monetary policy conduct problems: 
too low an inflation target
As regards the conduct of EZ monetary policy, the generic 
policy problem of excessively low inflation targeting is 
amplified in a currency union (Palley, 1997, 2006b). This 
is illustrated in Figure 3. For new classical economists, 
a non-optimal currency union may increase the natural 
rate of unemployment for the currency union as a whole 
(u*PRE < u*POST). However, from their perspective, there is 
no cost in sticking with the pre-existing inflation target 
since monetary policy cannot affect the new natural rate of 
unemployment. In sharp contrast, a Keynesian perspective 
counsels differently. The Phillips curve shifts right from 
KPCPRE to KPCPOST, so that preventing further increased 
unemployment requires the currency union to adopt a 
higher inflation target. If the target is unchanged and held 
at π* after monetary union, the unemployment rate will rise 
to u2 > u1. 
Additionally, the higher unemployment caused by the 
EZ’s low inflation targeting problem has been further 
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compounded by the fact that Germany’s Bundesbank 
monetary policy was adopted as the template for the euro. 
The Bundesbank has long been dominated by monetarist 
thinking that is staunchly opposed to inflation. Its mone-
tarist approach was imported into the ECB in the form of 
an inflation target mandating less than 2 percent inflation. 
In effect, the creation of the euro was used to lower the EZ’s 
overall inflation target (πPOST < πPRE) as shown in Figure 4. 
That caused an even larger increase in EZ unemployment to 
u3 > u2. 
Figure 3. The effect of currency union on the Phillips curve.
Inflation 
rate, %
Unemployment rate, %u*PRE u*POST
KPCPOST
KPCPRE
π* 
u1 u2
NCPCPRE NCPCPOST
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Figure 4. The effect of adopting the 
Bundesbank’s ultra-low inflation target
Inflation 
rate, %
Unemployment rate, %u*PRE u*POST
KPCPOSTKPCPRE
NCPCPRE NCPCPOST
πPRE 
πPOST 
u1 u2 u3
In sum, from a Keynesian perspective, not only did 
monetary policy fail to raise the inflation target to combat 
higher unemployment caused by monetary union creating 
a more diverse economy with more dispersed economic 
outcomes, it lowered the inflation target for many member 
countries which had higher targets prior to the euro. That 
made for a double failure in the conduct of monetary policy.
4. The crisis and the failure of neoliberal economics
The financial crisis of 2008, the Great Recession, and the 
ensuing stagnation should have entirely discredited neoliberal 
economics. These events have shown financial markets can 
be unstable and can greatly misprice assets; economies do 
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not automatically and quickly rebound to full employment; 
fiscal policy can be highly effective; and inflation is not 
exclusively and automatically generated by money supply 
growth. That speaks to remaking the EZ’s monetary archi-
tecture and redesigning the conduct of monetary policy as 
events have shown the current architecture and policy design 
are founded on flawed theory.
5. Remedying the EZ’s monetary 
architecture and monetary policy
5.a) Repairing the money – fiscal policy link via a financing union
The euro’s divorce of the monetary and fiscal authorities has 
created grave problems for governments’ ability to finance 
fiscal policy and defend against financial market speculators. 
The conventional wisdom is the EZ needs “fiscal union” to 
overcome these architectural failings, but EZ countries do 
not politically want that. Instead, I (Palley, 2011a, 2011b, 
2016) have argued for a “financing union” that involves 
collective issuance of debt, the proceeds of which are 
distributed among members on a per capita basis.
A financing union would require establishment of a 
European Finance Authority (EFA) governed by the finance 
ministers of euro zone countries. The Finance Authority 
would issue bonds jointly and severally backed by all member 
countries, which the ECB could buy. 
The Authority would engage in no spending, and would 
simply pay issue proceeds to member countries on a per 
capita basis, with countries liable for debt service on the 
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same per capita basis. Each year the EFA would determine 
the appropriate budget deficit for the euro zone, issue bonds, 
and distribute the proceeds to member countries to use as 
they deemed fit.
Those countries wanting fiscal stimulus could spend 
the proceeds: others could use them to buy EFA bonds, 
thereby covering their obligation and leaving their net debt 
position unchanged.
Countries could also issue their own national bonds to 
finance additional stimulus over and above that financed 
by EFA, and these national bonds would constitute a form 
of junior national debt. Lastly, an accompanying bank-
ruptcy mechanism would be established. Country national 
debt would be subject to a junior bankruptcy mechanism 
similar to the Chapter 9 provision in US law for states 
and municipalities. EFA debt would be subject to a senior 
sovereign bail-out mechanism that could permit condi-
tionality arrangements.
The financing union proposal has many significant advan-
tages, but three stand out. First, it permanently remedies the 
euro’s original sin, creating both a permanent policy mech-
anism for deficit financing and a bond that can be bought 
without qualification by the ECB. Second, it avoids the great 
political pitfall of fiscal unions regarding usurping control of 
the purse from the state or imposing transfers between coun-
tries. Countries choose how they spend EFA proceeds. Third, 
it reconnects money and the state without creating fiscal moral 
hazard as countries are not bailed out by the EFA or ECB.
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5.b) Conduct of monetary policy: a higher inflation target
With regard to conduct of monetary policy, the first change 
should be a higher inflation target in the region of 3 – 5 
percent. Some mainstream economists (Blanchard et al., 
2010) are also moving in this direction. Their argument is 
that a higher equilibrium inflation rate is needed to raise 
nominal interest rates, thereby providing space for the central 
bank to lower interest rates if the economy gets in trouble.
Such support is welcome, even if the reasoning is stuck 
in failed monetary theory. However, it would be far better 
if the Keynesian Phillips curve rationale were adopted as 
that would also bury the natural rate of unemployment 
hypothesis. As long as central banks hold to that hypothesis, 
there will be a perennial risk that central banks are drawn 
back into actively supporting the mistaken and damaging 
labor market “flexibility” agenda.
5.c) Conduct of monetary policy: target the 
bond rate on newly issued EFM bonds.
A financing union would create a steady growing supply of 
EFA bonds, and the ECB could then target the long bond 
rate as well as set the short-term interest rate. Neoliberal 
monetary theory recommends targeting just the short-term 
interest rate. The assumption is the combination of efficient 
financial markets plus a credible transparent interest rate 
rule ensures current long term interest rates reflect expecta-
tions of future short-term interest rates. Consequently, there 
is no need to target the long rate.
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Such indirect management is unreliable and imprecise as 
it rests on markets having correct expectations and under-
standings of future policy. The behavior of financial markets 
should have punctured that belief long ago. In future, rather 
than relying on market expectations to determine long rates, 
the ECB should directly target long rates using EFA bonds 
as the benchmark (Palley, 2013).
5.d) Asset based reserve requirements (ABRR)
Interest rate targeting should be supplemented by a system of 
ABRR which would extend margin requirements to a wide 
array of assets held by financial institutions (Palley, 2000, 
2003, 2004, 2006b, 2010). ABRR require financial firms to 
hold reserves against different classes of assets, with the regu-
latory authority setting adjustable reserve requirements on the 
basis of its concerns with each asset class. One concern may 
be that an asset class is too risky; another may be that an asset 
class is expanding too fast and producing inflated asset prices. 
A system of ABRR that covers all financial firms has 
multiple policy benefits. Most importantly, it enables 
central banks to target sector imbalances without recourse 
to the blunderbuss of interest rate increases. For example, 
if a monetary authority was concerned about a house price 
bubble generating excessive risk exposure, it could impose 
reserve requirements on new mortgages. This would force 
mortgage lenders to hold some cash to support their new 
loans, raising the cost of such loans and cooling the market.
For the EZ, ABRR are additionally attractive because they 
can help address the policy instrument gap at the national 
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level created by the euro’s introduction (Palley, 2006b). That 
can be done by implementing ABRR on a geographic basis. 
For instance, requirements on new mortgage loans can vary 
by country, or even by region within countries.
5.e) Banking union
Just as the design of the EZ neglected fiscal policy and the 
need for a government banker, so too it neglected the problem 
of cross-country bank runs (as has happened with money 
fleeing from the EZ periphery crisis countries to Germany).
The ECB’s TARGET 2 balance system has plugged the 
hole by making liquidity available to banks losing deposits. 
However, it is an inefficient system that recycles liquidity 
ex-post rather than preventing its flight ex-ante. It also 
creates banking regulatory moral hazard across countries, 
since countries know their banks have access to emergency 
liquidity from the ECB. That speaks to the need for full 
banking union with deposit insurance and common regu-
latory standards and capital requirements for bank asset and 
liability structures.
6. Radical reform of central bank thinking: 
bring back pluralism and Keynesianism.
Lastly, there is a need for profound and radical reform of 
ECB thinking and practice. Over the last three decades, 
central banks have been arrogant, with closed minds, 
ignoring all economists outside their narrow sociological 
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circle, and dismissing all who disagreed with their belief that 
low inflation targeting was sufficient. Events have proved 
central bank economists wrong and shown the assumptions 
of neoliberal monetary theory to be disastrously flawed.
In contrast, the Keynesian critics got things substan-
tially right. Godley (1992) argued the euro had a blind spot 
regarding the need for a European federal institution to 
undertake counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Goodhart (1998) 
identified the dangers for financing fiscal policy of divorcing 
the monetary and fiscal authorities.2 Palley (1997) argued this 
divorce gives bond markets the power to discipline govern-
ments that pursue economic policies which markets dislike. 
Additionally, Palley (1997, 2003, 2006a, 2006b) argued for 
both a higher inflation target and the need for quantitative 
monetary policy and ABRR to supplement interest rate 
inflation targeting policy, thereby giving member countries 
additional policy instruments to replace those lost owing to 
currency union. 
The superior record of Keynesians, regarding under-
standing the monetary macroeconomics of currency unions 
and anticipating the problems of the euro, suggests it is time 
to heed them by reforming the EZ along the lines they have 
advocated. It is also time to break the new classical monopoly 
on monetary theory and policy and open central banking to 
Keynesian ideas – and Keynesian economists.
Notes
1. Though somewhat more caveated today, new classical macroeconomics 
remains mainstream economists’ dominant theoretical frame, which 
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explains their incapacity to understand the problems of the EZ and 
resistance to reform. New classical macroeconomics’ standing in relation 
to mainstream macroeconomics parallels the standing of neoclassical 
competitive general equilibrium theory to mainstream microeconomics.
2. Goodhart is perhaps the only establishment economist to have 
anticipated specific structural problems of the euro, as against generic 
concerns regarding the euro being a non-optimal currency area. That said 
Goodhart is a distinguished “grey beard” who was admitted to the circle 
of central bankers before the ideological boom came down in the 1980s 
and put an end to pluralism in economic thought.
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From the Maastricht 
Treaty to the euro crisis – 
exploring guidelines for 
reform of the euro system
Jan Priewe
Maastricht with a neoliberal bias
25 years after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 – which estab-
lished the architecture of the euro – we can recognize with 
the wisdom of hindsight that the Treaty was deeply flawed. It 
was not based on sound theoretical guidelines. It was not the 
common currency as such that was at fault but the design of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU), its institutions and 
policy rules. In retrospect, the main flaws were a neoliberal 
bias and institutional rigidity combined with minimalism in 
the institutional setting. The neoliberal bias was based, first, 
on the belief that inflation control in the EMU depends 
only on money supply that can be controlled by a truly inde-
pendent central bank focused on just one goal: price stability 
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in the euro zone average. Second, growth and employment 
depend in the long run on supply side factors, mainly tech-
nical progress, flexible goods and labour markets, free trade 
and strong competition on all markets (given the corporatist 
structure of product markets, more emphasis is placed on 
labour markets). Absent are problems of aggregate demand 
so that fiscal policy can be ignored; markets and competition 
in labour markets can replace nominal exchange rates. Third, 
there was financial neoliberalism via the propagation of a 
liberalised single capital market and subsequent deregulation 
of the financial sector without any banking union. ”One 
market, one currency” was the mantra as if the new currency 
were just an appendix to the single market.
In this vision, public finance is necessary for public goods 
but counter-cyclical fiscal policy, that is in essence Keynesian 
fiscal policy, is unnecessary and potentially detrimental for 
price stability. A little dose of short-term fiscal policy may be 
acceptable, contained by the (arbitrary) 3% deficit criterion 
and the supplementary (also arbitrary) 60% debt/GDP goal 
for member states, without embracing fiscal policy at the 
euro area level. Further core beliefs were: having no political 
union, a slim central EU budget, a ban on debt issuance, 
and a monetary union (MU) conceived as a euro-club with 
intergovernmental decision-making, requiring unanimity 
for key decisions. This implies that the key rules embracing 
the design of the EMU were carved in stone. In the year 
1992, the EU comprised just 12 members which were 
potential candidates for the EMU; it was not foreseen that 
by enlargement to 28 members, all of them possible candi-
dates for adopting the euro, the institutional rigidity would 
be amplified. 
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The only European sovereign needed in this design is 
the ECB, not backed by anything like a political sovereign, 
including a fiscal sovereign. This is more akin to the Gold 
Standard or a fixed exchange-rate system with suprana-
tional money, like using dollars in Panama as legal tender 
(although Panama has more fiscal space than an EMU 
member). No fiscal union means no “transfer union”, no 
European treasury, no bail-outs if neighbours fall into 
financial trouble, no fiscal backstop for the ECB. With 
regard to monetary policy, the institutional design embraces 
having no banking union, disregard of inflation variance 
across members and restrictions upon ECB outright open 
market operations, even on the secondary markets due 
to suspected “monetary financing” of governments (in 
contrast to all other leading central banks regarding the 
safeguarding of sovereign bonds against default risks). In 
a single market/single currency economy with many nation 
states, it is markets which should take care of national price 
stability and balance of payment problems – and the belief 
of EMU architects that markets can do this since they 
can punish undisciplined member states’ policy. Solidarity 
is – from this angle – disqualified as “moral hazard”. The 
loss of sovereign monetary policy in member states was 
seen as a blessing, since all too often inflation had been 
tolerated; and the loss of the exchange rate was regarded as 
enhancing competition without the cushion of devaluation. 
Long-standing economic crises, let alone huge financial 
crises, or persistent high (involuntary) unemployment were 
beyond the imagination of what can happen in a modern 
truly neoliberal market economy, endowed with the char-
acteristics sketched above.
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
108
This set of ideas, put in practice and engraved in the 
Treaties, cannot guide a thriving European economy. Such 
a monetary union is at risk of failure. Some might argue the 
view described is exaggerated since other initiators of Maas-
tricht, especially from France, but also the then German 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, had different visions. Yes, Maas-
tricht was a compromise, but German ordoliberals from the 
Deutsche Bundesbank and the Ministry of Finance most 
likely predominated (Theo Waigel, Hans Tietmeyer, Helmut 
Schlesinger, Otmar Issing, Horst Köhler et al.); the Conserv-
ative British government led by John Major, successor of 
Margaret Thatcher since 1990, had to give its consent (even-
tually with an opt-out clause over adopting the euro).
Unsatisfactory guidance from OCA theories 
and mainstream economics
How about the economics profession? One old guiding 
principle for a MU was and for some still is the theory of 
optimal currency areas (OCA). However, there are different 
generations with conflicting recommendations. Most critics 
of the euro project follow the first generation, mainly views 
from Robert Mundell (1961) and Ronald McKinnon (1963). 
Here preconditions are factor mobility and trade integration 
between members, in particular labour mobility, and little 
exposure to asymmetric shocks hitting only some members. 
From this angle, the euro area is clearly a non-optimal MU. 
The argument is reinforced by Peter Kenen (1969) who called 
for similarity among economies and hinted at the need for 
fiscal federalism and therefore indirectly a common state. 
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The second generation of OCA theories, starting with 
Mundell (1973) and extended by McKinnon (2002) (and 
others), argued that large MUs might be optimal if some 
monetary aspects are included. A MU with a hard currency, 
backed, say by the reputation of the DM, abandons currency 
mismatches, “original sin” (i.e. issuing debt in foreign 
currency) and country-specific risk premia; thus, they benefit 
from lower inflation and lower real interest rates which 
favour investment, growth and employment. Cross-country 
financial integration with portfolio diversification may 
reduce risks from asymmetric shocks.
Most critics of the euro have disregarded OCA II. Yet, 
both generations of OCA theories do not address the design 
features of a MU, the role of statehood and the concrete 
institutional setting, especially in respect of the policy 
mix of monetary and fiscal policies (except Kenen). OCA 
generation II is unclear about the potential replacements for 
sovereign monetary policy and for the nominal exchange 
rate of members. Issues of financial regulation such as 
banking union remained completely unheeded. Hence, all 
OCA concepts are not sufficient advice for policy makers.
However, what can be learned from the variety of OCA 
theories and debates about them is the following. Advan-
tages of a MU, compared to national currencies, are the ones 
advised by the second generation of OCA theories. They can 
be augmented if fiscal federalism exists, especially in the case 
of low labour mobility across borders, and in this respect 
represent better options to cope with asymmetric shocks. 
Fiscal policy facilities, centralised or decentralised, are indis-
pensable. Risks of a MU pertain to proper replacement 
mechanisms for national monetary and exchange rate policy, 
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including the Lender of Last Resort (LLR) functions of 
the central bank, current account imbalances and diver-
gence of development, especially in the case of dissimilar 
members and the absence or incompleteness of a common 
state. Some of the risks were emphasised by the first gener-
ation of OCA theories. The extent of risks and hence the 
net benefits depend very much on the design of the MU, and 
here in particular on the role of fiscal and financial policies 
and common regulations. It becomes evident that a large 
and heterogeneous MU without a strong federal state is an 
ambitious experiment with no successful predecessors.
If policy-makers turn, frustrated by diverse opinions on 
OCA concepts, to mainstream macroeconomics, repre-
sented by the “New Consensus” and backed by and large 
by neoclassical and New Keynesian economists, they learn 
that monetary policy is virtually almighty and can steer 
economies to macro-equilibrium with full employment and 
low inflation. Fiscal policy plays a minor or even negligible 
role, unless it turns into an inflationary stance so that fiscal 
expansion needs to be restricted. In severe recessions, an 
expansionary fiscal policy may have a role, but only as long 
as government finances are “sound”. Later, the credibility 
approach came in arguing that under heavy debt and deficits 
austerity improves credibility and triggers growth (“expan-
sionary fiscal contraction”). All this supported the view that 
fiscal policy is unnecessary in a MU. 
This set of ideas was heavily questioned by other streams 
of thinking in the economics profession, by Keynesians 
of different hues and by many empirical analysts. Key 
insights from their research shows, inter alia, the following: 
investment is much less interest rate elastic than was thought, 
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in particular in recessions, thus limiting the power of central 
banks; business cycles are strongly driven by credit cycles 
due to varying leverage, and modern capitalism is strongly 
finance-driven – requiring more financial regulation, not 
less; aggregate demand in a MU can be steered by fiscal 
policy, especially in recessions – and when targeted on public 
investment; the weight of the fiscal stance for macro perfor-
mance becomes stronger in economies with a large public 
sector (often above 30% of GDP); the credibility approach 
to fiscal policy is deeply flawed, theoretically and empiri-
cally as well, in particular in economies without a national 
currency and no options for exchange rate adjustments.
A better guide than OCA theories or mainstream 
economics may be the wisdom of hindsight when we look at 
the emergence and evolution of the euro crisis. This narrative 
is very telling and will lead us to proposals for reform. The 
lessons learnt, in my view, do not concern the euro as a 
common currency per se but the specific design (or archi-
tecture) established in the euro zone.
Five lessons from the euro crisis 
The euro crisis is considered as meaning the specific 
problems emanating in the “crisis countries” (Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Cyprus, Spain – GIIPCS) after the Great 
Recession 2008-9, starting in 2010 and lingering until now 
(2017). There is no counterfactual information as to how 
the global crisis would have hit member countries if they 
had retained their national currency. The specific nature of 
the euro crisis came with the stark emergence of sovereign 
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bond spreads from 2010 with contagion risks, leading to 
an outright sovereign debt crisis, intertwined with systemic 
banking crises. The main underlying causes were private 
sector credit booms, amplified in Greece by a fiscal spending 
boom. The credit boom was connected with high current 
account imbalances in the whole euro area, accumulated from 
a near-balance in 1999 to record intra-EMU imbalances in 
2008 and thereafter to record extra-EMU imbalances. 
The causes of the euro crisis can be classified within three 
categories: (a) those resulting directly from the common 
currency, i.e. the loss of domestic monetary policy and of 
control of nominal exchange rate changes, (b) design flaws in 
the Maastricht and subsequent Treaties, leading to design-
based policy flaws, and (c) other policy flaws which could 
have been avoided within the given legal framework. In what 
follows, I list in the first instance five conspicuous problems; 
these are then collated within one of the three categories.
Inflation divergence
The starting point for the run-up to the crisis was a positive 
asymmetric shock in the GIIPCS, benefiting them with 
lower real interest rates than before the adoption of the 
euro. However, this triggered above-target inflation, in 
parallel with below-target inflation in Germany and some 
other countries, and heavy short-term capital inflows from 
northern euro members to the GIIPCS. They were amplified 
by Germany’s poor domestic demand growth which induced 
net capital outflows toward asset price bubbles in GIIPCS 
and in the US as well.1
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This way, the low interest rates in the later crisis coun-
tries could not fully realise their productive potential.2 
The systemic problem, partly foreseen by the well-known 
Walters critique3, was twofold: First, these countries 
had higher inflation rates (than target inflation) of up to 
around two percentage points which led, cumulated year 
by year, to a bloated price level compared to the surplus 
countries. Nobody cared about it. ECB felt no need to be 
in charge since average euro zone inflation was satisfactory, 
nor did national central banks or treasuries responsible for 
national fiscal policy. The problem was – one size monetary 
policy fits none if inflation rates diverge. The only policy 
that could have prevented diverging inflation rates – 
given the absence of nominal exchange rate realignment 
– would have been national counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
(putting aside wage policy coordination in the euro zone). 
Diverging price levels in the euro zone contributed to 
diverging price competitiveness, aggravating current 
account imbalances at the same time. Second, the low 
real interest rates in GIICPS triggered credit and asset 
price booms with excessive leverage of banks, aggravated 
by regulatory arbitrage that attracted financial inflows 
in Ireland, Spain and elsewhere. Banking regulation was 
both fragmented and/or disregarded with the mantra of 
deregulation holding sway at all levels and in many coun-
tries. Furthermore, asset price inflation was generally (also 
in the US) not seen as a policy problem to be addressed. 
Ignoring both inflation divergence as well as coordination 
and the strengthening of banking regulation was a double 
policy failure of euro area institutions, not a failure caused 
by the introduction of the euro. 
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ECB’s timid and too late policy responses
The ECB responded by purchasing securities from crisis 
countries (Security Markets Programme, SMP) to contain 
spreads, but the programme was too timid (limited volume, 
sterilised) to prevent the infamous sudden stop of financial 
investors who had purchased sovereign bonds in Southern 
countries with slightly higher interest rates before the crisis 
and who had injected so much short-term finance into the 
bubble economies. In the midst of the crisis the ECB raised 
interest rates twice (in 2011) fearing inflation, a misguided 
act under its then President Trichet. Rising spreads signalled 
contagion and looming risks of state bankruptcy which had 
been absent in all OECD countries with debt (of central 
government) accounted for in their own currency since the 
Second World War. Spreads leapt upwards immediately after 
the “haircut” for Greece with “Private Sector Involvement” 
(PSI) on which the Eurogroup decided in early 2012, against 
the opposition of the ECB which foresaw the ensuing 
problems (Brunnermeier et al. 2016).
The announcement of the Outright Monetary Trans-
actions (OMT) programme by Mario Draghi, Trichet’s 
successor, came with a verbal promise in 2012 that ECB 
would do everything within its mandate to preserve the 
euro: “And believe me, it will be enough.” These words allude 
to the possibly limitless “fire power” of a central bank, in 
contrast to fiscal interventions. Immediately, spreads fell, 
but the OMT programme – designed to allow the purchase 
of sovereign bonds from selected members under certain 
conditions – was never applied. Draghi’s speech prevented 
a potentially explosive acceleration of the euro crisis. That 
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OMT has not been applied is likely due to the German 
Federal Constitutional Court which questioned its compat-
ibility with the Grundgesetz and ECB’s mandate. The point 
of contention is the prohibition of monetary financing of 
states. The response of the European Court of Justice gave 
only ambivalent support for the ECB. This signalled that the 
ECB has not sufficient legal backing to act as a full “Lender 
of Last Resort” (LLR), regarding banks and their main 
assets, namely sovereign government bonds. The result is 
that spreads still depend on the mood of financial investors 
and the rating of rating agencies4; rising spreads can swiftly 
return if risks loom ahead. This weakens the financial 
systems in crisis-ridden countries and can drain liquidity out 
of banks and induce capital flight among wealth owners.5
Often, it is held that Draghi’s words of 2012 were a 
sufficient replacement for the OMT. This can be ques-
tioned because the effects of OMT as well as Mr Draghi’s 
pronouncement are diluted because of linking OMT to the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), founded in the same 
year. The ESM can provide up to €500bn preferential loans 
to bail out countries and banks that have lost market access. 
Accessing the ESM requires that the country has ratified 
the fiscal compact, accepts the conditionalities imposed and 
follows them strictly under the continuous evaluation of the 
“Quadriga” (formerly Troika but since 2015 including ESM 
representatives). The OMT can only be used if there is a 
green light from the ESM. Decisions of the ESM require 
approval from national governments, with quasi-veto rights 
for Germany and France. In Germany, parliament has to 
approve. The German Federal Constitutional Court defined 
in its 2016 decision the restrictive conditions to be met by 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
116
ECB if it is not to be considered “monetary financing” 
of a state (inter alia, pre-announced volume of maximum 
purchases, i.e., not limitless “fire power”). All these conditions 
render OMT de facto inapplicable, quite apart from countries 
already being deterred from asking the ESM for support. 
Hence, the ECB’s LLR capacity is severely constrained.
Had the ECB started the OMT programme with 
GIIPCS (or something similar, like the SMP, but with 
possibly unlimited purchases) without all the restrictions 
as early as 2010 or 2011, most likely investor panic would 
have been prevented very soon, spreads reduced or erased, 
doubts about insolvency repelled, the quality of collateral 
for refinancing at ECB unimpaired, and the rating by rating 
agencies a notch or two higher. 
The ECB started with full quantitative easing (QE) in 
2015, seven years after the Fed, apart from undertaking a 
small programme for purchase of covered bonds (a kind of 
corporate bond) in 2009. This belated response contributed to 
the double-dip recession of 2012-13 (Bibow 2016), along with 
fiscal tightening. Mention must also be made of the fact that 
the ECB under Trichet had forced the Irish government to 
bail-out banks in order to protect the main creditors, French 
and German banks; this led to a wave of austerity in Ireland. 
As a member of the “Quadriga”, the ECB is heavily involved 
in imposing austerity on ESM programme countries.
Austerity
After 2008-9, when several European countries, including 
Germany, had embarked on counter-cyclical fiscal policies, 
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most others turned to austerity in a broad sense in 2010 with 
three elements: contractionary fiscal stance, wage cutting 
via flexibilization of labour markets, “structural reforms” 
which in most cases include spending constraints. This was 
an important contributor to rising interest rate spreads in 
GIICPS. Despite monetary policy at the zero lower bound 
(being not really expansionary with stagnating broad money 
and credit growth), the double-dip recession ensued in 
2012-13. This recession was overcome in 2014 only because 
of loosening fiscal policy constraints (disregarding the fiscal 
rules) and by devaluation of the euro, leading to a current 
account surplus of 3.7% of the euro zone (2016). The current 
account imbalance problem remains in different form since 
the euro zone surplus is carried almost entirely by Germany, 
the Netherlands and Ireland, while the others hover around 
zero. Euroland is hereby split into two. The crisis countries, 
including Finland, taken as a bloc, have not yet reached 
the GDP-peak of 2008 in 2016, nine lost years later, while 
the others had recovered already in 2011 but suffered slow 
growth thereafter. Mountains of unemployment remain in 
large parts of the euro area. The economic performance of 
Greece is a show-case for the disastrous results of excessive 
and counter-productive austerity.
Debt overhang
Lastly, the problems of government insolvency in one 
country, Greece, remain unresolved in 2017, leaving the 
country in dire limbo, paralysing the functioning of the 
banking sector and hence the recovery of fixed investment. 
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Also the debt overhang, mainly banking debt, in Portugal, 
Italy and Spain is still unresolved. The bail-in concept of 
the Eurogroup and the Commission, applied to Cyprus, 
does not seem to work. Hence, many banks are burdened 
with bad loans, unable to live, unable to die, on the verge 
of becoming zombie banks, thereby hampering recovery 
and always being on the brink of a fresh inflammation of 
contagion. As a result, the interbank money market is still 
paralysed since banks distrust each other and hold lots of 
liquidity at the ECB.
Lack of expansionary fiscal policy options
The European Commission initiated a fiscal stimulus 
programme in late 2008, called “European Economic 
Recovery Plan”, with around €200bn for all EU countries 
over two years. This was roughly 0.8% of GDP per year, a bit 
more in the euro zone countries in which GDP plummeted 
in 2009 by 4.5%. The Commission allowed governments 
to break the 3% deficit rule. Despite a rising deficit (from 
-2.2% in 2008 to -6.3% 2009 in the euro-zone), the fiscal 
impulse was too small to counter the huge blow of the 
crisis, and was followed after 2010 by tightening fiscal 
policy. The deficit was reduced to -2.1% in 2015. In 2014, 
the Commission launched the “European Plan for Stra-
tegic Investments” ( Juncker-Plan), a three-year investment 
initiative worth (supposedly) €315bn euro. Much of this is 
not really additional money and not targeted at the coun-
tries with the biggest output gaps or highest unemployment. 
Obviously, neither the EU nor the euro zone is prepared to 
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conduct any fiscal expansion despite the fact that the zero-
interest monetary policy of the ECB has limited effects on 
growth, apart from that of devaluing the euro. The explicit 
or implicit guideline for crisis countries is internal devalu-
ation by cutting wages and other costs to improve the price 
competitiveness of exports. To some extent this may work, as 
in Spain, but is a painful and protracted way with only small 
effects on unemployment since domestic demand for non-
tradables is suppressed. There is widespread concern that 
internal devaluation has contractionary and also possibly 
deflationary effects if maintained for a longer spell.
So far, I have discussed five crucial policy failures. Two of 
them are related to fiscal policy. These failures are rooted in 
the design of the Maastricht Treaty, the Stability and Growth 
Pact and subsequent rulings (Six Pack 2011, European Fiscal 
Compact 2012, Two Pack 2013) which are the response to 
breaking the Maastricht criteria during the financial crisis. 
The 3% deficit margin was reduced for countries with 
public debt above 60% of GDP, thereby strengthening fiscal 
constraints and centralisation of compliance measures at the 
European Commission. The underlying rationale is that too 
lax fiscal policy had led or at least contributed to the crisis. It 
is a programmatic rejection of counter-cyclical fiscal policy. 
The other three policy failures (inflation divergence, risks 
of interest rate spreads and state bankruptcy, debt overhang) 
are partly driven by causes related to category (a) mentioned 
above, partly by design flaws (b) in the statute of the ECB 
as well as in some national constitutions and by the lack of a 
workable banking union in the case of debt overhang issues. It 
is clear that a centralised monetary policy cannot bring about 
similar inflation rates in all member countries alike; nothing 
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addresses this problem. The loss of national monetary and 
exchange rate policy is aggravated by the concurrent absence 
of a centralised fiscal policy and by the constrained member 
states’ fiscal policy space. Such a monetary union may not 
necessarily collapse, but is doomed to languish in stagnation, 
continuously on the brink of breakdown and probably not 
prepared to weather another severe recession or financial 
crisis with probably even harsher blows to the weaker econ-
omies, especially the weaker regions within them.
There is a broad consensus that important reforms of the 
design of the euro system are necessary, as expressed also 
by official reform papers from the European Commission 
(2012 and 2015), the so-called Four and the later Five Presi-
dents Report. What are now the avenues for reform? 
Reform options
I will outline four key areas where design reforms are needed, 
without providing detailed new proposals. Many proposals 
have already been made, some are on the way of being imple-
mented, many have been rejected by the political authorities, 
in particular by the hegemonic German government.
Institutional reforms
As mentioned, European institutions and rules for decision-
making are trapped in ironclad treaties. Pivotal decisions 
require unanimity among member states. For the euro zone, 
all of the relevant institutions are informal6: the European 
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Council for the 19 euro members, the so-called Euro-
group (the ECOFIN Council for the euro countries), the 
“Quadriga” (including the ECB which has no mandate for 
general policy issues, and the IMF that is subject to a different 
jurisdiction). All these informal “entities” take far-reaching 
decisions. The European Commission is partially involved, 
the European Parliament only marginally. There is no trans-
parency about the working of these three institutions, not 
even minutes about their meetings are disclosed. The repre-
sentatives of the euro member states are only accountable to 
their government and to their national parliament; even so, 
they deal with issues of grave importance for other member 
states. If unanimity is necessary, it is likely that key countries 
have the status of primus inter pares if not a de facto superior 
veto right compared to less important members. Backroom 
deals, horse-trading and deals with quid pro quo arrange-
ments are common. Members are not always treated equally. 
At times, members in these councils need explicit backing 
from their national parliament in some countries, in others 
not. Unanimity rules make decisions difficult or impossible, 
hence there is built-in inertia. Such rules, based on inter-
governmental coordination rather than democratic majority 
rule, imply permanent grand coalitions of political parties. 
This is not only in conflict with basic tenets of parliamentary 
democracy, but cements slow, inefficient decision-making or 
even avoidance of or delay in taking decisions, with forward-
looking decisions driven by national rather than European 
interests. New modes of decision-making should also 
include more latitude for discretionary decisions.
Some see the making of new intergovernmental treaties 
with varying members as a way of bypassing these rigidities, 
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as happened in the case of the Schengen Agreement, the 
Fiscal Compact and the ESM. However, these novel treaties 
are carved in stone again, requiring unanimity of signatory 
states for amendments. They bring only short-term relief.
Abandoning these institutional rigidities requires 
quantum leaps. First, the euro area needs special institutions, 
in contrast to those ruling all EU members. Second, indirect 
“second degree” democracy – with the European Council 
acting as a government of 28 (or 27) governments – needs 
to be reduced, by granting more power to the European 
Parliament or establishing a Two-Chamber system as well 
as a euro zone economic government. Thirdly, majority rules 
should apply to at least some of the key issues, in particular 
to changing treaties (in the same way as national constitu-
tions can be amended in most countries with a qualified 
majority). This would be a great leap in achieving a higher 
degree of European statehood, efficiency and democracy. 
There can be many small steps in this direction, but at some 
point, one must leap forward.
ECB as extended Lender of Last Resort or 
replacement arrangements
Let’s assume that the ECB should be able to purchase uncon-
ditionally government bonds of all members on secondary 
markets if the spread reaches a certain threshold, say 200 basis 
points. Sovereign bonds could be rolled-over at maturity. All 
sovereign bonds would remain safe, and function as safe assets 
(risk-free or with a limited risk) in the pyramid of financial 
assets as in all other OECD countries with debt expressed in 
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their own currency. Domestic banks often hold big chunks of 
these bonds, and are at risk when bond prices fall. A full LLR 
could avoid the doom loop of over-indebted banks and states. 
Speculators are thereby deterred and bondholders tempted to 
turn to sudden stops will refrain from panic (unless private 
securities held by banks lose their value). State bankruptcy 
will not be possible. Contagion risks are mitigated. In prin-
ciple, this can be achieved with the OMT programme which 
does conform with the Treaties even though this is ques-
tioned by the German Federal Constitutional Court (as 
mentioned above). A clarifying amendment in the German 
constitutional law in this regard would be helpful, given the 
opinion of the Court that differs from international practice 
in OECD countries. 
The original understanding of the LLR means that banks 
have unlimited access to liquidity from the central bank 
but at a higher interest rate. If all banks have a liquidity 
problem, then all banks should have access. If banks hold 
government bonds, and these are suddenly exposed to large 
spreads, all banks together and the state are at risk. What is 
proposed here is an extended LLR function of the ECB. For 
all counter-arguments often levelled against the extended 
LLR (moral hazard, inflationary effects, confusing monetary 
and fiscal issues, not applicable to member states in the euro 
zone, etc.), see the forceful rebuttal of De Grauwe (2013). 
The ESM cannot perform this function as set out here and 
is an unsatisfactory replacement for the LLR of ECB (apart 
from its other functions that are required for the support of 
ailing banks, such as recapitalisation). 
If an extended LLR function for the ECB is rejected, a 
European agency could be founded that issues euro bonds. 
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There are a number of proposals for euro bonds on the table 
(Brunnermeier 2016, pp. 111 ff.). The idea is that a consid-
erable fraction of national bonds of all countries should be 
replaced by such euro bonds. Their issuance would be mutu-
alised on presumably favourable conditions. They can be 
rolled over at maturity, and the ECB may purchase them, 
without legal queries, within the framework of ordinary open 
market policy. This could be a replacement of the LLR role 
described above but that of LLR is much simpler and safer. 
All proposals mentioned here – extended LLR, ESM, 
euro bonds – involve some degree of direct or indirect mutu-
alisation of national debt. This is unavoidable in a MU; it is 
the price worth paying for financial stability, benefitting all, 
like a public good. 
Fiscal policy capacity
A fiscal capacity is needed for counter-cyclical policy and for 
financing public goods provided for the euro zone (or the 
whole EU). As mentioned, the present rules do not provide a 
relevant central fiscal capacity, apart from the paltry EU-budget 
(only 1% of EU GDP), with no capacity for levying taxes and 
issuing bonds. The European Fiscal Compact and the Stability 
and Growth Pact prioritise balanced (structural) budgets, allow 
far too little fiscal leeway in an expansionary direction and 
impose no commitment to act counter-cyclically. In principle, 
there are three options for reform: 
a. Establishing gradually a large central budget similar to 
that in federal states with a treasury, by shifting tasks and 
tax revenues from the national to the supranational level, 
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accompanied by moving decision-making from national 
to supranational institutions. The central budget may 
potentially restrict itself to providing union-wide public 
goods, or providing transfers and re-distributing income 
among members. In case debt is issued, counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy could be applied at the central level. 
b. Providing more fiscal space at national level, loosening the 
3%/60% convergence criteria and replacing them with a 
commitment to reach target inflation in all member coun-
tries and counter output gaps.
c. Establishing a centralised European financing facility, a 
European treasury in a nutshell, that issues euro bonds to 
cover all member state budget deficits and allocates the 
proceeds proportionally to national budgets.
In both b) and c), budget balances follow a common fiscal 
rule that should include the “golden rule” for debt-financing 
of public investment and should, besides this, be oriented 
toward a fiscal Taylor rule7 (budget balances depending 
on the inflation and output gaps). Monetary policy would 
remain as the main policy for fighting inflation union-wide, 
but supported at the decentral level. Automatic fiscal stabi-
lisers could be included in a), b) and c). In c), if fiscal deficits 
and surpluses are set discretionarily without strict caps, the 
debt/GDP ratio follows endogenously, mainly determined 
then by the ratio of interest rates and medium-term growth. 
Sanctions for guiding national fiscal policy in option b) 
could be cutting access to EU structural funds, reducing the 
allocation of seigniorage or suspending the LLR function, 
withdrawing voting rights in the European Council, 
dismissing the EU commissioner from a given country, or 
something similar. 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
126
Option b) – which I prefer, following Eichengreen/
Wyplosz (2016) and Wren-Lewis (2016) – helps to counter 
the Walters’ critique of the euro system, is adjusted to the 
specific fiscal needs of heterogeneous members, strengthens 
national budgetary rights and responsibilities, and avoids 
potentially large-scale fiscal redistribution among EMU 
members via a centralised budget as in option a). For option 
c) a number of proposals exists, for instance from Palley 
in this volume, Bibow (2013, 2016) and Tabellini (2016, 
based on several other authors). All three options require 
a European Treasury which monitors national and central 
fiscal policies and which should be elected and controlled by 
the European Parliament and approved by the Council.
Adding to these policy options, current EU budgetary 
rules should be changed to provide the capacity to levy a 
European tax, incur debt and issue bonds to a limited extent 
for EU-wide public investments. The EU budget would 
be enlarged only moderately, if option b) or c) is followed. 
Institutional details cannot be elaborated in this article. 
Macroeconomic imbalances
Chronic current account imbalances should only be tolerated 
to a small degree, say +/-3% of GDP or less, especially if they 
are not caused by differentials in long-term GDP growth. 
Imbalances within the euro zone members cast deficit coun-
tries into internal devaluation which dampens their growth, 
prompt deflationary tendencies, increase financial vulnera-
bility, lead to economic divergence and to a misfit of the euro 
exchange rate vis à vis other currencies (one-size-fits-nobody 
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problem: the external value of the euro may be appropriate 
for one country group, but induces heavy surpluses in the 
other, or vice versa). Imbalances are caused by three drivers, 
which must be reversed for ex post correction and avoided 
ex ante: trend towards real over- and undervaluation due to 
divergent cost dynamics; surplus countries save continuously 
more than they spend (both public and private spending), 
vice versa in the case of their deficit counterparts; diverging 
structural change with regard to modern and diversified 
sectors with superior international competitiveness in 
surplus countries and vice versa in deficit countries. In most 
cases, all three factors play a role. 
As for rebalancing current severe imbalances, fiscal 
policy could be used first. The adjustment burden should be 
placed asymmetrically primarily on the surplus countries 
since deficit countries would otherwise fall into prolonged 
austerity (see Müller and Janssen in this volume), possibly 
into deflation, while surplus countries should spend more 
via fiscal expansion; they should shoulder temporarily a 
somewhat higher than target inflation, embarking therewith 
on internal revaluation. Second, a European wages policy 
guideline could be helpful, supporting counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy in member states. Such a wages guideline would call 
for nominal increases set according to the country’s produc-
tivity increase plus target inflation rate, if external balance 
and target inflation are achieved. If not, again asymmetric 
adjustments are required, making adjustments in the surplus 
countries the priority. Governments may influence wage 
policies via this guideline with an incomes policy for the civil 
service, a minimum wage policy and legislation to promote 
centralised wage bargaining at national level. European 
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monitoring is necessary. Third, industrial and innovation 
policies in deficit countries should promote structural 
change and technological competitiveness, especially in 
semi-industrialised countries with a weak and small tradable 
sector such as Greece, Portugal or the Baltic states. If these 
adjustments are not accepted by member states, sanctions 
similar to those used for fiscal policy non-compliance could 
be imposed. Ultimately, stronger measures, using for example 
taxation of exports or imports, could be prescribed. Since 
correction of imbalances takes time, if painful ruptures are 
to be avoided, preventive measures must take priority. Since 
the loss of nominal exchange rate adjustments is a key point 
of vulnerability for a MU, a strong emphasis on preventive 
action is a sine qua non.
As there is much consensus in the euro zone that a banking 
union with its four parts – single supervision, single reso-
lution, common deposit insurance, plus macro-prudential 
regulation – is urgently necessary and one of the greatest 
sins in the euro zone design, I refrain from commenting on 
them (cp. Schuberth in this volume). 
Since the euro zone was started prematurely with so many 
shortcomings in its design, it will likely take a long time to 
re-design it. Nevertheless, those points of vulnerability which 
could bring the euro zone close to economic or political 
collapse need to be addressed first, with the greatest urgency.
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Notes
1. Capital inflows came not only from surplus countries with net outflows, 
but also from other countries with a more balanced current account via 
gross capital outflows (such as France).
2. Although gross fixed capital formation, as a percentage of GDP, rose most 
conspicuously in Ireland, Spain and Cyprus by 5-6 percentage points 
1999-2007, the ratio of fixed investment other than for construction 
remained almost constant. This was not so in Greece, Portugal and Italy 
(calculated with data from AMECO database).
3. Alan Walters was economic adviser to Margaret Thatcher, who strongly 
rejected the EMU by hinting at follow-up problems of divergent real 
interest rates caused by divergent inflation rates. The British Keynesian 
Wynne Godley (1992) endorsed Walters’ view but pleaded for a political 
union. Another prominent early Keynesian critique of the euro came from 
Thirlwall (1998).
4. EMU members need at least one credit rating of “investment grade” for 
sovereign bonds to qualify as collateral for the ECB. ECB accepts four 
rating agencies (the three big ones and the Canadian DBRS). If the credit 
rating is below the required level, countries have to apply to the ESM. 
For instance, Portugal depends on the satisfactory rating from only one 
agency, i.e., DBRS.
5. Greece, an extreme example, experienced since the outbreak of the crisis 
three recapitalisations of banks.
6. This implies that officially governments participate in decisions on EMU in 
the European Council include those which are not members of EMU, such 
as the UK.
7. The Taylor Rule is a rule for the conduct of monetary policy. The policy 
interest rate should be selected according to the output and inflation gap 
and a “natural” (normal) interest rate.
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Advocating new reforms of 
E(M)U economic governance
Christophe Blot, Jérôme Creel, Bruno Ducoudré,  
Raul Sampognaro, Xavier Timbeau and  
Sébastien Villemot 
The crisis which started in 2008 looks like it is never 
going to end. Nearly nine years after the meltdown of the 
financial system and the violent recession followed by the 
euro crisis in 2012, recovery has been weak in the Euro 
Area. This elusive recovery has had dramatic consequences. 
In 2016, 16.2 million people in the Euro Area were unem-
ployed. This is more than 2.5 million fewer than the high 
of 19 million in 2013, but it is still far from the 11.7 
million unemployed in 2007 before the Great Recession 
kicked in. Moreover, 8.8 million people were long-term 
unemployed in 2015 and among them 5.7 million belong 
to the category “very long-term unemployed” (defined 
as 24 months or more of unemployment). The number 
of young people not studying, not working and not in 
training (NEET) skyrocketed, creating a permanent effect 
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of the crisis. The situation is especially worrisome in the 
Southern European countries that have high NEET-rates, 
reaching 21.4 percent in the case of Italy (Eurostat). The 
deflation risk is also pervasive and the recent surge in 
headline inflation should not hide the low level of under-
lying inflation in the Euro Area. Public finances remain a 
major concern as some countries are still in the excessive 
deficit procedure. The debt-to-GDP ratio exceeds 60% 
for all Euro Area countries but the Baltics, Luxembourg 
and Slovakia. Most Eurozone members will therefore 
pursue fiscal consolidation to comply with existing fiscal 
rules. Despite a reduction in current account deficits in the 
deficit countries, external imbalances have not been fully 
reduced since this decrease in deficits partly results from 
economic slack. It might then revert to rising when those 
countries recover from the recession. Finally, the global 
financial crisis emphasized the need to reinforce financial 
stability to prevent future crises.
Undoubtedly, a lot of institutional and economic reforms 
have been implemented in the EU since the onset of the 
financial and sovereign debt crises. But, broadly speaking, 
these reforms either did not address the Euro Area’s 
structural flaws or, if they did, in a way that fuelled other 
imbalances and fed centrifugal forces. Against this back-
ground, we advocate a few policy reforms in fiscal and 
macroeconomic imbalance management in order to regain 
EU endorsement by its citizens1. Under a consistent agenda 
which emphasizes short-run policy objectives without 
neglecting long-run ones, we believe the EU’s full recovery 
and high potential growth could be within reach.
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1. The narrative of the crisis 
The policy choices explain to a large extent the elusive 
recovery observed mainly in the Euro Area. If the initial 
impact of the Great Recession on GDP and unemployment 
was similar in the Eurozone compared to other economies, 
the recovery that followed was disappointing. The diver-
gence of outcomes reflects the divergence of macroeconomic 
policies. On the one hand, the Euro Area managed to 
stabilize its public debt and accumulated external surpluses 
more successfully. On the other hand, the United States 
and the United Kingdom have been more pragmatic about 
public deficits and debt and chose to backload their fiscal 
adjustment. They have thus stabilized demand earlier and 
better and have attracted capital flows from surplus coun-
tries.  In so doing, they recovered faster from the financial 
meltdown. Of course, it is important to point out that 
neither the US nor the UK had to suffer from the euro debt 
crisis because their central banks, unconstrained by the Euro 
Area’s institutional complexities, took up their role as lender 
of last resort for governments sooner and triggered uncon-
ventional policies more effectively. In this context, productive 
public and private investment is picking up in the US and 
the UK, creating the basis for future prosperity. 
To legitimize the EU’s responses to the crisis, which 
included the adoption of a comprehensive institutional 
reform over a relatively short time span, there had to be a 
common view about the causes of the crisis. This view shaped 
the policies which were then implemented.
The usual causes explaining the Eurozone crisis are: too 
many debts (public and private) were borrowed abroad 
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(see e.g. CEPR, 2015). Contrary to what Ingram (1973) 
may have expected, the Euro Area crisis shows that coun-
tries which form a monetary union may suffer a severe 
crisis when financial flows suddenly stop. This is all the 
more so when the massive capital flows from core coun-
tries (notably Germany, France and the Netherlands) to the 
periphery (Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal) are invested 
in non-tradeable sectors (construction, consumer credit or 
government consumption) that drive prices and wages up 
and harm the competitiveness of the tradeable sector, rein-
forcing the current account deficits of peripheral countries 
and increasing their dependence on net capital inflows. 
The fact that those imbalances emerged in an incomplete 
single currency (no banking union, no crisis management 
framework, no lender of last resort) amplified the crisis. 
To understand how different narratives of the crisis 
appeared, it is worth recalling the three main determinants 
of current account imbalances. As they rely alternatively on 
public or private variables, they made it possible to either 
focus on growing public debts or on growing private debts. 
First, current account deficits reflect an excess of spending 
over income and more precisely an excess of investment over 
savings. To restore equilibrium, it is vital to reduce investment 
or to increase savings. Government consumption may be a 
major driver of domestic demand, notably in countries that 
failed to meet the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) targets 
(Greece and Portugal for deficits or Italy for public debt). 
Consequently, ensuring sound public finances is also a way to 
correct the twin (public and trade balance) deficits. 
A second point of view focuses on capital flows into fast-
moving economies with high returns. From this point of view 
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a current account deficit is not necessarily the symptom of 
disequilibrium. In the case of a country with a strong growth 
potential, which is catching up vis-à-vis more advanced coun-
tries, an external deficit can correspond to a healthy situation: 
external financing helps the catch-up toward the techno-
logical frontier. Since future growth will provide the basis for 
reimbursing the liabilities, the deficit is transitory and there is 
no reason to worry. This is the type of mainstream reasoning 
which emerged before the financial crisis and helped explain 
the deficits of southern countries (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 
2002). However, the undergoing process in the Euro Area 
did not fit into this optimistic scenario and rather showed 
an unsustainable divergence dynamics. Private capital inflows 
in southern countries were not directed towards sectors with 
strong productivity gains, but fuelled housing bubbles and 
financed low-innovative sectors and consumption credit. 
Hence, this explanation of current account deficits points out 
the negative consequences of mispricing in the assets markets 
and suggests that prudential policies and the monitoring of 
prices and capital flows is key to preventing future crises. 
Finally, current account deficits may also emerge as the 
consequence of poor external competitiveness. Competi-
tiveness divergence may be amplified by foreign capital inflows 
when they are concentrated in low productivity non-tradeable 
sectors that generate inflationary pressures. Those pressures can 
be reinforced by rigidities in the labour and product markets. 
From this point of view, monitoring the evolution of wages 
and prices and ensuring more flexible markets are required.
These three explanations hinge alternatively on public or 
private variables and paved the way for two rival narratives 
of the crisis.
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The first focused on the excess of (public) demand as 
the main cause of current account deficits in peripheral 
countries. Indeed, the kick-off of the crisis looked very 
much like a public debt crisis. In October 2009, the freshly 
elected Greek government admitted that public deficits and 
inherited public debt were in reality much bigger than previ-
ously thought. If at the beginning there was the sentiment 
that this was exclusively a Greek problem, financial markets 
lost confidence in the health of public finances in an 
increasing number of countries. This resulted in the dramatic 
rise of sovereign bond spreads for some countries, after 
almost a decade of convergence. To restore confidence, it was 
decided to strengthen the European fiscal governance. In 
2011, the “Six Pack” sought to improve compliance with the 
SGP framework and reinforced the corrective arm of fiscal 
governance. In particular, it limited the Council’s power 
to refuse the sanctions recommended by the Commission 
against countries missing their commitments. More impor-
tantly, in 2013 the introduction of the Fiscal Compact 
hardened the target of structural balance that Euro Area 
countries are expected to achieve. From now on, a budget 
is judged “balanced” if the structural deficit is lower than 
0.5 point of potential GDP. Moreover, the “Two Pack” rein-
forced the transparency and coordination of fiscal policy 
among member states.
If the Greek and the Portuguese cases are relatively well 
explained by this narrative, this is not true for the other 
countries. In particular, this narrative is at odds with the rise 
of sovereign spreads in Spain and Ireland, countries that 
were among the best performers in terms of respecting the 
SGP targets before the crisis. A second narrative emerged, 
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pointing up the fact that the roots of the crisis lie in the 
emergence of unsustainable private debt and divergent 
price-competitiveness. In this narrative, it was necessary 
to monitor a broader set of macroeconomic indicators. In 
2011, the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (MIP) 
was introduced as part of the surveillance framework that 
aims to identify, prevent and correct such imbalances. The 
MIP consists essentially of monitoring a set of 11 indicators 
covering the major sources of imbalances identified above. 
This set of indicators is the MIP’s scoreboard, whose aim is 
to create an early-warning system on problematic macroeco-
nomic imbalances. 
The institutional framework of macroeconomic 
governance changed dramatically during the crisis. Reform 
was broad and included elements of the three explanations 
for the build-up of current account imbalances. However, 
it suffered a bias towards fiscal adjustment even if private 
sector developments were now being monitored by the 
MIP. This bias can be explained in two ways. First, as the 
economic situation worsened, the links between banking 
risks and sovereign bonds risk appeared and the spreads on 
interest rates reached unsustainable levels in many coun-
tries (including Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and 
Greece). The crisis progressively transformed itself into a 
full-scale public debt crisis, validating the self-fulfilling 
expectation of investors demanding clear actions to restore 
credibility concerning the sustainability of public debt. 
Restoring credibility and eliminating debtors’ risk of moral 
hazard became the top priority for policy makers. Second, 
the two procedures have not the same binding power. On 
the one hand, the rules of the Excessive Deficit Procedure of 
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the SGP are more clearly specified and set targets for actions 
taken by Member States themselves. On the other hand, the 
MIP is less clear, less enforcing and it sets targets for indi-
cators not directly controlled by national governments, e.g. 
the rise in real estate prices. In this context, member states 
essentially try to stick to the (little or non-existent) fiscal 
space left by fiscal governance and neglect the targets set by 
the MIP, with no clear enforcement procedure.
2. Internal inconsistencies in the 
European economic governance
Since the global financial crisis erupted, Euro Area member 
states and institutions have not been passive. The economic 
strategy has relied on fiscal consolidation, conservative struc-
tural reforms2 and an expansionary monetary policy. However, 
the economic policies implemented so far have manifestly 
failed to deliver on promises. Not only did the European 
Commission and Euro Area member states underestimate 
the cost of fiscal consolidation but they have also failed to 
discern the inconsistency of this strategy and to recognize the 
trade-offs inherent in the pursuit of different objectives. 
First, achieving fiscal discipline (3% public deficit-to-
GDP ratio in the short-term and 60% public debt-to-GDP 
ratio in the medium-term) has entailed significant output 
losses (iAGS 2013, Rannenberg et al., 2015), in line with the 
consensus stressing that fiscal multipliers are high in times of 
crisis (see Creel et al., 2011). Hence, the fiscal consolidation 
implemented since 2010 has decreased demand, contributing 
to reduce current account deficits in the short term, but at 
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the expense of the unemployment objective. Fiscal consoli-
dation may thus also reduce long-term growth as it goes 
along with cuts in public investment and a decline in the 
skills of the long-term unemployed. Furthermore, by feeding 
the deflation risk, fiscal consolidation has complicated the 
task of the ECB regarding its ability to meet the inflation 
target. As illustrated by iAGS report 2013, there is a trade-
off between the growth objective and the fiscal sustainability 
objective, which is a long-term goal. The political choice that 
has been made has privileged the long-term public finance 
objective at the expense of growth and has proven counter-
productive: debt-to-GDP ratios have risen. 
Second, the claim was that conservative structural reforms 
would reduce the unemployment rate and correct current 
account imbalances. However, the positive effects of struc-
tural reforms have been overestimated and it has been 
overlooked that these effects, when positive, take time to 
be delivered. Eggertson and Krugman (2012) have also 
pointed to the risk of counterproductive effects with struc-
tural reforms. In a zero-lower-bound (ZLB) context, the 
decrease in the inflation rate increases the real interest rate 
and triggers a debt-deflation spiral. Consequently, achieving 
the reduction of current account imbalances and reducing 
the long-term unemployment rate may be feasible through 
structural reforms but it may be at the expense of short-
term output growth and of debt reduction. The deleveraging 
process is then made longer and harsher (as illustrated in 
iAGS 2016 and 2017).
In this context, the main stimulus for the Euro Area 
economy rests with the ECB. However, standard monetary 
policy is constrained by the ZLB, leading central banks to 
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implement unconventional monetary policies. The ECB 
has engaged in quantitative easing (QE) operations since 
2015 with the aim of bringing inflation in the Euro Area 
back to the 2% target. Unconventional monetary policy is 
also expected to support demand. Moreover, through its 
impact on sovereign yields, QE could reduce the need for 
fiscal consolidation. It therefore appears that, in contrast 
with fiscal and structural policies, an expansionary monetary 
policy may have positive spillovers on the other policy 
objectives. Yet, Borio and Zabai (2016) suggest that uncon-
ventional monetary policy could have decreasing returns and 
threaten financial stability by fuelling asset price bubbles. 
This illustrates an additional trade-off between price 
stability and financial stability. If the ECB is leaning against 
the wind to achieve financial stability, hence implementing 
a restrictive monetary policy to dampen financial bubbles, it 
will underperform its inflation target and recovery will be 
slowed down.
The multiplicity of EU objectives over different time 
horizons – price stability and unemployment in the short 
run; public debt, financial stability and price competi-
tiveness in the long run – requires one to solve the 
trade-offs. As the Tinbergen principle states, a limited 
number of policy tools can only achieve the same number 
of objectives. Consequently, priorities need to be defined 
and backed by political support. Until then, most political 
decisions have emphasized the long run over the short 
run. When these decisions have failed, the urgent task is 
certainly to enact a comprehensive package to meet all 
the European objectives consistently. It involves changing 
priorities – with an emphasis on curing the damage 
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caused by the divergence observed during the Euro’s first 
decade and the crisis itself – and enhancing democratic 
enforcement to make the new rules more legitimate and 
therefore credible while proving convincing that long run 
goals will not be overlooked.
3. Solutions
a. Rebuilding confidence
The fiscal policies implemented since 2011 illustrate the 
EU’s institutional weaknesses. By co-ordinating on the basis 
of rigid rules – like the 3% deficit rule – states are forced into 
untenable policies that do not produce the promised results, 
leading European citizens to distrust European institutions.
Monetary policy is facing similar difficulties. The ECB 
has had to pursue a bold expansionary policy that exposes it 
more to banking risks and to the risk of default by Euro Area 
governments. This situation gives rise to a legal challenge 
concerning the conformity of its actions with respect to its 
mandate. Such challenges are an obstacle for future decisions.
Lastly, the creation of rescue institutions for the member 
states facing a liquidity or solvency crisis – in particular, 
the “troika” of Commission, ECB and IMF – was accom-
panied by a strengthening of the Union’s intergovernmental 
dimension. However, these rescue institutions suffer from an 
absence of democratic legitimacy. In fact, they gave greater 
weight in the decision-making process to the big Euro Area 
member states and called into question the sovereignty of 
the smaller countries (e.g. Greece).
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Crisis countries have made huge efforts to respect their 
commitments towards the Euro Area. They did not default 
on their public debt (Greece only restructured part of its 
debt after the 2010 haircut) and have chosen to remain in 
the EMU. For a lasting commitment towards the Euro Area 
in these countries, the EU must reinforce the legitimacy and 
clarify the responsibilities of the European institutions. This 
is the only way to ensure effective co-ordination and escape 
from the trap of short-term views on the stability of public 
finances, to allow full exercise of monetary sovereignty while 
limiting implicit or explicit transfers between states. This 
calls for strengthening the democratic functioning of the 
Union either through a strengthened European Parliament 
or by the creation of a new (second) chamber.
b. A democratic re-foundation of Europe
As Chopin (2016, p. 3) put it: “Democracy is basically 
founded on three fundamental requirements: the democratic 
definition of political goals; the democratic selection of 
accountable leaders before the citizens; the exercise of demo-
cratic control over the decisions taken to assess whether 
goals have been achieved or not. With this in view the 
democratic political system supposes that there are at least 
two criteria: that of competition and possibility of political 
change”. The current functioning of EU institutions seems 
far from reaching all these prerequisites.
The Five Presidents’ Report of June 2015 has put on the 
table the question of reforming how European integration 
functions. The democratic dimension should play a key role 
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but the debate is now at a standstill. Yet the double question 
of the level of the exercise of sovereignty, in particular on 
the budgetary and monetary sides, and the legitimacy of the 
institutions in charge of exercising this sovereignty arises.
If pragmatism is justified when circumstances reveal the 
incompleteness of institutions, it is also understandable that 
European integration is struggling to gain its legitimacy 
through outcomes (output-oriented legitimacy, in the words 
of Scharpf, 2003), and that intrinsic legitimacy (input-
oriented legitimacy) becomes a necessary answer.
Rethinking the EU institutional architecture to put in 
place rigorous democratic processes constitutes a consid-
erable task. In the current context, this question cannot be 
answered by simplistic proposals. In particular, a radical 
federal leap is unrealistic politically, and its pursuit could 
strengthen doubts about the European project.
Giving more scope to representative democracy in 
defining monetary policy issues or within the rescue institu-
tions of member states is a relevant one. The idea of a Euro 
Area parliament has been justified until now by the disso-
nance that the British provoked in the European Parliament 
on issues specific to the Euro Area. Brexit partially over-
comes this obstacle, but the delay in its implementation 
increases the risks of postponing any democratic legitimacy 
of monetary policy, whose time horizon is much shorter. 
The ECB’s accountability is more of an exercise in commu-
nication currently than a formal open discussion about its 
monetary strategy. It could well be improved without chal-
lenging its independence. 
Strengthening the EU budget is another avenue. Building 
automatic stabilization mechanisms such as the proposals 
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for a European unemployment insurance scheme or a 
common Euro Area fiscal capacity could help to cope with 
symmetric and asymmetric shocks. In both cases, it will limit 
the necessary reliance on the ECB. Ensuring that future 
investments in infrastructure, education or the social sector 
are no longer pro-cyclical is also promising.
c. Golden Fiscal Rule
In contrast with current reforms of EU economic governance, 
we advocate an approach that, while acknowledging the limits 
of monetary policy, fully exploits the supportive potential of 
fiscal policy and of correcting imbalances through a coop-
erative strategy. This approach is also complementary to the 
possible adoption of a Euro Area fiscal capacity in two ways. 
First it pertains to both the short- and the long-run fiscal 
management of the Euro Area. Second, it complements fiscal 
management with progressive structural reforms.
Domestic fiscal policies are fettered and often passive, 
except at the margin under relatively bad economic condi-
tions, because of EU rules and national “debt brakes” 
introduced as part of the fiscal compact. Moreover, the 
method used by the Commission to estimate the output gap 
and then the cyclical part of the deficit leads to an overly pro-
cyclical fiscal policy (Péléraux, 2014). The implementation of 
austerity policies during downturns is self-defeating, and for 
a large part this explains the double dip recession and the 
sluggish recovery experienced by the Euro Area since 2011. 
Fiscal consolidation should instead be avoided in times of 
crisis and be back-loaded after the recovery. Additionally, 
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public investment has suffered disproportionately under 
austerity policies, in the absence of special SGP provisions 
supporting it. It is now at historically low levels in the Euro 
Area, and the stock of public capital even decreased in 2015. 
This situation endangers long-term growth potential, given 
the complementarity between private capital, labour and 
public infrastructures.
A major reform of the SGP therefore needs to be imple-
mented with the adoption of smarter rules that support 
public investment and increase member states’ budgetary 
flexibility so as to improve counter-cyclicality, while at the 
same time ensuring fiscal sustainability and compatibility 
with the overall EU fiscal and economic policy framework.
A promising reform path is to implement the “Golden 
Rule” of public finances within the SGP. The Golden Rule is 
a traditional public finance concept that consists in deducting 
net public investment from both the headline and structural 
deficits that are used to assess fiscal compliance. The rationale 
is that increases in public infrastructures will benefit future 
generations, and that it makes sense to finance them with 
debt; conversely, financing these infrastructures with current 
taxes would probably lead to their under-provisioning. We 
claim that rebuilding the stock of public assets would be in 
line with the SGP in that it would help achieve the long-
term sustainability of public debts and pension systems.
Of course, the definition of what is public investment 
should not rely on a narrow accounting concept, but should 
encompass those projects that provide tangible economic 
pay-offs, through their complementarities with private 
capital and labour. Only under this condition will the rule 
ensure long-term fiscal sustainability. The Golden Rule 
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would also augment the counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy, 
by giving back some discretionary power to governments, 
which will then be allowed to increase public investment 
projects during bad times. But to really remove the pro-
cyclicality of the rule needs a further reform of the procedure 
implemented by the European Commission for computing 
the cyclical component of deficits: a method drawing on 
the medium-term potential growth rate (as in Claeys et al., 
2016) would represent a significant improvement.
The launch of the Juncker investment plan is an acknowl-
edgement by European authorities of the public investment 
deficit. But this plan is far from being a satisfactory answer 
to the problem. First, it is only temporary in nature, and 
therefore does not solve the structural deficiency of current 
fiscal rules. Second, even though its impact is broadly positive, 
the plan is too small to provide a significant boost to short-
term aggregate demand and to long-term growth potential.
Overall, the rethinking of the mix between monetary and 
fiscal policies is critical for the future of the Euro Area. But 
it will not be enough to tackle all the challenges faced by 
the Eurozone.
d. A Golden Rule for wages and current account balance
Indeed, a careful analysis of the sovereign debt crisis has 
revealed that public debts were the symptom of broader 
macroeconomic disequilibria and, in particular, of current 
account imbalances. 
Where do we stand today? Faster demand growth, which 
is needed to bring unemployment down in Southern coun-
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tries, risks widening current account deficits once more; 
in other words, structural current accounts – i.e. current 
accounts corrected for their cyclical component – are still in 
deficit in many Southern countries. Symmetrically, Northern 
countries, and especially Germany, are running huge current 
account surpluses that could lead to a Euro appreciation, 
with negative consequences for the competitiveness of all 
member countries.
If we want to avoid a new crisis of the monetary union 
– and such a crisis could threaten its very survival – we 
therefore need a strategy to achieve re-convergence within 
the Euro Area. And it is critical that this effort is not borne 
unilaterally by overvalued countries, but is instead borne as 
symmetrically as possible.
Apart from growth differentials, current account disequi-
libria result from both price and non-price competitiveness 
differentials. The re-convergence of the Euro Area should 
therefore rely on two pillars: a nominal one – via a golden 
wage rule – and a structural one.
It is well established that current account imbalances are 
at least partly explained by the divergence of unit labour 
costs across the continent. Countries where nominal wages 
have increased faster (relatively to productivity) tend to be 
those whose current accounts have turned the most into 
deficit during the pre-crisis period.
Limiting such imbalances within the Euro Area requires 
a wage rule that serves as a coordination device. More 
precisely, the golden wage rule implies that nominal wages 
increase at the rate of domestic productivity augmented by 
the ECB inflation target of 2%. In the short run the rule 
should be adjusted to correct for existing nominal imbal-
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
150
ances, i.e. with wages increasing faster than the rule in 
the North and more slowly in the South. Note that this 
scheme is not incompatible with real wage increases, even in 
Southern countries: since the rule applies to nominal wages, 
purchasing power can increase either if prices are sluggish or 
if there are productivity gains.
Tools for the implementation of this coordinated wage 
policy include: generalization of wage floors and cross-
border coordination of any increases in them, some degree 
of domestic  recentralization of wage negotiations, and more 
collective agreements. Other tools relating to changes in 
indirect wage costs could also be mobilized.
In parallel, in order to deal with non-price competitiveness 
issues, policies centered on the convergence of productive 
capacities and standards of living must also be implemented; 
in the South, this includes structural investment in export 
capacities to raise productivity, improve non-cost competi-
tiveness and promote alternative energy production allowing 
full exploitation of comparative advantages in energy.
Finally, the MIP should be made symmetrical and 
completed by an analysis highlighting the link between 
different imbalances and the policy tradeoffs. So far, the 
adjustment has remained asymmetric, burdening mainly 
deficit countries. The MIP should be made more symmetric 
so as to encourage reflationary policies in countries with 
sluggish unit labour cost dynamics and high current account 
surpluses. According to the adjusted golden wage rule, a 
minimum value below but close to 2 % should be introduced 
for nominal unit labour cost growth. Moreover, the same 
absolute value should be used for upper and lower thresholds 
for the current account.
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More fundamentally, the MIP scoreboard hides the fact 
that some imbalances are linked – for example that surpluses 
in some countries have the same root cause as deficits in 
others – and that tradeoffs exist between policy objectives. 
Reducing domestic current account imbalances makes it 
more difficult for deficit countries to achieve debt stabili-
zation and full employment, because of the deflationary effect 
and the subsequent rise of the real interest rate. Moreover, 
correcting the Euro Area’s external imbalance – i.e. its high 
current account surplus – through a Euro appreciation would 
increase the internal divergence of the zone. Procedurally, 
the MIP should therefore be expanded with a broader and 
more systemic economic analysis. Substantively, the right 
policy to mitigate such tradeoffs is a full utilization of fiscal 
space in all countries combined with an increase in inflation 
in surplus countries.
4. Conclusion
Most of the reforms of EU economic governance since the 
global financial crisis have consisted of either strengthening 
fiscal rules (like the Fiscal Compact) despite non-compliance 
with former rules, or building a MIP scoreboard without 
binding commitments. These reforms have been unsuccessful 
in triggering a sharp EU recovery. Consequently, they have 
certainly fuelled discontent with both Euro and EU. It is also 
striking that other reforms of economic governance have 
consisted of delegating decisions to non-elected boards (like 
the fiscal boards and national productivity boards recom-
mended by the Council on September 20 2016), supposedly 
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representing independent expertise in economic and social 
matters. The response to people’s discontent has been tech-
nocratic. In contrast, we believe it is time for the EU to opt 
for a more progressive and a more democratic management 
of the Euro: with a common fiscal capacity, national Golden 
Rules on public finances and wages as well as investments in 
export capacities, the Euro Area may well recover faster and 
be better able to cope with key issues for its citizens such as 
climate change and social, economic and financial shocks.
Notes
1. In this contribution, we stick to the Treaty of the EU and claim that the 
Euro is part of EU’s acquis communautaire (except for Denmark and the 
UK which have an opt-out clause). Consequently, we argue in favour of 
reforms for the EU which are mainly reforms for the Euro Area.
2.  The European banking union can also be included in the set of structural 
reforms which is devoted to improve financial surveillance in the Euro 
Area and then reinforce financial stability.
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There Is an Alternative: 
The Flexible European 
Currency Community
Fritz W. Scharpf
1. Background
The following text is part of a longer article which, in its 
preceding sections, is trying to make several connected 
points (Scharpf 2016): 
The Eurozone includes structurally different “Northern” 
and “Southern” political economies that had performed 
as hard-currency and soft-currency economies under the 
previous regime of flexible exchange rates. Northern econ-
omies with relatively large exposed sectors had relied on 
export-led growth models and their coordinated industrial 
relations systems were capable of generating wage restraint 
under the leadership of export-sector industrial unions. By 
contrast, Southern economies with large sheltered sectors 
had depended on domestic demand-led growth, and their 
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industrial relations were characterized by union competition 
and persistent wage dynamics. As a result, inflation was 
generally lower in the North than in the South, and as long 
as these differences were compensated by the revaluation and 
devaluation of exchange rates, both types of political econ-
omies had been equally viable in pre-1999 Western Europe.
These structural differences were not acknowledged, let 
alone dealt with, by the original regime of the Monetary 
Union. Since they nevertheless persisted after entry, economic 
trajectories diverged widely after 1999. Low-inflation 
Northern economies were handicapped by average-oriented 
ECB monetary policies and high real interest rates, whereas 
Southern economies were boosted by the fall in interest rates 
and the rise of credit-financed domestic demand. Until the 
credit squeeze of the global financial crisis of 2008-09, rising 
current account deficits in the South were easily sustained 
by capital inflows from Northern surpluses. But when these 
stopped, Southern banks were collapsing and the states that 
came to their rescue were soon faced with challenges to their 
liquidity and ultimately solvency – which were treated as a 
Euro crisis requiring institutional changes beyond the mini-
malist regime established by the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability and Growth Pact.
The new Euro Regime, defined by the European Stability 
Mechanism, the Excessive Deficit Procedure, the Excessive 
Imbalances Procedure and the Fiscal Compact, has greatly 
extended and intensified centralized controls over the fiscal, 
economic, labor market and social policy choices of EMU 
member states. As structural differences are ultimately 
perceived as the root causes of the Euro crisis and of EMU’s 
persistent vulnerability, the regime’s acknowledged purpose 
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is to achieve the structural convergence of Eurozone econ-
omies. And since the Euro crisis struck at economies with 
large current account deficits, it appeared plausible to define 
a regime that will enforce a structural transformation towards 
the model of export-oriented Northern political economies. 
For Ireland with its large export sector, a Euro regime 
imposing fiscal austerity and wage repression does seem to 
facilitate export-led economic recovery. For Southern econ-
omies, however, the main (and intended) effect of the present 
regime is to reduce domestic demand to such an extent that 
not only demand for imports but domestic economic activity 
and, ultimately, the size of the large domestic sector are dras-
tically reduced. Once that is achieved, the export sector will 
grow in relative size and political influence, and export-sector 
unions may come to dominate wage-setting processes. In 
other words, Southern political economies will converge on 
the Northern model, the membership of the Eurozone will 
be structurally coherent and internationally competitive, and 
the Monetary Union will finally be safe. Or so it is hoped. 
For Southern political economies, however, enforced 
structural conversion has been and still is extremely painful 
– with massive job losses, excessive youth unemployment, 
rising poverty – and a legacy of business failures that has 
reduced the capacity for domestic growth. Even if exports are 
picking up eight years after the onset of the crisis, the road 
to export-led recovery of the economy at large continues 
to be at best arduous, uncertain and very long. And though 
all Southern governments have treated the Euro regime 
as being “without alternative”, the suffering it imposes on 
their societies has been immense, and its political impact so 
negative that none of the regime’s loyal supporters has yet 
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been able to win re-election. In other words, even though 
the present Euro regime might succeed as a huge economic 
gamble, it may yet collapse if the failure of its even more 
risky political gamble triggers the chaotic exit of one or more 
EMU member states.
 Amid rising criticism of its operation and consequences 
the present Euro regime is generating ever more proposals 
for its modification. Most of these suggest either a strength-
ening of centralized capacities to enforce present rules, 
or a softening of these rules and some sort of financial 
support to ease the structural transformation of Southern 
political economies. In terms of the dual gamble, however, 
both appear counterproductive. More powerful and rigid 
enforcement would greatly increase the risks of political 
collapse. And softer rules and transfers are likely to prevent 
structural transformation and may turn the South into a 
permanently subsidized European “Mezzogiorno”. 
Other critics are asking for a more “symmetric” regime 
that would also treat Northern (and in particular, German) 
current account surpluses as a major problem. Before 
EMU, the DM had appreciated when German exports had 
exceeded imports – and rising imports had then prevented 
the rise of persistent high trade surpluses. In the Monetary 
Union, however, the exchange-rate corrective was disabled, 
and since 1999 German imports have indeed been persis-
tently lower than exports. The effects of the German 
surplus for the stability of the EMU or for the recovery of 
Southern economies are in dispute. But even if they should 
be considered a major problem, on closer examination 
most suggestions for correcting this imbalance turn out to 
be ineffective or unfeasible; and the one that might work 
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– lower VAT (Value Added Tax) rates on imports – is not 
even considered in academic and political discussion.
To summarize: The paper argues that the Monetary 
Union is ill designed for dealing with the basic structural 
differences among Northern and Southern political econ-
omies, and that the present Euro regime’s attempt to enforce 
structural convergence may perhaps succeed in economic 
terms at enormous social costs, but will remain extremely 
vulnerable to political protests, rebellion and anti-European 
populist governments. In the absence of good solutions 
within present constraints, therefore, the paper concludes by 
suggesting that the Monetary Union itself should be trans-
formed into a more flexible Currency Community that is 
able to accommodate Northern and Southern political econ-
omies at the same time. 
2. A Non-catastrophic Alternative to EMU: 
The European Currency Community
At present, there are two plausible fears which may explain 
not only the defense of the EMU by its Northern benefi-
ciaries but also the fundamental loyalty of Southern 
governments even in the face of deep political dissatis-
faction with the economic and social sacrifices imposed by 
the present regime. The first is the belief that exits would 
not only be catastrophic for the country in question but 
might also destroy the Monetary Union itself. But though 
the consequences of individual exits need serious attention, 
there is surely no need to abolish the common currency 
for those Northern and Eastern political economies whose 
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interests and political preferences are well-served by it, or for 
member states that are politically committed to continue on 
a course of structural transformation under external super-
vision (Ferrera 2016). The second concern is the fear of the 
economic and political isolation of countries that might 
otherwise be better off outside of the EMU. It is these fears 
which the following discussion primarily seeks to address. 
Under present conditions, an individual exit from the 
common currency is indeed not an economically and politi-
cally viable option. Though its designers did not know how 
to make EMU work, they were devilishly clever in making 
it nearly irreversible. Even though in retrospect the move 
from the flexible European Monetary System of 1979 
(EMS) to the EMU may be seen as a dreadful mistake, its 
reversal is almost universally ruled out by the anticipation 
of horrendous transition costs and irresolvable uncertainties 
(Tsoukalis 2016). Indeed, under the present rules, exit may 
happen as a disaster, but it is not a policy option that could 
be chosen by responsible governments as a lesser evil, no 
matter how devastating the Euro regime’s impact is on its 
country’s economy or society. 
But these conditions could be changed. 
In addition to creating a formal right to leave the EMU 
without having to leave the EU, the feasibility of orderly exit 
presupposes at least three bodies of rules that would deal with 
state insolvency, with exit procedures, and with the subse-
quent relations between exiting states and the EMU. None of 
these rules is likely to be well-designed under the pressure of 
an acute crisis. Hence they ought to be discussed and adopted 
in relatively calm times as precautionary amendments or 
additions to the general rules governing the Eurozone.
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2.1 Rules for state insolvency and an “amicable divorce” 
With regard to the first requirement, discussions about 
rules for state insolvency have been under way for some 
time at the international level (International Law Associ-
ation 2010), and it should be possible to adapt these to the 
restructuring of excessive public sector debt under the condi-
tions of the Eurozone. A more difficult challenge will be the 
second requirement of procedures and rules facilitating the 
orderly exit of a member state from the EMU. To minimize 
repercussions in global capital markets, it would be highly 
desirable to avoid the uncertainties of controversial and 
long drawn-out “Brexit-type” bargaining. It might thus be 
helpful to construct a small set of pre-defined “exit models” 
with well-balanced rules for different types of problem 
constellations. They all would need to include procedures 
for the transition to a national (or parallel) currency, for 
the treatment of public and private debts defined in Euros, 
and for financial, legal, and procedural support during the 
transition period. While I lack the expertise to suggest 
specific solutions, I am encouraged to see that reputed and 
knowledgeable economists of very different theoretical and 
political persuasions appear to be quite sanguine about the 
availability and effectiveness of practicable options that 
would reduce the transition costs of a country’s exit from the 
EMU through a cooperatively managed “amicable divorce” 
(Stiglitz 2016, ch. 10; Sinn 2014; Sinn 2015, 480–492; 2016, 
306–309).1 
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2.2 Learning from the faults of the EMS
Even more important may be the third requirement of 
an economically and politically viable regime governing 
the future relations between exiting economies and the 
remaining EMU (rEMU). It would have to be clear (which 
at present it is not) that leaving the EMU does not conflict 
with continuing membership of the European Union. 
Even then, however, the prospect is bound to provoke 
disturbing concerns about the post-exit fate of economies 
that will continue to depend on integration in the Single 
Market: They might suddenly have to cope on their own 
with turbulent global capital markets and with speculative 
exchange-rate fluctuations that could wreak havoc on the 
viability of economically interdependent national industries 
and that might also trigger vicious price/wage devaluation 
spirals that could overwhelm all national efforts at stabi-
lization. With regard to these fears, however, promising 
solutions can be derived from a re-examination of the 
achievements and deficiencies of the monetary regime that 
had preceded the EMU.  
Before the post-unification crisis of 1992, the EMS 
regime of pegged but adjustable exchange rates had 
succeeded in achieving three purposes. It had helped reduce 
average inflation rates in Europe by obliging member states 
to use monetary and fiscal policies in order to keep their 
currencies within 75 percent of the exchange-rate band-
width (2.25 percent above and below the agreed rate). At 
the same time, its Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM I) 
had protected member currencies against short-term imbal-
ances and speculative attacks by (symmetrically!) obliging 
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central banks to intervene in currency markets in order to 
maintain the upper and the lower limits of their respective 
exchange-rate corridors. And finally, it had prevented the 
rise of persistent trade imbalances by allowing for agreed-
upon currency realignments (Artis and Taylor 1993). 
After an initial period of frequent adjustment, the EMS 
worked reasonably well, not only in dampening currency 
fluctuations and inflation rates but also in achieving a 
pattern of nominal exchange rates that reflected economic 
fundamentals and avoided the dynamic divergence of real 
effective exchange rates and the emergence of persistent 
external imbalances. The regime was institutionally 
vulnerable, however, because it lacked a central bank that 
was committed to the common interest. As exchange rates 
were defined pairwise between all national currencies, the 
Bundesbank (in charge of the largest and hardest currency) 
came to play a dominant role in all adjustments. Moreover, 
it had been allowed to insist – in the famous “Emminger 
letter” (Tietmeyer 2005, 79–80) – that it would not have to 
engage in monetary policies and currency interventions that 
might conflict with its basic commitment to price stability 
in Germany. As a result, the symmetry of interventions was 
incomplete, and currency realignments were more frequent 
than they otherwise would have been. 
These had to be adopted through difficult and often 
highly confrontational intergovernmental negotiations 
(Marsh 2009; Höpner and Spielau 2015) in which Germany 
was typically forced to accept greater DM revaluations than 
was good for its domestic growth. After 1987, however, 
revaluations were ruled out in the quest for even greater 
exchange-rate stability. When the Bundesbank then chose to 
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brutally clamp down on the German post-unification boom, 
it triggered major crises in other member states which in 
fact destroyed the EMS (Marsh 2009). 
The critical design fault that destroyed the ERM 1 has 
been corrected in its successor regime, the ERM II. It was 
created on January 1, 1999, for European states that would 
not immediately join the Monetary Union. Although all 
of its one-time members, except for Denmark, have now 
entered the EMU, its institutional framework still exists 
and remains available for new accessions. It differs from the 
ERM I in two crucial respects: the ECB retains its role as 
the central bank for the system as a whole, and the “central 
exchange rate” of a member currency is defined in relation to 
the Euro, rather than in a network of bilateral rates among 
all currencies. As a consequence, market interventions to 
stabilize the exchange rate of a member state are also nego-
tiated between its national central bank and the ECB, rather 
than among all national banks. 
Under ERM II rules, currencies are presently allowed to 
fluctuate up to 15 percent above and below their agreed-upon 
“central exchange rate.” This broad bandwidth, which was 
introduced after the EMS crisis of 1992, may be narrowed by 
agreement so as to circumscribe the politically desired action 
space of national macroeconomic management. Hence, if 
the central exchange rate is initially set to correspond to the 
underlying economic fundamentals, stabilizing interven-
tions in international currency markets should be required 
only to ward off speculative attacks – which, however, are 
likely to be deterred by the ECB’s quasi unlimited fire 
power.2 Nevertheless, there have been a few cases of agreed-
upon revaluations of currencies in the history of the ERM 
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II. Thus, exchange-rate adjustments in response to persistent 
imbalances and changes in the underlying economic funda-
mentals continue to be available as well. 
2.3 Toward a two-level European Currency Community 
Until now (and except for Denmark), membership of ERM 
II has been a trial period in which candidates for full EMU 
membership had to achieve perfect exchange-rate stability 
with the Euro. Hence, even if present rules remained in 
place, the regime would change its function if it were to 
become part of a “European Currency Community” (ECC) 
that may permanently include two types of member states 
– those belonging to the EMU (the future Euro Area) and 
those whose currencies are related to the Euro through the 
ERM II. In spite of the heterogeneity of its membership, 
however, the ECC would be a most powerful player on the 
global scene. All of its member currencies would form a large 
“Euro bloc” with the Euro itself at the center and ERM II 
currencies connected to it by agreed-upon exchange rates 
and commitments to mutual support against external attack. 
In other words, its currencies would float together in a global 
environment of flexible exchange rates, and the Euro bloc, 
represented by the ECB, would negotiate as a unitary actor 
in international negotiations about global, multilateral or 
bilateral currency regimes. Contrary to frequent apprehen-
sions, therefore, Europe’s influence in international monetary 
affairs might even increase by way of the ECC. 
One reason for this would be the reduction of internal 
conflicts if present political tensions between Northern and 
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Southern EMU states are resolved through flexible coor-
dination in a two-level system of monetary integration. In 
this context, the members of a more coherent EMU would 
benefit from the greater effectiveness of uniform ECB 
monetary policies and perhaps also from the closer coordi-
nation, envisaged by the “Five Presidents’ Report,” between 
the monetary, fiscal, and economic policies among struc-
turally convergent economies. Moreover, opportunities for 
further political integration might also allow the EMU to 
move beyond the present constraints of a rigid hard currency 
regime toward a wider range of macroeconomic options. 
The members of the ERM area, by contrast, would not 
be required to be economically coherent and structurally 
convergent. It could include members like Greece and other 
Southern political economies for whom the present coercion 
to achieve structural convergence appears economically, 
socially, or politically intolerable. Other members might 
resemble Denmark, the only current participant in ERM II; 
for them, structural convergence on the Northern model and 
EMU rules may be economically unproblematic, but their 
sense of political autonomy and democratic accountability 
may not allow them to submit to the directives, controls, and 
sanctions of centralized European authorities. 
Regardless of their diversity, they all depend on economic 
exchanges in closely integrated European markets and 
hence would benefit from protection against speculative 
currency fluctuations. Moreover, some of them might 
benefit even more from protection against downward 
currency speculation in situations where they are trying to 
fight a wage–inflation devaluation cycle. If the ECC were 
successful, both ERM and EMU members would enjoy the 
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economic benefits of being able to trade in the European 
economic space under nominal exchange rates reflecting the 
underlying fundamentals of their respective economies. 
In order to enjoy these benefits, however, ERM members 
would have to forswear the temptation of competitive deval-
uation. Both the central exchange rate and the permissible 
bandwidth would have to be set and could only be changed 
by agreement with the ECB, and willful noncompliance would 
entail exclusion from the ECC. In other words, membership 
of the ERM area would not relieve states from the discipline 
of having to manage the conflicting requirements spelled out 
in the Mundell-Fleming Trilemma.3 But it would allow them 
to use their own macroeconomic instruments in managing 
the trilemma and they would have more political discretion 
in doing so. Moreover, they would retain the safety option of 
being able to ask for a readjustment of the central exchange 
rate in the case of massive changes in economic fundamentals.4 
Under these conditions, it might not be utopian to think 
that not only Sweden, Poland, or the Czech Republic, but 
ultimately also Norway, Switzerland, and perhaps a post-
Brexit UK might come to prefer ERM membership to either 
joining EMU or struggling on their own in international 
currency markets. In other words, flexible coordination in 
the ECC could indeed contribute to further European inte-
gration and an enhanced European weight in world affairs. 
2.4 Assistance in transition
More immediately, however, countries like Greece – for 
whom EMU has become a prison regime with destructive 
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impacts on the domestic economy, the welfare state, and the 
political system – would need assistance in making the tran-
sition to ERM II. The need for such support was explicitly 
acknowledged by the German finance minister in the last 
paragraph of his “non-paper” of July 10, 2015, in which the 
possibility of Grexit (described as a “time-out” from EMU 
membership) was suggested. It proposed that
The time-out solution should be accompanied by supporting Greece 
as an EU member and the Greek people with growth-enhancing, 
humanitarian and technical assistance over the next years.5
The size, form, and conditions of such support would 
have to be negotiated, of course. Nevertheless, its purposes 
are well identified in the paragraph cited: technical support 
would be needed to facilitate the installation of a new 
currency, and humanitarian support would have to assist 
the rebuilding of minimal public and social services in areas 
where they have been devastated by austerity requirements. 
However, the third item, “growth-enhancing assistance,” 
requires comment.
In passages summarized above, I argue against proposals 
amounting to a “transfer union” that would ease the burdens 
of Southern adjustment by financial assistance in the context 
of the present EMU. By relaxing the pressures of fiscal 
austerity and internal devaluation, transfers would coun-
teract the purposes of structural transformation; and as long 
as competitiveness is not restored, subsidies to private invest-
ments could not induce sustained economic growth. Hence, 
moral appeals to European solidarity would be undermined 
by expectations of economic futility. But once Grexit and 
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nominal devaluation6 would establish the preconditions of 
external competitiveness, the availability of financial support 
for productive investments and essential imports may play 
the same positive role for economic recovery which the U.S. 
Marshall Plan played in postwar German reconstruction after 
a massive devaluation of the Deutsche Mark in 1949 (!). In 
other words, claims to solidarity and burden-sharing that 
invoke a common responsibility for damages inflicted by an 
ill-designed Monetary Union (e.g.,Tsoukalis 2016; Stiglitz 
2016) would then cease to be economically counterproductive. 
3. Conclusion
In June and July of 2015, none of the three preconditions postu-
lated above was in place. There were no general rules for dealing 
with state insolvency and the restructuring of public-sector 
debt; there were no standardized procedures allowing a state to 
leave the EMU without jeopardizing its EU membership; and 
there was no institutional framework defining the supportive 
relationship between the EMU and membership of the ERM 
II. But if this institutional background had existed, it would 
have been less plausible to think that the Tsipras government 
would still have preferred the humiliation of accepting the even 
harsher conditionalities of another rescue loan to the Grexit 
option suggested by Germany.
From a Greek perspective, moving from the EMU to 
ERM II would have allowed devaluation to an exchange 
rate corresponding to the country’s international competi-
tiveness. It would have reduced imports and facilitated 
exports without the ruinous contraction of aggregate 
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domestic demand and internal devaluation imposed by the 
present euro regime.7 Moreover, with the background guar-
antees of ECB interventions, the new exchange rate would 
be protected against speculative attacks triggering a spiral of 
devaluation, wage push inflation, and further devaluation. 
This would allow governments and unions to work out a 
social pact that would plausibly combine wage restraint and 
social policy commitments in a way that is compatible with 
sustainable economic growth. At the same time, this scenario 
would more plausibly allay geopolitical fears in Washington 
and Brussels than the continuing enforcement of structural 
convergence with its risk of political collapse could promise.
Beyond that, the institutional preconditions discussed 
would allow the evolution of a two-level European 
Currency Community. The first tier would include a struc-
turally more coherent Monetary Union combining a core 
group of Northern political economies and other members 
of the present Eurozone which might not wish to jeop-
ardize the gains already achieved through painful structural 
transformation or may have intrinsic preferences for hard 
currency policies and export-led economic growth. Their 
members would benefit from more effective macroeconomic 
management and from opportunities for greater institu-
tional and political integration. The second tier of a future 
European Currency Community would include economies 
for which enforced structural transformation appears unre-
alistic or that have strong political preferences for a greater 
autonomy in macroeconomic policy choices, but would still 
appreciate the benefits of reduced currency fluctuations and 
of mutual support against speculative attacks associated with 
membership of the wider community. 
There Is an Alternative: The Flexible 
European Currency Community
171
Even more important would be the benefits for European 
integration itself. Allowing member economies to grow in 
accordance with their structurally conditioned “growth 
models” would help to overcome the persistent economic 
stagnation of the Eurozone. At the same time, replacing 
the rigid institutional shell of a Monetary Union with 
a flexible two-level Community, and replacing enforced 
structural convergence with coordination among different 
political economies, would defuse the potentially explosive 
North–South conflicts that cannot be politically resolved at 
the European level. Economically and politically, therefore, 
Europe would not become weaker but stronger, internally 
and externally, by the transition from the coercive European 
Monetary Union to a cooperative European Currency 
Community, a community that could unlock capacities for 
European cooperation and political action that are presently 
paralyzed by the need to suppress the politicization of an 
irresolvable conflict.
Notes
1. Like George Soros, Mervyn King, and other economists, Stiglitz (2016, 
292-203) also suggests that transition would be much easier if Germany 
and other Northern economies would exit the EMU instead. In my view, 
this would be politically impossible. But Germany should have an interest 
in a smaller, structurally more coherent, economically more stable, and 
politically less conflict-ridden Eurozone – and, hence, should be willing to 
facilitate the transition to a more flexible monetary regime (Sinn 2014).
2. This assumes that the future Euro Area will be much larger than any 
individual ERM economy. Under these conditions, the ECB – unlike the 
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Bundesbank in 1992 – will be able to defeat (economically unjustifiable) 
downward speculation against any one ERM currency without jeopard-
izing its commitment to price stability in the EMU. And its willingness 
to intervene in currency markets would – again unlike that of the 
Bundesbank in 1992 – be supported by the voice of ERM states in ECB 
governing bodies. In addition to the buying and selling of currencies, one 
might also consider currency exchange controls (which the Bundesbank 
had used extensively in earlier decades) as a useful part of the option set.
3. The trilemma, identified independently by both authors at about the 
same time, suggests that fixed exchange rates, capital mobility, and 
monetary autonomy cannot be strictly maintained at the same time.
4. Unfortunately, Finland, whose (highly competitive) economy is suffering 
from the collapse of Nokia and the rise of EU sanctions against Russia, did 
not have this option under EMU.
5. http://www.sven-giegold.de/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/grexit_
bundesregierung_non_paper_10_juli_2015.pdf.
6. The present Euro regime is trying to achieve the same effect through 
downward pressures on wages and prices (“internal devaluation”), which 
are much harder to implement and politically much more controversial 
– and hence inherently precarious. In purely economic terms, under 
both types of devaluation, debtors will suffer – which is likely to impede 
domestic demand led economic growth. But in the case of nominal 
devaluation, the effect could be avoided by legislation defining a 1:1 
conversion rate for domestic wages, prices and debts. The conversion 
rate for border-crossing transactions would have to be defined in the 
agreement governing exit from the EMU.
7. Compared to internal devaluation (through wage depression and rising 
unemployment) whose costs will have to be borne by labor, the rise of 
import prices caused by nominal devaluation will affect all consumers. 
In both cases, however, the gain in competitiveness would be nullified 
through compensatory wage increases. 
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How risky is the unconventional 
monetary policy of the 
ECB? An assessment of 
(mainly German) critiques 
Maik Grabau and Heike Joebges
1. Introduction
Since the financial crisis, the ECB has been trying to ease 
financial tensions in the Euro Area by using unconventional 
monetary policy, or non-standard policy as the bank calls it. 
This policy faces heavy criticism, especially in Germany. Part 
of the criticism stems from unrealistic expectations about 
the power of monetary policy: according to some, extremely 
low and partially even negative interest rates should bust 
economic activity and especially investment. As this has 
not happened, the argument runs, the ECB’s policy must 
be unsuccessful and must be stopped. This criticism will not 
be considered here, as monetary policy can easily dampen 
economic activity, but not as easily kick-start growth: It can 
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only set incentives for more investment by decreasing interest 
rates. Yet, first, commercial banks have to translate these 
reductions into rates of credit, and second, companies will 
only invest if they expect that demand will be high enough to 
allow for profits. 
In addition, monetary policy has been confronted with 
savage austerity measures in the Euro Area: Several countries 
suffered from high government debt levels, resulting from 
the financial crisis and the ensuing recession. The pressure 
to decrease public spending, especially in crisis countries like 
Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Italy, resulted in a very 
contractionary fiscal policy. Such a policy dampens economic 
activity. Consequently, monetary and fiscal policies aimed at 
opposite outcomes, blocking their mutual effects.
While the degree of austerity has diminished in the Euro 
Area and growth seems to turn positive in all member coun-
tries, the ECB is continuing its unconventional policy. This 
has been effective in several ways: It dampened spreads 
between government bonds of Euro Area countries, thereby 
easing financial market access for crisis countries’ govern-
ments. At the same time, it provided commercial banks 
with long-term liquidity to stabilize banks and support 
credit supply. This helped to decrease spreads in lending 
rates among Euro Area countries, and it led to overall low 
interest rates and returns, even for longer maturities, thereby 
decreasing investment costs. In addition, these policies 
dampened the value of the Euro, thereby supporting Euro 
Area exports. 
Nevertheless, all these measures imply risks. Critics point to 
• distributional consequences: the policy harms poorer 
savers and benefits wealthy asset holders;
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• the risk of asset bubbles in equity and housing, 
• decreasing profits in the banking system, and weakening 
banks, leaving them less prepared for fresh crises, and 
• decreasing profits of companies offering life insurance and 
pension provisions, potentially provoking insolvencies. 
The article will explain how relevant the different risks are. 
Yet, before judging their relevance, it will briefly explain the 
positive effects of the ECB’s unconventional policy.
2. Positive Effects of unconventional monetary policy
Unconventional policy goes beyond a policy rate close to 
zero (see “main refinancing rate” in figure 1). It includes the 
provision of more and longer-term liquidity to commercial 
banks compared to normal times. To prevent commercial 
banks from hoarding this liquidity, they have to pay for depos-
iting excess liquidity at the ECB (see the negative “deposit 
facility rate” in figure 1). In addition, the ECB purchases 
corporate and government bonds on secondary markets.
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Figure 1: ECB policy rate and related rates
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Source: ECB via Reuters Datastream, own presentation.
As can be seen in figure 2 (below), returns on government 
bonds started to increase for Greece at the end of 2009. 
Irish and Portuguese yields seemed to mimic this behaviour, 
followed by those on Spanish and Italian bonds. Bond 
returns reflect refinancing costs for governments, implying 
that servicing the debt became more costly for those coun-
tries that anyway faced several economic problems. Figure 
2 shows the increase of yields for those countries up to 
mid-2012, and the later decrease of spreads until 2015. 
The declining yields have probably rescued the Euro and, 
furthermore, contributed to easing the fiscal burden on crisis 
countries’ governments. 
In order to decrease the spread in yields between different 
Euro Area countries, the ECB reverted to unconven-
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tional measures: An important factor was ECB president 
Mario Draghi’s announcement to support the Euro with 
“whatever it takes” in July 2012, followed later by purchases 
of government bonds (SMP, PSPP). As the ECB purchased 
government bonds on secondary markets, it contributed 
to decreasing the spreads in yields and – at the same time 
– pushed liquidity into the system (figure 3), not only to 
financial institutions, but also to the non-financial sector. 
While the policy of purchasing government bonds to 
decrease spreads in yields was successful until 2015, spreads 
on bond returns have started to widen again since then 
(figure 2).
Figure 2: Yields on government bonds 
of selected euro area countries
Source: ECB, own presentation.
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Figure 3: Liquidity effects of the ECB’s bond 
purchasing programs in billion euro
 
Note: SMP: Securities Markets Program, PSPP: Public Sector Purchase 
Program; CBPP1-CBPP3: Covered Bond Purchase Programs, ABSPP: 
Asset Backed Securities Purchase Program)
Source: ECB via Reuters Datastream, own presentation. 
Besides supporting financial access for governments, the 
ECB tried to stabilize commercial banks by providing them 
with more and more longer-term liquidity at low costs. In 
order to remove incentives for them to deposit this liquidity 
at the ECB, and rather use it for credit supply, banks have had 
to pay for excessive deposits since June 2014 (figure 1, deposit 
facility rate). These measures have contributed to banking 
system stability and supported credit supply. Together with 
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negligible costs for accessing liquidity, lending rates have 
decreased. The ECB stresses: “Bank retail lending rates have 
declined steadily since 2014 and their dispersion has narrowed 
considerably across the euro area.” (ECB 2017, p. 41). Lower 
interest rates and lower yields on financial assets, especially for 
longer maturities, are supposed to decrease investment costs 
and support economic activity. Figure 4 shows that the ECB 
managed to stabilize credit developments for the Euro Area 
on average, but not for all countries, as the decreasing credit 
volume for instance in Spain demonstrates. The ECB deems 
these unconventional measures necessary for the transmission 
of monetary policy and for ensuring financial stability.
Figure 4: Credit supply in the euro area 
and selected euro area countries
Source: ECB via Reuters Datastream, own presentation
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Figure 5 shows that the ECB’s policy has also weakened 
the Euro’s external value, especially against the Swiss Franc, 
but also against the US-Dollar, yet hardly against the 
Japanese Yen and the British Pound. The Pound suffered 
from the Brexit debate. Even though exchange rate policy is 
not part of the ECB’s mandate, the dampening effect on the 
currency’s value via low interest rates supports exports.
Figure 5: The external value of the euro 
against selected currencies
Source: Reuters Datastream, own presentation
3. Distributional consequences of 
the ECB’s monetary policy
Critics point to unwanted distributional consequences of 
the ECB’s unconventional monetary policy. This is a valid 
point, as central banks’ actions always imply distributional 
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effects. Interestingly, these effects caught less attention up 
until the financial crisis. The simplest argument is that low 
or even negative interest rates favour borrowers over lenders 
and savers. This critique is correct, yet this is one of this 
policy’s intended effects: it seeks to discourage savings and 
encourage spending so as to boost economic activity. 
Opponents in Germany may argue that its economy 
does not require such a low level of interest rates and that 
it is hurting German savers more than necessary. Implicitly, 
they are criticizing the fact that the ECB can only try to 
optimize the policy rate for the entire Eurozone, focusing 
on average economic developments. This is a problem of 
any common currency area. Yet, this critique should be 
aimed at the absence of alternative policy instruments that 
might compensate for the lack of national monetary policy. 
National governments did not or could not use fiscal policy 
to a degree that would have been able to counteract divergent 
economic developments. The lack of complementary or alter-
native instruments in the Euro Area to substitute for the loss 
of national monetary policy attracts illegitimate criticisms of 
the ECB, thus treating it as a scapegoat (see the discussion 
of instruments in other contributions to this book). 
Given the current institutional setup, the ECB can only 
set interest rates for the average Euro Area. The resulting 
interest rate level is indeed low for Germany, and very unat-
tractive for savers. Yet, low levels do not necessarily signal 
that interest rates are too low. Even though the European 
Commission expects that from 2016 onwards, all Eurozone 
economies (and even all EU members) will have been 
growing in real terms, inflation in the Euro Area has only 
very recently been closer to the ECB’s target of close to 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
186
but below 2 %. Euro Area inflation measured by the HICP 
reached 1.8% in January 2017, and 1.9% in Germany. As 
special effects stemming from recent energy price increases 
are behind these higher figures, but will fade out in the 
coming months, inflation expectations of professional fore-
casters continue to expect HICP inflation clearly below 2%, 
in line with the ECB’s own forecasts for the coming years. 
Second, the relevance of the effect is unclear, as Thomas 
Fricke has pointed out recently in a Social Europe Blog 
(Fricke 2017). He subtracts about 50% of the German 
population with close to no savings or even negative savings 
(i.e. indebted households) and argues that most savers will 
not mainly retain their money in a bank account but benefit 
from the rise in equity prices. 
Third, even if his calculations underestimate the effect’s 
relevance, it is interesting to note that critics were less 
concerned during the long phase when savers and lenders in 
Germany benefitted from too high (real) interest rates, and 
borrowers suffered. From the introduction of the Euro up to 
the financial crisis, (real) interest rates were above the levels 
justified by economic developments in Germany. In addition, 
negative real rates are not something new: Real returns on 
short-term German savings deposits were negative during 
the 1970s and in the early 1990s
Nevertheless, not only low or negative interest rates have 
distributional consequences, but also the ECB’s purchase 
of government bonds and corporate bonds. Adam and 
Tzamourani (2016) try to simulate the effects of asset price 
increases in bonds, equity, and housing separately for the 
Euro Area, as all these prices may rise as a consequence of 
the ECB’s unconventional policy. Assuming for each asset 
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an increase of about 10%, they find on average no relevant 
distributional consequences for bond price increases in the 
Euro Area, while the increase in equity prices mainly benefits 
the upper 5% of the population with already high levels of 
wealth. Regarding this effect, the ECB contributes to wealth 
inequality by furthering share price inflation. Yet, the positive 
effect on housing prices rather benefits the middle class (and 
lower classes, should they own their home), for whom housing 
wealth constitutes a higher share of overall wealth than for 
wealthy individuals. In countries with high home ownership 
ratios, this effect may even dampen overall inequality.
In addition, even the Bundesbank argues that a compre-
hensive assessment of distributional effects should also 
incorporate the positive effect of the ECB’s policy on 
employment and income that might otherwise have suffered 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2016). As better employment and 
income developments benefit employees relying on wage 
income, the ECB’s policy might even decrease income 
and wealth inequality in the Euro Area. In addition, low 
returns on government bonds increase the policy room for 
manoeuvre for financing social policy and transfers to low-
income households. Overall, the criticism about increasing 
inequality appears unjustified. 
4. Risks of asset bubbles in equity and housing
Another criticism often voiced concerns asset bubbles, 
especially bubbles in equity and housing. The Bundesbank 
has recently published a study, according to which housing 
prices have increased in Germany by 25 percent since 2010. 
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Yet, concentrating solely on the seven biggest German cities, 
the increase amounts to more than 60 percent (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2017). This raises the fear of local bubbles. To 
avoid asset bubble formation at national level is especially 
important for housing, as bursting bubbles can have long-
lasting negative effects on economic activity. 
While this is a risk, it should not be overstressed: First, 
increasing equity and housing prices are important channels 
for the transmission of monetary policy. With increasing 
prices, companies’ values increase, improving equity to debt 
ratios and allowing for easier credit access. Second, a rise in 
housing prices does not directly signal bubble formation. 
Instead, housing prices should go up if interest rates fall 
and are expected to stay at low levels, at least according to 
theoretical models. This constitutes a fundamentally justified 
price increase. Third, prudent financial regulations in a broad 
sense can address and prevent asset bubble formation, even 
in the face of low financing costs (Dullien et al. 2015). 
The EU has already reacted and enforced the national 
implementation of new mortgage credit regulation: Since 
then (March 2015 for Germany), banks have to factor in the 
repayment capabilities of potential borrowers after a future 
rate increase. The idea is that nobody should get a loan who 
can only service the debt in periods of extremely low rates, 
but would default in the event of a rate rise. 
Consequently, the risk of asset price inflation is not a 
convincing argument to end unconventional monetary 
policy. House price increases may increase social tensions 
between home-owners and non-owners and may contribute 
to rising rentals; yet, there are better tools to counteract these 
developments than monetary policy. Adequate financial 
How risky is the unconventional monetary policy of the ECB? 
An assessment of (mainly German) critiques
189
regulation can prevent bubble formation. And the local 
housing price increases in Germany rather call for a greater 
social housing supply of low rent flats in bigger cities and 
reduced incentives to use housing as a speculative asset.
5. Decreasing profitability of banks 
Another, more relevant criticism concerns the negative effect 
on banks’ business. Savings banks in particular benefit from 
higher nominal interest rate levels and this tends to increase 
banks’ profit margins, as proven empirically. Current low to 
negative rates have decreased their margins. 
Even worse, holding customers’ deposits is even proving 
costly for banks: Commercial banks have to hold a fraction 
of their deposits at the ECB. If they hold more than the 
required amount, which they may do as holdings at the ECB 
are considered extremely safe and liquid, they have to pay 
for it, as the deposit facility rate is negative. Consequently, 
banks may lose money from deposits, even if they pay zero 
interest rates to their clients. Banks try to shift these costs to 
their clients, and have been successful in making companies 
pay, and, in the interim, even (local) governments. Yet, they 
cannot easily pass on negative rates to private households, 
as these have the option to hold money as cash instead. In 
addition, legal barriers may impede this: In Germany, for 
example, the Civil Code (§ 488 (1) BGB) allows zero, but 
not negative nominal interest rates for bank deposits, at least 
according to prevailing interpretations. Banks try to partly 
compensate for costs by increasing account maintenance 
fees, yet this can only be a sub-optimal solution. 
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In addition, banks relying traditionally on transforming 
different maturities (channelling short-term deposits into 
long-term credit), benefit from a steep yield curve, i.e. from 
strong differences between long-term and short-term rates. 
Yet, the ECB’s policy has contributed to a rather flat yield 
curve, and even on purpose: Long-term rates are close to 
low short-term rates, in order to allow for low credit costs 
and thereby incentivise investments. While this is positive 
for companies, it harms the banking system that relies on 
revenues from maturity transformation. The ECB shows in 
a study that margins based on maturity transformation have 
more or less halved since 2014 (ECB 2017: 45).
These developments, together with higher capital require-
ments as a response to the financial crisis, explain the 
decreasing profit margins in the banking system. According to 
a calculation by Bain & Company, the return on equity has 
halved for German banks, from about 4 % before the financial 
crisis to only 2% in 2012-2015. While the return on equity has 
also decreased for French banks by more than 50%, they still 
show a rate of return slightly above German pre-crisis levels 
(Bain & Company 2016, p. 7). Nevertheless, this loss in profit-
ability is a worrying outcome for all banks in the Euro Area. A 
continuation of the low interest rate environment will weaken 
the banking system, reducing their resilience to future shocks.
6. Decreasing profitability of life and 
pension insurance companies
Similarly, life and pension insurance companies suffer. 
Owing to regulation, these companies mainly invest in safe 
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assets. Consequently, government bonds carrying a low risk 
play an important role as assets in their portfolio. Yet, returns 
on government bonds considered safe havens, such as 
German Bunds, have fallen and even turned negative in the 
wake of the ECB’s unconventional policy. While negative 
rates are more prevalent among shorter maturities, figure 2 
shows that even 10-year government bonds became slightly 
negative during the second and third quarters of 2016.
This would not constitute a problem if life and pension 
insurance companies could roll-over the negative rates to 
their clients. But this is legally impossible: Many contracts 
for retirement provisions and life insurance have a guar-
anteed (minimum) interest rate, set by national authorities. 
In Germany, the federal ministry of finance has reduced the 
minimum interest rate that companies have to offer several 
times since 2000, down to 0.9% in 2017. Yet, this reduced 
rate only applies to new life insurance policies or pension 
contracts, while the old contracts may offer rates above 
4%. Consequently, companies offering life insurance and 
pensions suffer from the low and negative interest rate envi-
ronment. The longer it takes for rates to recover, the higher 
the probability of decreasing profits and even insolvencies. 
7. Conclusions
Alongside improving economic indicators for the Euro Area, 
the ECB is continuing its unconventional policy as HICP 
inflation has not yet clearly reached target inflation. This 
policy has been effective: First, it decreased spreads between 
government bonds of Euro Area countries and eased 
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financial market access for crisis countries. Second, it stabi-
lized commercial banks by providing them with long-term 
and almost cost-free liquidity, coupled with incentives to 
supply credit to the economy. This contributed to low lending 
rates, even for longer maturities, and declining spreads 
between euro area countries, thereby stabilizing the Euro 
Area financial system. In addition, this policy dampened the 
Euro’s external value, thereby supporting exports. 
Critics are right in pointing to the risks involved. Yet, 
some of the criticisms seem unjustified. First, unconven-
tional monetary policy does not seem to increase wealth 
inequality but the opposite. Second, the risk of asset bubbles 
in equities and housing could be (and has been) addressed by 
sensible regulation. Even so, unconventional policy weakens 
the financial sector. Decreasing returns for the banking 
system and companies providing life insurance and pensions 
may lay the ground for future problems in this sector, if the 
low interest rate environment persists. Yet, in order to avoid 
such a destabilization, a swifter recovery of the Euro Area 
should be supported by other means such as fiscal measures, 
not necessarily by a different stance of monetary policy.
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EMU architecture and 
governance of finance
Helene Schuberth1 
1. Introduction
While the global financial crisis that emerged in 2007 and 
quickly spread across the globe was triggered by events 
in the US mortgage and banking sector, its repercussions 
were felt particularly severely in Europe. The European 
banking sector was hit hard given its insufficient degree 
of external diversification owing to a strong bias towards 
the US. Banks and the structured investment vehicles 
that were linked to them had invested heavily in the US 
mortgage market. As interbank markets broke down, 
central banks had to step in and governments eventually 
provided wholesale guarantees and capital for financial 
institutions. The socialisation of private losses was unprec-
edented in recent economic history and added to the surge 
in public debt. 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
196
With the increasing length of the crisis, the deep struc-
tural flaws of the regulatory architecture of the Euro Area 
became fully visible. Indeed, the crisis would most likely have 
materialised even without the financial disruption in the 
US at some time in the future. With the onset of the self-
fulfilling liquidity runs on some Euro Area sovereigns in 
2010, the crisis also revealed institutional design failures in the 
European Monetary Union (EMU) – some of them related to 
banking and financial sector regulation – that were tested in 
the extreme and which exacerbated the financial crisis. 
This contribution discusses governance and regulatory 
reforms in the European Union with a special focus on 
the reforms related to the better functioning of Monetary 
Union (MU) and it tries to identify reform gaps and the 
challenges ahead. Section 2 asks why European banks were 
so severely affected by the crisis. Section 3 outlines how the 
governance of finance in general added to the design failures 
in MU that are at the heart of the so-called euro crisis. 
Section 4 discusses the rationale of the Banking Union and 
other proposals that contribute to a better working of MU. 
Section 5 outlines conclusions.
2. Why were European banks so 
heavily affected by the crisis? 
When considering the role of European banks before the 
crisis, three features stand out. 
First, the crisis has fundamentally challenged the narrative, 
predominant in policy circles, of European banks primarily 
funding the real economy and being less engaged in the opaque 
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shadow banking activities known in shareholder value econ-
omies. The dichotomy is not so much between arms-length, 
market financing (i.e. US, UK) and bank-based financial struc-
tures (i.e. Germany) but between traditional retail banking 
activities and market-based business models that focus on 
high-risk and high-leverage activities. European banks pursued 
aggressive expansion strategies and became global, systemi-
cally important financial institutions. Starting in the 1990s, the 
historically prevalent bank-intermediated financial system in 
Europe had undergone, via policy-induced deregulation and 
innovation and legislative initiatives promoting integration, 
a process of fundamental transformation towards the devel-
opment of liquid, securitized financial markets, supported by 
a large-volume, integrated wholesale market that was increas-
ingly used by banks to leverage up their balance sheets at low 
cost. European banks were the most reliant on wholesale 
funding worldwide, much more so than U.S. banks. At the 
height of the crisis, large European banks were funding about 
two-thirds of their assets in wholesale funding markets. The 
wholesale market is not supported by any official safety net 
and is inherently fragile. It comprises unsecured short-term 
debt securities issued by banks, the unsecured interbank debt 
market, refinancing operations with the European Central 
Bank (ECB), as well as repurchase agreements (‘repo market’). 
Initiatives to integrate the repo market which accounted for 
an important part of the wholesale market were key for the 
rapid growth of this funding source of banks. Between 2001 
and 2008 the repo market tripled in volume, to €6 trillion. By 
2008 its size was similar to that of the US (Gabor 2016).
The increasing mix of traditional and capital markets 
banking in Europe had important systemic implications 
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that were widely overlooked before the crisis. Securities 
dealing, over-the-counter derivatives and repo markets are 
based on margin accounts and the need for collateral, such as 
government bonds, which are the most important collateral 
by far in repo transactions in Europe, as well as other, often 
securitized assets. 
Repos were usually portrayed as transferring and miti-
gating risk. Banks borrow short term against collateral. If the 
bank that has borrowed cash defaults, the lender of cash is 
not exposed to the credit risk of the borrower as it can sell the 
collateral. But when banks are unable to meet collateral calls 
because of significant mark-to-market price shifts of assets 
that serve as collateral, liquidity crises emerge (Blundell-
Wignall 2011) that may well degenerate into solvency crises. 
The technique of re-hypothecation allowed multiple use of 
the same collateral. Hence, different financial institutions 
are connected through just one financial instrument and are 
exposed to its price volatility. If its price falls the institutions 
that have accepted the instrument as collateral make margin 
calls on their counterparties: each borrower has to post addi-
tional collateral or cash. Or haircuts are increased. This may 
lead to fire sales and further margin calls and systemic risks 
may be spreading through collateral networks.
Systemic risk may also be relevant when securitized 
instruments are involved. In principle, the more securitized 
credit and derivative contracts are, the greater the likelihood 
of liquidity crises (Garber and Folkerts-Landau 1992) and 
the more the financial system becomes globally intercon-
nected and opaque. It became increasingly difficult to trace 
risk transfers. Securitization has played a role in ampli-
fying systemic risk by facilitating excessive leverage and 
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risk concentration across the financial sector (Acharaya et 
al. 2013). Further, even not so large banks turned out to be 
systemically important.
Second, widely unnoticed before the crisis, global 
European banks increasingly engaged in round-tripping 
across the Atlantic. Their US branches and subsidiaries 
borrowed large amounts of US dollars through the US 
money markets, transferred them to headquarters in Europe 
and invested them in asset-backed, particularly mortgage-
backed securities and structured products generated by 
securitization via the US shadow banking system (Shin 
2012). Or to put it simply: The US banks provided the 
European banks with the funds that allowed the latter to 
purchase high-yielding US safe assets, that turned out to 
be not that safe. In the crisis these apparently liquid assets 
became illiquid while the apparently stable funding base 
evaporated in a flash (Ramskogler 2014). The significance of 
this round-tripping is well visible in the US capital accounts 
data. In the years before the crisis gross capital inflows from 
Europe to the US grew rapidly in parallel to the surge in 
gross capital outflows (Chart 1). 
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Chart 1: Gross Capital Flows to and from the US
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In 2007 the recycling mechanism explained above came to 
a sudden halt, flows of funds dried up and central banks and 
fiscal authorities had to step in at an unprecedented scale.
The third feature that stands out was the explosive growth 
of cross-border banking within the Euro Area – facilitated 
by the elimination of currency risk within it following the 
adoption of a single currency (see Chart 2). Cross-border 
takeovers were much less important and the retail banking 
markets remained quite fragmented. This increase in cross-
border flows mainly reflects cross-border lending of the core 
Eurozone countries’ banks to the banks of the periphery 
countries while the latter, given inadequate regulation and 
an impaired intermediation function of banks, fuelled unsus-
tainable credit, property and consumption booms. They 
were partly directed towards unproductive uses. In addition, 
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core countries’ banks and insurance companies in particular 
invested in sovereign bonds of the periphery, practically 
equalising yields across Euro Area countries. Intra Euro 
Area capital inflows to peripheral countries facilitated real 
effective exchange rate appreciations via an economic boom 
that further widened unsustainable current account deficits 
(Chen et al. 2012). This was particularly harmful given the 
various shocks to the periphery countries’ trade balance orig-
inating outside (i.e. the rise of China) and inside (excessive 
wage moderation in surplus countries) the Euro Area in the 
years before the crisis.
Severe capital flow reversals – comparable to the sudden-
stop events known from emerging market currency crises 
rather than sovereign debt crises (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 
2012) – started in 2008 that could only partly be mitigated 
by Eurosystem financing and program financial facilities. The 
exposure of Euro Area core countries’ banks to the periphery 
countries did not stabilise until 2012. Ultimately, the ECB’s 
‘whatever it takes’ stance was decisive in mitigating the flight 
to safety and in stabilising sovereign bond yields of the 
stressed economies at a rather low level. This commitment 
was so effective that markets never tested it (see for details 
Herr in this volume).
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Chart 2: Cross-border claims of Euro Area banks 
on EA core and periphery (intra-EA)
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3. Design features of the Euro Area and the role of banks
What were the main design features of the Euro Area’s 
architecture related to banks that created a breeding ground 
for the severe and lasting crisis episodes in Europe? 
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3.1 Global banks – national supervisors
First, European banks rapidly expanded cross-border inte-
gration, while they remained supervised at national level. 
Financial conglomerates operating under multiple juris-
dictions emerged with complex, opaque organisational 
structures. The gap between the geographical exposure of the 
banks and their supervision at national level is indicative of 
the regulatory deficiencies before the crisis, because it created 
above all opportunities of regulatory arbitrage and regulatory 
capture. Further, national banking systems are large relative 
to the size of a country’s economy and of the respective 
fiscal backstops (see Chart 3). Regulators were often willing 
to relax rules and exercise regulatory forbearance in order 
to improve the competitive advantage of the respective 
domestic banking system. Too often they did not account 
for the negative cross-border spill-overs of their activities. 
The fact that the focus was on microprudential supervision 
alone fundamentally added to these deficiencies. No specific 
consideration was given to systemic risk.
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Chart 3: Size of the banking sector in EA, UK and US
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The lack of a vigorous supervisor at European level had other 
severe implications. The rapid shift to market-based (shadow) 
banking activities and the associated complex intermediation 
chains overwhelmed national supervisory capacities.
With the outbreak of the crisis, the national character 
of bank rescue operations in general strengthened the 
sovereign/bank nexus: Fiscal backstops were only provided 
nationally. Private losses were shifted to the respective 
country’s public sector. This has generated (the potential 
of ) rising risk premia for (previously sound) sovereigns of 
economies with weak banking systems in anticipation of a 
bailout (De Grauwe and Ji 2012). In contrast, in the US a 
regional banking crisis does not negatively affect the ratings 
of a regional state because bank rescue and resolution are a 
federal competence. In the absence of a proper (cross-border) 
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resolution framework for banks, a far smaller number of 
distressed banks was liquidated in Europe than in the US, 
which has a long tradition in bank resolution.
3.2 Sovereigns and banks in monetary union 
issue debt in ‘foreign currency’
The second design feature that puts severe stress on the 
stability of the Euro Area is related to the fact that the sover-
eigns and banks of the 19 Euro Area countries issue debt “in 
foreign currency”. All Euro Area countries have their own 
national central banks that keep their own balance sheets 
and, unlike “stand-alone countries” like the US, member 
countries of the MU issue debt in a currency they no longer 
control. As a result, governments cannot guarantee that 
liquidity will always be available to roll over government 
debt (De Grauwe and Ji 2013). Thus, the sovereign credit of 
the (weaker) member states is more exposed to the risk of 
liquidity runs, contagion and self-fulfilling default. Indirectly, 
via the sovereign/bank nexus, this has also repercussions on 
banks, as doubts concerning their exposure to the sovereign 
may arise more easily, translating more quickly into funding 
problems. Moreover, similar to (weaker) sovereigns, banks 
in (weaker) Monetary Union countries are directly affected: 
they lack an implicit guarantee from their central banks that 
cash will always be available under the central banks’ lender-
of-last-resort function.  Thus, these banks are more exposed 
to the risk of bank runs. At the same time, a common deposit 
insurance is still lacking, while depositors become increas-
ingly aware how easy and cheap it is to transfer deposits to 
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banks in other (stronger) member states, given the success of 
the Single European Payment Area (SEPA).
One direct effect is financial fragmentation in the Euro 
Area via tightened credit supply conditions for the crisis 
countries. This generates a downward spiral of deleveraging, 
contracting economic conditions, rising non-performing 
loans that weigh on new lending, a recession-induced dete-
rioration of the fiscal position and capital flight.
3.3 ‘Shadow/fiscal nexus’ is destabilizing government debt markets
Related to the second, the third inherently destabi-
lising feature of the Euro Area that should deserve more 
attention is the way in which the repo market, the most 
important setting for shadow banking activities in Europe, is 
connecting the fate of sovereigns with the fate of large banks 
(or non-bank intermediaries belonging to shadow banking 
entities) that are key nodes in collateral networks (Gabor 
and Ban 2016). This design feature related to governance of 
the repo market in Europe amplifies the second. 
As indicated above, reliance on short-term repos that 
are to a large part collateralised with government bonds 
turned sovereign debt into a crucial tool for financing banks’ 
expansion strategies. Thus, highly liquid sovereign assets 
became important for ensuring (international) funding for 
those banks in particular that have a weak deposit base. At 
the same time, this makes the 19 individual sovereigns in the 
Euro Area dependent on the collateral quality of their debt, 
which may be disconnected from fiscal sustainability and 
fundamentals – the familiar narrative. Rather, the fortune of 
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sovereigns hinges, via the repo market, on shocks to the short-
term funding of global banks, on the tightening or loosening 
of collateral policies of private repo actors and central banks, 
moreover on pro-cyclical ratings, as well as on the amplifying 
effects of credit default swaps that were driving up interest 
rates of peripheral countries, thus exacerbating the crisis 
(Delatte et al. 2012). In a highly liquid government bond 
market like that of the US, one backed by the central bank, 
the ‘shadow/fiscal nexus’ is probably less relevant. During the 
crisis, US treasuries preserved their ‘safe asset’ collateral status. 
But in a currency union with many sovereigns not backed by 
their central banks, individual sovereigns are at the mercy of 
the multiple actors in the repo market.
4. Financial sector regulation and the 
rationale of the banking union
Following the regulatory reform agenda of the G-20 that 
started its work in late 2008, the EU has implemented a 
wide range of regulations through many legislative acts 
(Schuberth 2013). The main focus was to make banks more 
resilient by introducing, above all, higher capital ratios for all, 
and in particular, for large, systemic banks. Large parts of the 
previously opaque derivatives market were forced to migrate 
to central counterparty platforms (CCPs). Macroprudential 
instruments have been introduced that should mitigate pro-
cyclicality in bank lending.
But the crisis taught Europe the lesson that, in addition 
to regulatory reforms, MU governance needs a complete 
overhaul – in particular in the areas of a Fiscal, Social and 
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Banking union. The latter is considered as the main remedy 
for breaking the ‘diabolic’ feedback loop between national 
banking and sovereign risks. But governance reform is 
closely interlinked with regulatory reform. Both have to be 
implemented in a comprehensive and consistent manner. In 
the following, the major governance reforms are discussed. 
We explore whether they may fix the design failures laid out 
in Section 2 and whether they are consistent with the regu-
latory reform agenda.
4.1 Governance reforms in EMU – an overview 
Governance (and regulatory) reform so far has mainly 
addressed the design failures, indicated in 2a (global banks 
– national supervisors). The transfer of supervisory and reso-
lution powers to the central level via Banking Union was 
meant to alleviate 2a, and – partially – 2b (sovereigns and 
banks in monetary union issue debt in ‘foreign currency’). So 
far, reform has done little to lessen the destabilising effects 
stemming from 2b and the ‘shadow/fiscal nexus’ (2c) via the 
repo market. Options would be new regulation commanding 
countercyclical collateral policies that were strongly pro-
cyclical during the crisis, financial transactions taxes for 
repo transactions, taxation of repo-based bank liabilities, or, 
more far-reaching, providing backstops for repo markets or 
pooling sovereignty via euro bonds, the latter being probably 
the most effective cure for the design failures of the Euro 
Area in general.
But governance reform has strongly relied on one 
phenomenon identified as the single most important 
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impediment to recovery in the Euro Area, and in particular 
in the periphery: The sovereign/bank nexus. The tight 
financial linkages between states and banks set in motion 
a vicious circle where banking and sovereign crises exac-
erbate each other. The sovereign/bank loop works two 
ways. First, systemically important troubled banks might 
trigger a surge in the spread on debt of a previously sound 
sovereign because of the potential for a government-
financed bank bailout or because of lower tax revenues 
resulting from severe economic downturns caused by 
problems in the banking sector. Second, if there is doubt 
about fiscal sustainability and spreads of government bonds 
are rising, the risk premia of previously healthy banks may 
rise in parallel. 
Several proposals have been put forward to diminish this 
nexus and address the embedded design failures of MU. 
4.2 Banking Union 
First and foremost is the creation of a Banking Union. 
To many this seems to be an initiative born out of the 
experience of the crisis. But it is in fact based on an older 
debate. During the preparations for the Maastricht Treaty 
in the early 1990s, there was already the strong conviction 
that a single system of banking supervision at European 
level was a key element in the construction of MU ( James 
2013). While the proposal was vetoed at the time, Article 
127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union eventually allowed the European Council to confer 
the task of prudential supervision upon the ECB. 
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At the height of the euro crisis in summer 2012 the EU 
decided to establish a Banking Union – following numerous 
calls by economists and policy-makers – by setting up a 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) as of November 
2014. Within the SSM, the ECB is the primary supervisor 
of the Euro Area’s biggest banks. It directly supervises the 
largest 129 banks, accounting for approximately 85% of 
banking assets of the area, and indirectly all the banks in 
the area. The smaller institutions (well over 3,000 of them) 
continue to be supervised by national supervisory author-
ities, subject to ECB oversight. All Euro Area member states 
participate in the SSM as a rule but other EU member states 
may choose to be included.
The first pillar of Banking Union, the SSM, is a highly 
centralised scheme. The second pillar is the Single Reso-
lution Mechanism (SRM) that aims to ensure that failing 
systemically important financial institutions can be resolved 
in an orderly manner without burdening taxpayers. In 
general, the SRM entails a more complex division of respon-
sibilities between European and national authorities. At the 
beginning of 2016 the Single Resolution Board (SRB) was 
given full responsibility for dissolving ailing banks within 
Euro Area countries. The SRB can press ahead with reso-
lution measures even if the national authorities are reluctant, 
but the involvement of the European Commission and 
Council makes for a complex decision-making structure, 
which is seen as drawback of the SRM regime (Veron 
2015). To ensure the efficient application of resolution 
tools, a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) has been established. 
During a period of transition, the SRF consists of national 
compartments coexisting with a mutualised fund, until full 
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mutualisation is achieved in 2024. Then it should reach a 
total size of €55 billion funded by contributions from banks. 
Given the size of European banks’ assets, which reached 
more than €30 trillion euro in 2016, the fund is considered 
to be extremely under-sized. Another concern is the lack of 
a common backstop during the transition period and the 
continued lack of a European fiscal backstop. Setting up a 
credible common backstop for the SRF during this tran-
sition period features as one of the priorities indicated by 
The Five Presidents’ Report (EC 2015). 
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) sets 
the frame for the resolution process. Bailing-in shareholders 
and uninsured and unsecured creditors for a minimum 
amount of 8% of total bank liabilities before any funds 
from the SRF may be injected into a bank under resolution 
has been mandatory since 2016. The bail-in instrument is 
usually seen as a huge step forward.  It should reduce the 
implicit state guarantee ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) banks are 
enjoying by substantially diminishing the expectation of a 
taxpayers’ bailout. It should be mentioned that public inter-
ventions for the rescue of banks have often resulted in a 
further concentration of the banking sector through mergers 
(Zhou et al. 2012); this has further aggravated the ‘too-big-
to-fail’ problem. Further, moral hazard should be eliminated 
by forcing shareholders and creditors to bear the losses on 
the risks they have taken. Finally, bail-in could to some 
extent help to break the bank/sovereign nexus. 
But there are problematic features as well that will have to 
be fixed. Bail-in is a useful tool for dealing with idiosyncratic 
bank failures but difficult to implement during a systemic 
crisis. If banks hold a large amount of bail-in-able debt secu-
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rities – which is the case in the Euro Area (Pigrum et al. 2016) 
– intra-sectoral connectedness may lead to contagion in the 
case of large-scale bail-in operations. The quite substantial 
share of wealthy households in holdings of bail-in-able debt 
instruments may prompt political pressure to avoid bail-ins. 
By the end of 2016 the endeavour to bail in creditors was 
only partly successful, as the Italian government decided to 
bail in holdings of institutional investors, but to bail out the 
roughly similar-sized volume of all retail investors’ holdings 
of subordinated bail-in-able bank debt.
The new framework of resolution and bail-in implies a 
major shift to more balanced burden-sharing and to sounder 
incentives for investors and bank managers. But it is no 
universal remedy for the ‘too-big-to-fail’ problem, which 
requires reducing the complexity and interconnectedness of 
banks and limiting the size of extremely large bank groups. 
The fact that some basic elements of a Banking Union 
(centralised supervision – matching the perimeter of banks 
with the regulatory perimeter, reducing risk of regulatory 
capture at national level, bail-in regime) have been put in 
place is a huge step forward. It is probably the most signif-
icant policy development in Europe since the creation of the 
Euro. But with only the first and the second pillar in place, 
the link between banks and sovereigns has not been fully 
broken. An important ingredient of the Banking Union still 
needs to be implemented: the European Deposit Insurance 
Scheme (EDIS). This third and long-awaited final pillar 
should guarantee that the level of depositor confidence in 
a bank should not depend on the bank’s location. It should 
minimize the risk of panic mass cash withdrawals caused by 
the fear of bankruptcy and the risk of capital outflows from 
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a country in crisis. EDIS would develop over time and in 
three stages: first a re-insurance stage, then a co-insurance 
stage and, finally, a full European system of deposit guar-
antees, which is envisaged for 2024. 
As risk-sharing among Euro Area countries is poten-
tially involved, the proposal is faced with fierce opposition 
and its implementation is made contingent on various 
reforms that help reduce risks in banks’ balance sheets, such 
as reducing the large stock of non-performing loans. But 
one other such prerequisite that is called for is a change in 
the regulatory treatment of sovereign bonds, i.e. by intro-
ducing non-zero risk weights for the sovereign exposure of 
banks (ESRB 2015). This might be dangerously reinvigor-
ating tensions in the Euro Area so that any reform has to 
be considered very carefully. If at all, then such a reform 
should take place only after the successful introduction and 
initial market development of a Eurozone-wide low-risk 
asset (see chapter 4.3 below) and comprise concentration-
based rather than credit-risk-based non-zero risk weights. 
In this context, an uneasy stalemate has evolved by linking 
implementation of EDIS to the regulatory treatment of 
sovereign exposures. Another criticism of the envisaged 
EDIS, which, however, applies to current national deposit 
insurance schemes, too, is the unequal treatment between 
(wealthy) holders of bail-in instruments and (wealthy) 
deposit holders, who in principle can get insurance for 
a multiple of the €100,000 up to which their savings are 
currently guaranteed at individual banks, if they distribute 
their savings across many banks. This is not only prob-
lematic from a distributional point of view, but it biases 
incentives away from holding bail-in instruments.
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In addition, there are further concerns regarding the 
details, such as the negligible size of the SRF, the lack of 
a common backstop for it, and complex decision-making 
processes in bank resolution that require decisive and urgent 
action, to give a few examples. But these details camouflage 
a more substantial concern. Even if the Banking Union is 
completed, it does not do enough to remove the ‘shadow/
fiscal nexus’. A related concern is the threat that large banks 
pose to financial stability. Given large, complex and intercon-
nected banks with business models reliant on market-based 
activities, including shadow banking, there might be impedi-
ments that make resolution appear risky. As indicated above, 
if bail-in instruments are held on the balance sheets of banks 
and some other types of financial institutions, vulnerability 
through interconnectedness might even increase.
4.3 Integration of public capital markets: European bonds
The Capital Markets Union (CMU) project launched by 
the European Commission intends to promote integrated 
private capital markets that should provide more diver-
sified sources of financing for investment and herewith 
also help ‘de-risk’ the banking sector, that plays, according 
to the CMU architects, a too significant role in financing 
the real economy. Whether this project can deliver on its 
promises is open to debate. The endeavours to revive secu-
ritisation have astounded some commentators who fear 
that accelerating financial integration by further developing 
market-based activities and strengthening shadow bank 
entities and shadow bank activities of large banks might 
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increase financial instability and might even jeopardize the 
goal of de-risking banks (Gabor 2014).
Doubts about financial stability aside, at the current 
juncture it seems that the integration of public capital 
markets should be the top priority for promoting financial 
integration. The Five Presidents’ Report sketches out the 
idea of a Euro Area treasury that could also issue Euro bonds 
with joint liability. However, Euro bonds are only foreseen 
after full fiscal integration. Given the reluctance to agree on 
Euro bonds, which involve risk-sharing among sovereigns 
and, hence, a true Fiscal Union, Brunnermeier et al. (2011) 
have proposed European Safe Bonds (ESBies). ESBies have 
the potential to alleviate the sovereign/bank nexus as well 
as the shadow/fiscal nexus und would herewith stabilise the 
Euro Area without involving risk-sharing among member 
states. This approach would further provide a highly liquid 
European low-risk asset. How does this work? An agency 
would purchase a certain share of public debt-to-GDP of 
each Euro Area member state. To finance this purchase, the 
agency issues a senior tranche and a junior tranche, e.g. in the 
relation of 70:30, as proposed by Brunnermeier et al. (2011). 
The senior tranche has a safe asset character; the investors 
are guaranteed the interest and principle payments should 
a member state default. Investors in the junior tranche who 
are willing to take on more risk in turn for higher yields have 
to accept a haircut if a country defaults. Risks of default are 
transferred to private investors and are not – as in the case of 
Euro bonds – a joint liability of member states. The ESBies 
proposal has been criticized for repeating the errors of the 
crisis by structuring a securitised product. But ESBies differ 
from the securitised financial instruments at the centre of the 
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financial crisis. They are high-quality non-opaque securitized 
assets because senior and junior tranches are underpinned by 
highly liquid, transparent government bonds, unlike illiquid, 
opaque mortgage or student credit as in the case of struc-
tured products.
4.4 Consistency of regulatory and governance reform
As argued above, the regulatory reform agenda and the 
Banking Union lack consistency in the way the problem of 
interconnectedness is tackled.  The regulatory response to 
TBTF was initially addressed by raising the capital ratios 
imposed on systemically important banks, and later, by 
introducing a bank resolution framework. 
Regulatory reforms including higher capital requirements 
have had an impact on the size of some large banks whose 
balance sheets have shrunk to some degree. Deleveraging 
was further sustained by the weak business environment. 
But imposing higher capital ratios on large banks might not 
protect them from failing in a system-wide stress, as argued 
by Blundell-Wignall et al. (2014, p. 71) when referring to 
the regulator’s paradox “that large complex and intercon-
nected banks need very little capital in the good times, but they 
can never have enough in an extreme crisis.” Interconnec-
tivity, complexity and increased intermediation chains that 
are amplified by the derivatives portfolio make those banks 
highly vulnerable. Research has shown that trading on a large 
scale has destabilized banks. Trading also points to misal-
location of capital, in part at the expense of lending (Boot 
and Ratnovsky 2012). From this research it follows that any 
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business model that combines core relationship operations 
with transactional activity on a large scale might no longer 
be sustainable.
Far-reaching regulatory reforms on resolution provided 
another powerful case for some kind of separation of a bank’s 
high-risk activities, primarily proprietary trading, including 
trading derivatives, from its ‘core’ business, such as deposit-
taking or retail payment services that are of vital importance 
for the real economy: TBTF banks that combine trading and 
core activities may be too large, too complex and too inter-
connected to resolve over a weekend.2 In the US a weak form 
of intervention into the banking structure went into effect 
in 2014. The Volcker rule disallows short-term proprietary 
trading for banks’ own accounts and restricts investment in 
hedge and private equity funds but it contains a number of 
exemptions. While in the US the principle of intervention 
was legislated early on, legislation on bank structure reform 
in the EU is still work in progress. 
5. Conclusion
Governance reform is imperative for containing the 
centrifugal forces in the Euro Area.  Completing the 
Banking Union is decisive to break the diabolic feedback 
loops between national banks and sovereigns, and much has 
been accomplished so far. Yet – as argued here – the focus on 
this nexus is probably too narrow. In addition, the ‘shadow/
fiscal nexus’ amplifies the design failures of the Euro Area, 
and the Banking Union would do little to break this link. 
Since government bonds are the most important collateral 
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in market-based finance in Europe, their collateral value is 
inexorably linked to the pro-cyclical shadow-banking activ-
ities of large banks, which may trigger flight to safety and 
flows from the periphery to the core. 
At least two considerations follow from this. First, intro-
ducing Euro bonds is one effective option to contain these 
destabilising forces together with those stemming from 
the bank/sovereign nexus, and they are a necessary part 
of a Banking Union. The ESBies proposal circumvents 
the political difficulties related to the various Euro bond 
proposals on the table that all involve some potential risk-
sharing between member states that would, according to 
opponents, require a true Fiscal Union. ESBies work without 
mutualisation of debt. The risk of a default of a Euro Area 
member state is transferred to holders of the junior tranche 
of ESBies, who in turn receive higher yields.
Second, governance and regulatory reform lack some 
consistency. One may argue that the goals of a Banking 
Union, such as protecting tax-payers’ money, may be jeop-
ardized by reforms that further market-driven integration 
via shadow bank activities. By any measure, regulatory 
reform was far-reaching and ambitious, but it was partial 
too. Following stronger regulation of banks, risks migrated to 
shadow banking entities. The fundamental challenges posed 
by the architecture of European finance, which is shaped by 
large and systemically interconnected banks, have not been 
addressed sufficiently.
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Notes
1. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect 
those of the National Bank of Austria (OeNB) or the Eurosystem. The author 
thanks Paul Ramskogler and Thomas Reininger for helpful comments.
2. In its opinion on the recommendations of the Liikanen report (2012), 
the EBA (2012) pointed out that in the absence of a legal segregation, as 
proposed by the High Level Group, “… it might be extremely difficult for 
a supervisory authority to exercise its discretionary judgment and impose a 
break up of a universal bank,…”
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Re-Booting Europe: What 
kind of Fiscal Union – What 
kind of Social Union?  
Willi Semmler, New School for Social Research,  
and Brigitte Young, University of Muenster 
I. Introduction 
There is a wide-spread attack on the single European 
currency, ranging from the rise of anti-European parties to 
Nobel Prize laureates such as Joseph Stiglitz (2016) with his 
claim that the Euro Area is an unsustainable currency union. 
Such criticisms are not new, having been raised by several 
American economists who predicted the Euro’s failure from 
its very start.
 While Stiglitz is right in criticizing many of the policy 
failures of European leaders during the sovereign debt crisis, 
his proposed solution of abandoning the single currency is 
not very helpful. Europe would have to go through a valley 
of tears, in precarious times, with quite uncertain outcomes. 
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Rather than engage in such scenarios, we will address in this 
paper both the challenges to the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) and the larger European Union, suggesting that the 
single currency is a European public good worth the political 
and intellectual effort to be ‘rescued’.      
Since the financial crisis, the EU has seen, due to the 
existence of an EMU, a very active monetary authority, 
and thus quite an independent central bank taking strong 
monetary and financial measures against the crisis.   
The EU has also taken important institutional steps 
to reduce the so-called sovereign/bank nexus, and has 
completed two legs of the Banking Union with a European 
oversight function (the Single Supervisory Mechanism or 
SSM), and a common framework for winding up failing 
banks with a (currently underfunded) Single Resolution 
Fund (SRF). Missing is the third leg of a European Deposit 
Insurance (EDIS) which would provide risk-sharing across 
the euro-area banking system.  
 Many argue that the next building block should be to 
focus on the fiscal union and social union, in particular 
after Brexit, where a re-booting of the EU is important to 
improve fiscal and economic policy coordination and foster 
social cohesion in the Euro Area.  
 As for the Fiscal Union, one is tempted to compare 
EU fiscal institutions and fiscal policy to US fiscal feder-
alism, but this is not an appropriate model. In the US, there 
are clear obligations and responsibilities with federal tax 
revenue expenditures historically shared between the federal 
state and the individual states.  In addition, the monetary 
policy of the US Federal Reserve provides fiscal stabili-
zation measures for the states in times of crisis. This type of 
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fiscal integration has not been reached in the EU and may 
be too ambitious.  
As compared to the US, the EU member states have a long 
tradition of controlling their own fiscal decisions, manifested 
in national parliaments’ power over taxes and expenditures 
against an Absolute State, monarch or ruling aristocracy. 
National sovereignty gave parliaments the power to make 
budgetary decisions on raising state revenues and expen-
ditures, and issuing debts. Designing a workable European 
form of fiscal federalism thus means that national parliaments 
are likely to retain some sovereignty on tax, expenditure, and 
fiscal decisions. In other words, the challenge is how to obtain 
fiscal federalism within a loose fiscal union, where there is 
still a dominance of member states in economic, social and 
fiscal affairs (Semmler and Young 2016). 
Given these specific conditions, any EU Fiscal Union 
is likely to work only if a two-track system is established 
where there is some form of federal treasury while, at the 
same time, sovereign national parliamentary decisions are 
preserved, or at least partially preserved.  Going too far in 
one or the other direction would endanger the EU project 
as a whole. As a first step to creating full EU fiscal feder-
alism with tax-and-spend powers, the art is to find a middle 
ground between federal fiscal institutions and preserving 
some national parliamentary budgetary decision-making.   
 In our contribution, we want to argue that fiscal stabili-
zation policies should be planned at two levels—the central 
level dealing with aggregate macroeconomic instabilities, or 
instabilities arising from external effects at local or regional 
level, and in addition fiscal stabilization at member state 
level (i.e., national parliaments and ministries). This scenario 
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would embrace both fiscal consolidations as well as fiscal 
expansions during times of economic downturns.  
This presupposes that central fiscal institutions are 
important. Richard Musgrave, who developed the path-
breaking theory of modern fiscal federalism, identified in 
principle three important goals of the fiscal authorities: 
a) providing public goods, b) ensuring macroeconomic 
stabilization, and c) re-distributional measures counter-
balancing market failures. The first function would provide 
fiscal capacity to fund European public goods so as to 
provide solutions to common problems that can no longer 
be resolved at local or national level. The second function of 
macroeconomic stabilization is based on Keynesian insights 
and complements the ECB in its monetary policy. 
The final goal is re-distributionist policies that are 
supposed to correct market failures generating an uneven 
primary income distribution, an important pillar that was 
included in the post-war German social market. Until now, 
re-distributionist policies have been restricted to the domain 
of member state governments. In line with subsidiarity, these 
are primarily responsible for employment and social policies. 
However, after Brexit and the large populist revolt in many 
EU countries against free market policies and growing social 
inequality, it is in the EU’s long-term interest to create more 
of a Social Europe.  
 Since the social policy agenda has been neglected in 
the EU, we will thus focus in the latter part of the paper 
on the social market economy tradition and ask whether 
the new Pillar of Social Rights introduced by the European 
Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker in 2015 is the 
start of a European New Deal for a more socially cohesive 
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Europe. In other words, is there the prospect of a European 
social market economy that puts fundamental social rights 
above the freedom of untrammelled competition policy, 
providing hope for those who have been left behind in trying 
to cope with neoliberal market forces that have dominated 
the Single Market since its inception.  
II. Major Recent Challenges 
One also needs to think about the challenges facing the EU 
that need to be managed when it comes to fiscal institutions. 
The EU is a monetary (and incomplete banking) union, but 
not yet a fiscal union. There is a central monetary authority 
but a variety of fiscal policies/cultures. Undoubtedly, there 
have been some achievements since the start of the EMU 
but challenges remain.   
1)  Convergence/non-convergence
There was an initial convergence process in terms of human 
capital, infrastructure and productivity across countries (see 
Mongelli et al., 2015), but since the great recession starting 
in 2007/8 one can observe processes of divergence. Discus-
sions centred on whether Germany created the imbalance 
and divergent trends by itself. In particular, the argument put 
forward suggests that the productivity of the German labour 
force grew faster than wages from the mid-1990s until 
2007/8 and then started catching up again. On the other 
hand, nominal wages in some Southern countries moved 
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up more quickly (see the contributions of Herr, Janssen 
and Müller in this volume).  For Germany, this created 
high current account surpluses and external imbalances 
in the Euro Area. There were also capital flows from the 
North to the South through the respective banking systems, 
with financial engineering taking place, by pushing credit 
into low-income segments of the population in the South 
(Kumhof et al., 2012). Although the chains of causality for 
the imbalances are unclear, imbalances and non-convergence 
or divergence have been distinctly obvious.  
2) Fiscal Policy Failures
A particular driver of divergence has been the fiscal consol-
idation policy imposed on the South. There have been 
failures of fiscal consolidations since 2008/9. This has been 
recognized by official representatives of the IMF since 2013 
(see Blanchard et al., 2013; also Semmler and Semmler, 
2013; Semmler and Haider, 2017) as the perils of fiscal 
austerity during recessions. Important in this context are the 
new studies on the regime dependent multiplier. Evidence 
from non-linear VAR (MRVAR) is given in Mittnik and 
Semmler (2012). An IMF Study (Batini et al.,  2013: 24)
states: “In all countries a fiscal consolidation is substantially 
more contractionary if made during a recession than during 
an expansion” (see also Blanchard and Leigh, 2013). This has 
had adverse effects, since the fiscal austerity under pursuit 
has increased financial stress in all EU countries (see Schleer 
and Semmler, 2015). 
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3) Debt-deflation
What is more, there has been a trend toward debt-deflation 
in the South. Inflation rates were negative after 2008/9 
and then again after 2014. With negative inflation rates, 
expenditure by households and firms declines, since the 
price of future goods is even lower, and agents postpone 
spending. This is the Tobin effect whereby an expected 
decline in prices slows down spending. On the other 
hand, with deflation, real interest rates rise and real debt 
increases (Fisher effect). Moreover, with deflation and low 
or negative growth rates, there is a rising insolvency risk 
among banks, since households and businesses cannot 
repay loans and risk premia for loans rise (Minsky effect) 
(Ernst et al., 2016).
4) Banking Vulnerability and Banking Union
Though a Banking Union has been put in place, numerous 
banking problems remain in the EU.  Banks show rising 
debt levels since roughly 2000, actual bank debt has risen 
even higher since 2004 (see Schleer, Semmler and Illner, 
2017).  The Banking Union started with: 1) ECB super-
vision, 2) stress tests, 3) single resolution mechanism, and 4) 
the regulatory policy of bail-in (asset and bond holders of 
banks made liable in case of bank insolvency). Yet overall, 
bank vulnerabilities and perils (due to debt deflation, low 
interest rates inducing low spreads between long and short 
interest rates) remain, particularly in Italy.
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5) Future sovereign debt
At the same time, we can expect at some point the ECB 
to gradually wind down unconventional monetary policy. 
The ending of Quantitative Easing (QE) and the Asset 
Purchasing Program (APP), possibly in 2017, will raise 
nominal interest rates and real rates might rise too if the 
inflation rate remains low. This is likely to recreate fiscal 
debt problems in the most fragile EMU member states, 
which will once more pose a crucial challenge for Euro-
area stability – and create great perils for the Euro’s 
continued existence.
6) Divergent political trends
Furthermore, there are/have been crucial elections in 
the Euro Area in 2017 (in the Netherlands, France and 
Germany) that may boost anti-European parties. These may 
mean further divergent trends in terms of EU fiscal policies, 
if politically populist/nationalistic governments come to 
power. The absence of or presence of merely weak social 
buffers in some countries will magnify this process. 
In sum, the above challenges require careful consideration 
in terms of what can realistically be built, what type of inter-
action is needed between monetary and fiscal union/policies, 
and what proposals are necessary for fiscal arrangements and 
fiscal capacity building at federal EU level that, at the same 
time, accepts some kind of retained sovereignty by national 
fiscal authorities.     
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III. Stabilizing a Loose Fiscal Union  
Current Institutions  
The original construction under the Maastricht Treaty was 
a central monetary union and member states pursuing many 
different fiscal policies. The deficiencies of the Maastricht 
arrangements have received much attention in academia. We 
want to make only a few points:  
• The ECB was given a mandate for price stability alone, 
with autonomy in pursuing this goal  
• The Stability and Growth Pact relies solely on automatic 
stabilizers; national budgets should be balanced over the 
business cycle 
• The Maastricht Treaty gives the Commission a strong 
mandate for conducting single market policies, favouring 
structural reforms but handing over no stabilization role.  
Given these shortcomings, resulting in only limited  room 
in the Euro Area for expansionary fiscal policy in recessions, 
it is not surprising that after the crisis of 2008/9, and the new 
challenges arising from Brexit and the election of Donald 
Trump as President of the United States, many politicians, 
academics and practitioners from industry, financial markets, 
and trade unions look to re-booting Europe, particularly on 
the fiscal front.
Need for broader fiscal tasks 
As the many crises starting in areas of finance, banking and 
debt have demonstrated, local or national solutions are no 
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longer adequate for global and regional problems. There 
are eminent public goods problems which need a common 
solution at the federal EU level such as: investment in 
European infrastructure; European research and development 
tasks; policies concerning transportation, climate, energy, 
immigration and migration; internal and external security; 
and harmonization and standardization across product 
lines. Providing such funding would have the added value 
of contributing to cyclical stabilization across member states 
during times of recessions (Demertzis and Wolff, 2016).   
Fair risk sharing needs new institutions 
From the start of the EMU, there were two concepts as to how 
to balance the upcoming risks in a monetary union: one from 
Robert Mundell on the optimum currency area required high 
mobility of capital and labour, the other – adhered to also by 
McKinnon from the start in 2000 – is that a union will have 
lower capital costs and can be held together through risk-
sharing. It has become apparent that the uneven performance 
of the European macroeconomy in the light of the many 
fiscal policies within a central monetary union is possibly 
generating greater risks and instabilities than foreseen. Given 
the current arrangements, and the above-mentioned possible 
phasing out of unconventional monetary policy in the near 
future, likely scenarios can be sketched out in a game theory 
set-up (see Canofari et al., 2016).  
How is risk-sharing taking place to stabilize the Euro 
if there is a significant rise in sovereign debt and the risk 
of sovereign insolvency, as well as a threat to the Euro’s 
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survival? There are two ways of responding and consoli-
dating the public debt of member states: 
• Non-cooperative game and indirect risk-sharing through 
debt reduction strategies, namely differential inflation 
rates – higher inflation rate in the North and lower in 
the South – and possibly Quantitative Easing (QE). The 
first one might be ambivalent, since higher inflation in the 
North through QE may reduce real interest rates there 
and raise them in the South, but deflation in the South – 
so some argue – may increase competitiveness and allow 
for debt repayment, though real interest rates may rise due 
to deflation. On the other hand, some QE reduces risk 
premia in the South and allows for easier borrowing and 
debt repayments. In addition, there would be a need for 
debt relief/restructuring through multiple escape routes, 
reducing perils for the Euro Area (see Semmler and 
Proano, 2015). 
• Cooperative game and direct risk-sharing arrangements 
through cooperation and interaction of monetary and 
fiscal policy – with the goal of stabilizing the Euro Area 
through more highly coordinated fiscal policy, as well 
as monetary and fiscal policy cooperation to make debt 
sustainable. Low interest rates and QE and APP policies, 
for example, allow for relaxation in sovereign debt markets, 
low cost refinancing, and reducing sovereign default risk. 
As Canofari et al. (2016) argue, this might also allow the 
Southern countries to pursue an expansionary fiscal policy 
if required. 
Whereas the first strategy needs less institution building 
but a higher adaptation cost due to sovereign default threats 
and the peril of the Euro Area falling apart, the second 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
234
requires more cooperation and institution building, and in 
particular this strategy would require extensive cooperation 
from Germany and other Northern countries. But, under the 
threat of the break-up of the Euro, the cooperative solution 
might be a preferable strategy.   
Building fiscal capacity 
Some experts argue that the plan of a Eurozone treasury 
seems premature because one needs first some fiscal 
capacity building, as Demertzis and Wolff  (2016) suggest. 
They propose a sequence of three steps: First, completing 
the Banking Union, second, building fiscal capacity for 
the Eurozone in the area of public goods (dealing with 
environment/climate policy, migration, defence, fiscal stabi-
lization), and building a social Europe (social security for 
buffering risk). And third, starting a fiscal federation by 
suggesting a centralized social security system with 20% of 
total government spending allocated to it.    
Yet here, as with the widely discussed Eurozone treasury, 
unresolved issues remain such as the funding sources, 
checks and balances, as well as legitimization and account-
ability problems.   
Moreover, additional EU emergency programmes are 
required. One could, for example, think of the Golden 
Rule of fiscal policy (see Saraceno, 2016 and Truger in 
this volume), where public investments are undertaken in 
a private-public partnership that issues development and 
green bonds that would, in turn, stem further divergence in 
growth and employment and promote convergence.  This 
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is, however, designed to be a partnership where the public 
ensures itself a stake in its success.
Eurozone Treasury 
The proposal for coordinated behaviour in the EU requires 
further institution building. Many scholars and practi-
tioners have proposed a Eurozone treasury. In fact, both 
the presidents of the German and French Central Banks, 
Jens Weidmann and Francois Villeroy de Galhau, have 
suggested a Euro-treasury (Süddeutsche Zeitung 8.2.2017). 
They argue that the EU faces a stark choice: either more 
decentralization within the EMU and less solidarity, 
or a substantial reform of the EMU with the creation of 
a finance ministry, a more efficient and less fragmented 
European bureaucracy, as well as creating a stronger 
political board subject to parliamentary control. This would 
ensure the required balance between liability and control. 
(For further detailed discussion of a Eurozone treasury, see 
Semmler and Young, 2016).  
The difficulty is how to achieve fiscal federalism in a 
loose fiscal union.  Goals such as macro stabilization, public 
goods and redistribution should be pursued, but it is unclear 
which specified revenues, taxes and bond issuings should be 
assigned to the federal and member state levels – and how. 
The dominance of some member states over fiscal policy and 
their unwillingness to give up some sovereignty is a major 
obstacle that is hard to resolve. At the same time, monitoring 
the performance of member states’ fiscal policy must be part 
of the design of a Eurozone treasury. Unresolved is also the 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
236
question about the democratic legitimacy and accountability 
of such an acting executive of a Eurozone treasury.   
We will now turn to Musgrave’s third pillar of correcting 
distortions in income distribution and analyse whether a 
Social Union is a feasible project for further EU integration. 
Can the idea of a European social market economy, mentioned 
as a specific goal in the Lisbon Treaty, provide a framework for 
combining policies promoting social protection and equality 
and those promoting market efficiency?      
IV. The New EU Pillar of Social Rights of 2015    
The European Commission has started to emphasize EMU’s 
social dimension as a way to regaining some of the legitimacy 
the EU has lost since the financial and sovereign debt crises. 
Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, launched a 
new European Pillar of Social Rights on assuming office. 
He told the European Parliament that “I want Europe to 
be dedicated to being triple-A on social issues, as much 
as it is to being triple A in the financial and economic 
sense” (EU Press release, 22.6.2015). In spring 2016, the 
Commission launched a consultation paper on such a Pillar, 
which emphasized better functioning of labour markets and 
welfare systems as well as social cohesion as the core of the 
new process of “upward convergence” within the Euro Area. 
Other EU member states can join the Social Union if so 
desired at a subsequent time (European Commission 2016). 
In consultation with the other presidents of the EU institu-
tions, the Commission will present a White Paper in 2017 
and set completion of the EMU by 2025.  
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Many scholars agree that this new European Pillar 
of Social Rights is a step in the right direction, but the 
document (containing 34 social principles) is rather vague 
in terms of providing definitions of “adequate” income, 
“fairer EMU”, “well-functioning and fair labour markets and 
welfare systems”, and “reliable balance of rights and obli-
gations between workers and employers”. While it speaks 
about the role, scope and legal nature of the Pillar, it does not 
provide indicators to measure and compare member states’ 
social performance and has little to say about compliance. 
Neither does it address the different legal competences 
between the EU and the member states, inter alia, on labour 
markets. For instance, Article 153 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) clearly does 
not provide any Union competence in matters of “pay”. It 
remains unclear how national and EU competences are to 
be shared in the Social Union (Sanden and Schlüter, 2016). 
The Four Presidents’ Report of 2012 (Towards a Genuine 
Economic and Monetary Union) and Five Presidents’ Report 
from 2015 (Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary 
Union) already raise the prospect of a fiscal policy framework. 
Yet there is little mention of creating a discretionary fiscal 
policy or enabling an EU unemployment insurance1 scheme 
as an automatic stabilizer to counter economic divergences 
across Eurozone countries since the financial crisis, or 
allowing permanent cross-border transfers. Experts have 
also criticized the fact that Jean-Claude Juncker has made 
no further reference to the Social Pillar since announcing it. 
This may indicate a divided Commission with strong internal 
opposition to establishing a Social Europe. There may also 
be strong headwinds on two further fronts: “The EU is 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
238
blocking social advances in certain areas at member states 
level and the member states are blocking social progress at 
European levels” (Höpner and Weiss, 2017, no page).    
V. Social Europe Embedded within a 
European Social Market Economy   
Creating new institutions for a socially fair Fiscal Union 
with a European treasury with its own budget, economic and 
tax coordination, and a common unemployment insurance 
scheme requires a comprehensive framework in the form of a 
European social market economy. This is not a new idea. Art. 3 
of the Lisbon Treaty has already spelled out the goal of a social 
market economy, meaning that social concerns should be 
taken into account throughout the decision-making process. 
However, it did not provide details about the institutional 
structures required for a competitive social market economy. 
Building such structures at EU level is all the more difficult, 
since the social partners are not key players in this process. 
The Single European Act of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty 
of 1992 were concerned with economic and monetary matters 
and left the social dimension to be dealt with at member state 
level. The major obstacle in EU social integration is the multi-
layered institutional mismatch between EU market structures 
and nationally fragmented institutional arrangements. An 
added difficulty is the rise of virulent nationalism as witnessed 
in the form of Brexit and populism in many member states. 
As a result, national governments continue to insist that 
social and labour policies are ”their” competences, demanding 
national priority over common EU solutions.  
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Given these national preferences, social policy has been 
a stepchild in European integration, creating a consti-
tutional asymmetry between policies promoting market 
efficiencies and policies promoting social protection and 
equality (Scharpf, 2002). The European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) further sanctioned the subordination of social 
rights in the legal disputes between Viking, Laval, Rüffert 
and Commission versus Luxembourg. The ECJ ruled that 
freedom of competition took precedence over fundamental 
social rights. Its judgment meant that national social rights, 
such as the right to strike, make collective agreements or 
pursue wage policies were not allowed to interfere ‘exces-
sively’ with the freedom of competition. In response, Mario 
Monti in 2010 warned that the subordination of social 
rights had the potential to alienate large portions of the 
workers’ movement and trade unions from the European 
project (Bosch, 2017).  
This alienation has become reality among the European 
populace, including many citizens bearing the brunt of 
austerity measures in the Southern periphery, and among 
members of the populist right-wing movements on the 
European continent. Yet a reform programme that would 
make monetary union sustainable and acceptable to ordinary 
people must be premised on the idea that the stability and 
integrity of financial markets, free trade, and free movement 
of labour depend upon a fairer balance between markets and 
social cohesion. Money and banking, trade, capital flows, 
movement of labour are not just technical issues reserved for 
experts, they also have important social, cultural and political 
dimensions and may have negative externalities across 
member state territorial boundaries.  
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A European social market economy? 
Can the ideas of the social market economy offer some 
guidance on how to institutionalize a fairer compromise 
between competitive markets and social solidarity? The 
origins of the social market economy go back to the German 
economist Alfred Müller-Armack who coined the term 
Soziale Marktwirtschaft after World War II to rebuild with 
Ludwig Erhard (first as Economics Minister, and then as 
Chancellor) a warn-torn German economy. Müller-Armack 
belonged to a group of economists and lawyers in the 1930s, 
the so-called neoliberals, who opposed Anglo-Saxon laissez-
faire liberalism and its notion of self-regulating markets. 
Rejecting the market fundamentalism that led to the 
Great Depression, post-war Germany faced the challenge 
of setting up a constitutional framework to establish both 
political and economic democracy within a federal system 
that did not rely on a strong centralized state. Business was 
free to operate within a market economy that was explicitly 
competitive. The social market economy also contained a 
major social element, since there were millions of refugees, 
war widows, orphans, war veterans, poor pensioners who 
could not be left exposed to market forces and had to be 
integrated into the new market economy. What matters most 
for our argument is that the social market economy was not 
the outcome of a strict technocratic ordo-liberal rules-based 
concept but rather of political leaders entering into conces-
sions and compromises with existing socio-political forces.   
Ludwig Erhard had to take into account the interests 
of the American occupation forces, demands of the Social 
Democrats and the impoverished working class, the war 
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destitute, West German big business, especially in the Ruhr 
region as well as the mittelständische firms of Southern 
Germany (Berghahn 2015). This pragmatism in creating a 
new federal economic system with weak centralization but 
a strong federal component institutionalized in the second 
chamber of the German Parliament (Bundesrat) may hold 
out some promise for building a European social market 
economy despite the fragmented and centrifugal tendencies 
among EU member states. 
 Of course, the ideas of Müller-Armack must be updated, 
they are overly normative and are a top-down paternal-
istic approach to achieving a balance between market 
freedom and social security. They must also be adopted to a 
Post-Westfalian (non-nation-state centered) political envi-
ronment. However, his core concepts still hold today. Thus, 
the overriding essence of the social market economy for 
Müller-Armack is a “peace order” (Müller-Armack, 1972). 
Unlike his ordo-liberal colleagues of the Freiburg School, he 
insisted on a second pillar of social politics to the constitu-
tional economic order. He defined social politics as an arena 
that should not be subordinated to economics in case of any 
conflict between economic and social concerns.    
 As early as the 1920s, Müller-Armack championed 
– before John Maynard Keynes – an active business cycle 
policy of state intervention. It is the duty of the state, he 
said, to ensure reconciliation between different interests. 
Müller-Armack goes beyond suggesting interventions in the 
economic order. For him, the social praxis implies shaping 
the entire scope of social life (Gesellschaftspolitik). Politics 
is thus not the result of a rules-oriented constitutional 
order, but is outcome-oriented and requires discretionary 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
242
intervention. Interpreting market failures as integral to free 
markets, Müller-Armack stipulated that since the constant 
adaptation of the market economy imposes high social hard-
ships which individuals are forced to bear in their helpless 
and anonymous role, it is important to reduce justified and 
unjustified fears arising from the (otherwise unfettered) 
mechanism of free markets (cited in Vanberg, 2002; Lange-
von Kulessa and Renner, 1998). 
Understandably, given the compliance failure of the 
Stability and Growth Pact, the Maastricht Treaty, Two and 
Six Packs as well as the Fiscal Compact, some macroecono-
mists argue that fiscal capacities for countercyclical policies 
as advocated in the Five Presidents’ Report are illusory at 
EMU level. Thus, fiscal policies are best left to the nation 
state (see Priewe in this volume).  
However, it is not clear why social policies underpinned by 
unemployment insurance at EMU level fail as a regional public 
good benefitting the citizens of the member states. That social 
policies are prone to higher implementation problems, are 
more vulnerable to distributional conflicts and to moral hazard 
makes these policies no different from agricultural policies, 
nuclear, climate and energy policies, creating a Banking Union 
with a European Stability Mechanism as a redemption fund 
for banking liquidity crisis, or fighting terrorism. 
 In all these examples, collective tasks are resolved at 
the European level when they can no longer be resolved 
at the individual member state level. In other words, there 
is cooperation at the EU level to ensure that public goods 
are provided to all the citizenry. That in the process some 
national sovereignty is transferred to the EU level has been 
accepted as long as people feel it is in their common interest. 
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A Second Chamber for the European Union? 
To make fiscal policy work at EMU level it may be more 
acceptable to include national parliaments in a hybrid 
decision-making process with the European Parliament. 
Again, this is not a new idea. Already the two EU Presi-
dents’ Reports of 2012 and 2015 have championed a hybrid 
model to increase legitimacy and accountability in cases of 
negotiating on politically fraught decisions. Again, little 
progress has been made on this front. A hybrid model 
may stipulate that fiscal decision-making will largely be 
made at federal EU level, but coordinated and controlled 
by national parliaments. Alternatively, as Bénassy-Quéré 
et al. (2016) suggest, national fiscal policies remain largely 
in nation state hands but decision-making over that policy 
is shared with the federal level. Such a hybrid model of 
power-sharing presupposes a new EU Parliament with 
two chambers.  
 This reform may be easier in the light of Brexit. The 
first chamber would comprise elected EU nationals and 
the second members of national parliaments and civil 
society. This would ensure that national parliaments and 
the voices of civil society are an intrinsic part of the EU 
fiscal decision-making process. Such an EU parliamentary 
reform should not be a top-down process. Instead, new 
innovative ideas should come from a European-wide 
competition conducted within a public assembly in which 
a broad spectrum of society are able to formulate ideas for 
such a hybrid model designed by the members of the EU 
for the members of EU. 
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VI. Conclusion  
Doomsday scenarios about the survival of the Euro, and 
the EU itself have gained prominence since Brexit. The 
uncertainty has further increased since President Trump 
applauded the decision of the British people to leave the EU 
and expressed his open hostility to it. While we cannot deny 
the endogenous and exogenous challenges to the European 
Union, and especially to the European Monetary Union, 
these challenges can also function as an opportunity and 
incentive to think about how we can achieve a European 
social market economy that does not subordinate issues of 
fairness and equality to market competition. This was the 
intent of this paper.  
In the first section, we enumerated the many chal-
lenges facing the EU that need to be taken into account 
when thinking about new fiscal institutions. EMU weak-
nesses became evident during the financial and subsequent 
sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone. Since that financial 
turmoil, many institutional novelties have been imple-
mented to stabilize the Eurozone. At the same time, the 
major challenge remains between a central monetary union 
and divergent fiscal policies in the member states. Originally, 
it was believed that a monetary union with an independent 
European Central Bank would eventually lead to a conver-
gence of the various national fiscal policies. This is and 
remains the Achilles heel and biggest stumbling block in 
building a more integrated EMU.  
Given the deficits in EMU institutional design, many 
experts believe that the next building block should be to 
focus on a Fiscal Union and Social Union to improve fiscal 
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and economic policy coordination and foster social cohesion 
in the Euro Area. The next section of the paper discussed 
the institutional requirements for fiscal capacity building 
and the introduction of a Eurozone treasury. In the final 
section, the focus shifted to the ideas of a European social 
market economy and argued that a modernized version of 
the original concept of the German social market economy, 
as initiated by the economist Alfred Müller-Armack, 
may function as a starting point to ensure a fairer balance 
between markets and social cohesion. Social policy for 
Müller-Armack is a “peace order” and, unlike his ordo-
liberal colleagues of the Freiburg School, he insisted on 
discretionary intervention to reduce justified and unjustified 
fears among people arising from market failures.
 In contrast to other scholars, we argue that fiscal policy 
capacity building should be both at the federal EU level with 
input and control from national parliaments. Such a hybrid 
model of power-sharing assumes a parliamentary structure 
with two chambers. The first chamber would comprise the 
citizens of the EU, and the second representatives of national 
parliaments and civil society.  
Creating a Fiscal Union and Social Union should not be 
a top-down project from European experts and economists. 
Instead, there should be citizen involvement in the form of a 
public assembly (including activists, entrepreneurs, political 
leaders, economists, business managers) to design and create 
such a new hybrid institutional structures for a digitalized 
21st century.   
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
246
Notes
1. A good beginning for an EU unemployment insurance has been made 
by an EU Commission document (EU Commission 2016) and Dullien 
(2014) who suggests a two-pillar system: A minimum EU unemployment 
insurance (50 %, 1 year), topped up by national unemployment insurance 
(60 % and of longer duration).
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The golden rule of public 
investment as a lowest common 
denominator to achieve a fiscal 
stimulus in the Euro area*
Achim Truger
1. Introduction
It is crystal clear that the Euro area’s institutional archi-
tecture will have to undergo far-reaching reforms if the 
Euro is to be saved and prosperity restored. This is rightly 
highlighted in many articles in this volume. It is completely 
unclear, however, how the necessary changes are to come 
about politically. For many years, political conflicts driven 
or at least exacerbated by conflicting economic world views 
have prevailed. Whereas Keynesian or undogmatic main-
stream economists and politicians in the periphery call for 
*  Sections 2 and 3 of this paper are based on an updated, modified and 
shortened version of Truger (2016a) which in turn borrowed from Truger 
(2016b) albeit with substantial revisions and updates. Section 5 is based 
on chapter 3.2 of Timbeau et al. (2016). 
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an end to austerity policies, more fiscal flexibility and a 
partial mutualisation of member states’ public debt, some 
economists, lawyers with little understanding of macroeco-
nomics and politicians in some of the core countries and, in 
particular, in the German finance ministry call for a continu-
ation of austerity and even tighter fiscal rules. This stalemate 
renders the economic recovery weak and fragile. Given the 
lack of political will in the face of the coming political chal-
lenges, this means that the whole Euro project may collapse 
sooner rather than later. 
What is required, therefore, is a politically feasible short-
term strategy to save the Euro. Such a strategy must bring 
about a substantial fiscal stimulus for a strong and sustained 
recovery in the Euro area. This would help stabilise the social 
and political situation in the member countries, buying 
time for initiating the necessary institutional reforms in the 
medium term. In the current stalemate the strategy would 
have to be based on a lowest common denominator that 
all different parties could agree on. This article argues that 
one potentially promising candidate for such a common 
denominator could be the traditional Golden Rule of public 
investment as it can be supported by economists from 
many different theoretical schools. If pragmatic recourse 
to the Golden Rule could push politicians into successfully 
boosting public investment and reinforce the recovery then 
this could conceivably initiate a political learning process 
that might in the end achieve the necessary more ambitious 
institutional reforms in the long run. 
Section 2 introduces the basic idea of the Golden rule of 
public investment and addresses the problem of different 
definitions of public investment. Section 3 shows that 
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traditional public investment as defined in the national 
accounts is a potent tool to boost economic growth both in 
the short and long run. Section 4 explains why a very prag-
matic approach to defining public investment may both be 
economically sensible while at the same time increasing 
political feasibility. Section 5 then turns to the question 
of approximating the golden investment rule even within 
current European institutional constraints on fiscal policy. 
Section 6 briefly gives an outlook whether the proposal is 
realistic in the current political circumstances.
2. The Golden rule of public investment: 
From theory to operationalization
2.1. The pay-as-you-use-principle and intergenerational equity
The golden rule has been a widely accepted traditional public 
finance concept for the handling of government deficits for 
decades (see Musgrave 1939 and 1959: 556-575). It strives 
for an intertemporal realization of the pay-as-you-use prin-
ciple in the sense that present government spending provides 
future benefits. It calls for financing such spending (=net 
public investment) by government deficits, thus promoting 
intergenerational equity. Net public investment increases 
the public and/or social capital stock and provides benefits 
for future generations. Therefore, it is justifiable that future 
generations should contribute to financing those invest-
ments via the debt service. Future generations inherit the 
burden of public debt, but in exchange they receive a corre-
sponding public and/or social capital stock. Failure to allow 
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for debt financing of future generations’ benefits will lead to 
a disproportionate burden on the present generation through 
higher taxes or lower spending, creating incentives for the 
under-provision of public investment to the detriment of 
future generations. This general incentive problem may 
become exacerbated in times of fiscal consolidation when 
cutting public investment may seem the politically easiest 
way to reduce the budget deficit. The development of net 
public investment, i.e. gross investment minus depreciation 
in the Euro area, shows that this danger is real and has, in 
fact, materialised in the most striking manner: net public 
investment in the Eurozone periphery, with its particular 
need for a catch-up in infrastructure, has decreased from 
about 2 per cent of GDP to a negative -0.6 per cent – the 
net public capital stock was thereby shrinking. For the euro 
area as a whole and for Germany in particular net public 
investment has been negative since 2013 (see figure 1). Inde-
pendent of the current crisis, there is evidence that fiscal 
contractions were a key factor responsible for the decline 
in public investment in earlier decades (Välilä et al. 2005; 
Turrini 2004: 9-26).
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Figure 1: General government net fixed capital formation 
(ESA 2010) in the euro area, the European Periphery 
and selected countries in per cent of GDP, 1995-2015
Source: European Commission (2016); author’s calculations.
The concept of the Golden Rule has many prominent 
advocates in academia starting with Richard A. Musgrave, 
one of the founding fathers of modern public finance. In 
the context of the fiscal policy debate in the EU, many 
economists have criticised the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP) for its lack of a Golden Rule on public 
investment and correspondingly proposed to introduce 
such a rule into the fiscal framework (e.g. Fitoussi and 
Creel 2002: 63-65, Blanchard and Giavazzi 2004, Barbiero 
and Darvas 2014). Last but not least, the German council 
of economic experts delivered a proposal which explicitly 
expressed the need to include the Golden Rule as an 
important element of its concept for a constitutional 
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limit to government deficits (SVR 2007). Ironically, this 
proposal became the blueprint for the German debt brake 
as well as the Fiscal Compact, but unfortunately with the 
Golden Rule itself removed. 
2.2. Different definitions of public investment
Although the general idea behind the Golden Rule is plau-
sible and easy to understand, its operationalization is not 
trivial. The most difficult problem is to find a workable 
and economically sensible definition of the term ‘public 
investment’ that allows for government deficits. Theoreti-
cally, any government action that creates benefits – in the 
widest sense – for more than one period may qualify for this. 
However, the literature usually focusses on concrete future 
material economic benefits in terms of higher productivity 
and growth. Therefore, the central question at a macroeco-
nomic level is whether general categories of public spending 
can be identified that are usually associated with sufficiently 
higher growth and productivity. 
The natural candidate for such a definition would be the 
traditional concept of investment in the national accounts 
(see section 3 below). However, there may be other 
expenditure categories that may be equally or even more 
beneficial. A prominent example would be public spending 
on education or health care which in the existing system 
of national accounts is classified as current expenditure. 
Education as investment in human capital is crucial from 
the point of view of endogenous growth theory (Lucas 
1988) and empirical research suggests that the private as 
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well as social rate of return of education can be assumed 
to be very high (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004; Card 
2001). Although it is difficult to compare the estimated rate 
of return for different types of expenditure reliably, it would 
at least be plausible to include public education expenditures 
under the Golden Rule. This is also the general conclusion 
drawn by most of its advocates. 
At the present stage, it may be difficult to implement this 
in a convincing way. First, an exact definition of the relevant 
education expenditure would have to be given which is not 
straightforward. Second, in order to be consistent with the 
Golden Rule, net education investment would have to be 
measured, i.e. depreciation would have to be deducted. This 
may pose some difficult conceptual issues that would have to 
be resolved before education expenditure could be properly 
included into the Golden Rule.
There are still more expenditure categories that might be 
considered as investment under the Golden Rule. Indeed, 
from a supply-side perspective some types of social spending 
may well be highly productive, because they increase labour 
supply and production: Health expenditures, if effective, will 
contribute to a more stable and larger workforce. Spending 
on child care can substantially increase parents’ labour 
force participation (Bauernschuster and Schlotter 2015). 
And the same may be said for spending on social work and 
integration. All of this could lead to higher labour force 
participation and therefore contribute to higher growth and, 
at the same time, to one of the main “Europe 2020” goals. 
Obviously, it is not easy to find adequate definitions and 
estimating depreciation in order to derive net investment 
may be even more difficult. 
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3. Growth effects of traditional public investment
The central question of the long-run growth effects of public 
investment has received much attention in the literature 
(for an overview see Romp and de Haan 2005; Melo et al. 
2013; Bom and Ligthart 2014). From a theoretical point 
of view, it is most plausible that public investment, espe-
cially if it focusses on “core” infrastructure like transport 
facilities (roads, railways, ports, airports), communication 
systems as well as power generation and other utilities 
should be productive and growth enhancing. The public 
infrastructure stock in this sense is simply indispensable for 
most production processes. It is, therefore, plausible to think 
of public infrastructure as an input factor that is comple-
mentary to private capital and labour, inducing additional 
private investment and labour supply. Net public investment 
need not necessarily go into completely new infrastructure 
projects: Given the fact that the quality of the existing infra-
structure stock may have decreased through wear-and-tear, 
(IMF 2014: 79-81) maintenance investment may also have 
an important role to play. 
Empirically, the effects are contested in the literature. 
The famous study by Aschauer (1989), using a production 
function approach, found a very high elasticity of output 
with respect to the public capital stock. This would have 
meant an extremely high return on public investment, 
indeed, much higher than imaginable for private investment. 
In the debate that followed, many different definitions of 
public (infrastructure) capital were used, different estimation 
techniques and variations on Aschauer’s original approach 
were introduced. Furthermore, apart from Aschauer’s 
The golden rule of public investment as a lowest common 
denominator to achieve a fiscal stimulus in the Euro area
259
original production function approach, the cost-function 
approach, times series analysis as well as cross section esti-
mations were also applied. Although the results differed 
greatly and some studies found no or even negative effects of 
public investment on growth, the general conclusion is that 
there is a positive growth effect, but that it is much smaller 
than originally claimed by Aschauer (see Romp and de Haan 
2005; Melo et al. 2013).
Table 1: Implied marginal returns to 
public investment in per cent. 
all public capital core public capital
Regional national regional national
short term 17.4 10.2 24.0 16.8
long term 28.0 20.8 34.6 27.4
Source: IMF (2014: 86); Bom and Ligthart (2014: 907-908); author’s 
calculations.
Bom and Ligthart (2014) conducted meta-regressions 
including 68 studies with 578 estimates for the public 
capital-growth nexus and confirm this basic conclusion for 
the period 1983 to 2008. According to their results, the 
average output elasticity of public capital is 0.082. Condi-
tional elasticities vary depending on whether they refer 
to the short or the long run, to all public capital or core 
infrastructure and to regional or national investment. They 
are higher for core infrastructure, for regional investment 
and for the long run. Table 3 shows the implied marginal 
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returns which are in the range between 10 per cent (short 
run, national, all public capital) and 34.6 per cent (long run, 
regional, core infrastructure). Whereas the latter marginal 
return is large enough to justify deficit-financed public 
investment, even under pessimistic assumptions about the 
user cost of capital (real interest rate plus depreciation rate), 
the former would have to rely on more favourable condi-
tions. However, the implied long term marginal returns even 
in the case of all public capital for national and regional 
investment with 20.8 and 28 per cent respectively are quite 
high. All in all, therefore, one may safely assume traditional 
public investment to have substantial pro-growth effects.
In addition to the long-run supply-side effects, the short-
run demand-side effects of public investment must also be 
addressed. The traditional pre-crisis empirical studies usually 
found substantially positive multipliers. As suggested by 
the standard Keynesian textbook models and the Haav-
elmo-Theorem, expenditure multipliers were typically 
substantially larger than revenue side ones (see e.g. the over-
views by Hemming et al. 2002, Bouthevillain et al. 2009). 
Many of the more recent studies confirm the earlier multiplier 
estimates and in many cases even go substantially beyond them 
(Gechert 2015 and Gechert and Rannenberg 2014). As to the 
question of the relative size of the public investment multi-
plier, the pre-crisis literature as a rule of thumb found it to be 
(slightly) above one and therefore slightly larger than for other 
spending categories so that public investment, in addition to 
its long-term economic advantages, could be seen as the most 
effective short-run fiscal policy instrument. Some of the recent 
studies even come up with much larger (relative) estimates 
of the investment multiplier. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
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(2012) obtain values larger than two with a maximum estimate 
of more than four whereas the estimates for government 
consumption spending are “only” at about 1.4. Gechert 
(2015) and Gechert and Rannenberg (2014) conducted meta-
regressions including 104/ 98 empirical multiplier studies 
controlling for different study characteristics. They also find 
generally higher investment multipliers as compared to their 
consumption counterparts (around 1.6 vs. 1), but the difference 
is certainly not as large as in the Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2012) paper. On average, Gechert (2015) and Gechert and 
Rannenberg (2014) find systematically smallermultipliers for 
government transfers. All in all, therefore, the empirical liter-
ature on short-run effects of fiscal policy strongly supports 
protecting public investment from consolidation pressures and 
using it to stimulate the economy. 
4. Towards a pragmatic definition of public investment 
As shown in section 2.2, from an economic point of view 
there are different definitions of public investment that could 
be considered within the logic of the Golden Rule. Politi-
cally, this ambivalence can be disastrous in the sense that 
different actors may prefer different definitions and this will 
undermine political consensus in favour of the Golden Rule. 
For example, conservatives will tend to prefer the traditional 
definition from the national accounts. Liberals and progres-
sives may tend to prefer a definition including spending 
on education whereas Greens will tend to favour green 
investment over traditional investment. Politicians with a 
focus on social policy will favour a definition including at 
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least parts of social spending. Finally, deficit hawks will tend 
to be suspicious of any privileges for specific expenditure 
categories as they fear the Golden Rule will simply be used 
to undermine the deficit limits of the SGP.
How does one resolve the controversy?  First, to convince 
people concerned about risks for the sustainability of public 
finances, one could offer to limit the maximum amount of 
net investment to be considered under the Golden Rule to 1 
or 1.5 per cent of GDP. Second, the solution proposed here 
advocates a very high degree of pragmatism in the definition 
of public investment. This plea for pragmatism is based on 
the conviction that an investment-related fiscal boost is so 
important in the current situation that neither the exact 
definition nor the exact procedure as to how the definition is 
arrived at should dominate the debate and the final decision. 
In short: Protagonists of the Golden Rule logic should agree 
on whatever definition or procedure is most likely to find a 
political majority. 
As to the procedure, one may try to reach political 
agreement directly or one may delegate it to a scientific and/
or political committee. One may leave it to the European 
Commission and the Council to take the final decision. 
One may also suggest that the Commission and Council 
use changing definitions according to the most important 
political priorities. This could e.g. also be investment in 
education, including child care, or it could more generally 
focus on spending with a view to achieving the currently 
neglected Europe 2020 goals such as social inclusion or other 
areas that have strongly suffered from austerity in recent 
years and then move on to more traditional investment defi-
nitions in future. 
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But why should proponents of a particular definition 
agree with a different definition? The reason is that – as 
long as economically sensible expenditure is characterised as 
investment – the Golden Rule will directly and/or indirectly 
create fiscal leeway even for those expenditure categories 
not directly privileged under it: To the extent that there is 
already positive net investment with respect to the chosen 
definition the golden rule directly creates the corresponding 
leeway for other purposes. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that through its partly self-financing nature the golden rule 
creates additional fiscal leeway that can be used for other 
purposes. The fiscal stimulus leads to a higher GDP which 
will in turn lead to an improvement in the budget balance. 
Whether this improvement opens up additional fiscal 
leeway depends on whether it is interpreted as cyclical or as 
structural. According to the de facto pro-cyclical method of 
cyclical adjustment by the European Commission (Truger 
2015b and 2015c), a substantial part of the improvement 
would be interpreted as structural, so that it could be used 
for further fiscal stimulus. This in turn starts an additional 
expansionary process (Truger 2016a). 
That way the definition of government investment to be 
included in the Golden Rule becomes less crucial. Even if 
one has serious doubts about the rather narrow definition 
of public investment based on the national accounts – that 
might be preferred for pragmatic reasons in the political 
process – the endogenous creation of further structural 
fiscal leeway will allow a strong increase also in those parts 
of government expenditure that are not directly privileged 
by the narrower definition of the Golden Rule. Plausible, 
multiplier-based simulations (Truger 2016a) suggest that 
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the indirect leeway created could be almost as large as the 
initial investment stimulus allowed under the Golden Rule. 
5. Implementing a public investment stimulus 
within the current European fiscal framework 
For a regular implementation of the Golden Rule within 
the fiscal framework of the SGP and the fiscal compact, 
net public investment suitably defined would have to be 
deducted from member states’ relevant deficit measures, i.e. 
from the government deficit under the corrective arm and 
the structural deficit under the preventive arm of both pact 
and compact. In effect, this means that the threshold for 
an excessive deficit as well as the medium-term budgetary 
objective would be increased by the amount of net public 
investment. However, such an implementation would most 
probably need a change of Council regulations or even the 
Treaty as the Golden Rule would permanently change the 
interpretation of the relevant deficit definitions in a way that 
is not completely in line with the Treaty. 
Obviously, this poses an impediment for immediate 
implementation, even if the necessary changes could be 
adopted as primary law in the form of an ‘Investment 
Protocol’ that would be annexed to the Treaty under the 
simplified revisions procedure of Art.48 of the Lisbon 
treaty (see table  2).  At member state level, further legal 
changes would be required if following the fiscal compact 
as there were other legal provisions put in place that would 
prevent a deduction of net public investment from the 
budget balance. 
The golden rule of public investment as a lowest common 
denominator to achieve a fiscal stimulus in the Euro area
265
Table 2: Various opportunities to strengthen 
public investment and facilitate an expansionary 
overall fiscal policy stance in Europe
Goals Measures
short term (use interpretational leeway within present framework to increase budgetary 
flexibility and boost public investment)
strengthening  
investment
+
expansionary 
overall 
fiscal policy 
stance
(1) allow for temporary investment programmes (analogous to the 
European Fund for Strategic Investment)
(2) interpret emporary investment programmes as structural 
reforms
(3) incorporate realistic investment multiplier in budgetary analysis 
ex ante
(4) increase flexibility for cyclical conditions
(5) use exception for severe downturn 
(6) implement better methods of cyclical adjustment
medium term (solid implementation of changes regarding public investment)
EU implemen-
tation
(7) ‘investment protocol’ as annex to the Treaty 
(simplified revisions procedure Art. 48)
national imple-
mentation
(8) change national legislation to allow necessary changes based 
on the Golden Rule of public investment combined with a better 
spending rule 
Source: Timbeau (2016: 120).
It is indeed possible to use the leeway inherent in the 
current institutional framework for such a stimulus provided 
the Commission and Council prove willing to more actively 
use the interpretational leeway within this framework (see 
Table 2 for an overview of measures). In fact, the clarification 
as to the interpretation of the Pact that the Commission 
(2015) has given as well as the end-point of the Commonly 
agreed position on Flexibility in the Stability and Growth 
Pact by the Council can already be seen as illustrating 
important if still timid steps in that direction. 
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At least additional net investment could be justified if it 
came in the form of a temporary investment programme, 
analogous to the way the Commission interprets contri-
butions to the EFSI (1 in table 2, same for the following 
numbers). Additionally or alternatively, it may be possible 
to treat an investment programme as a structural reform 
that temporarily allows for deviations from Medium 
Term Objectives (MTO) or the adjustment path towards 
it (2). Admittedly, the conditionalities and limits set by 
Commission and Council in their current interpretation 
(co-financing of EU projects, limit of 0.5 % of GDP which 
is an arbitrary margin, mostly for countries in the preventive 
arm) certainly block a substantial and sustained fiscal 
stimulus, but at least the provisions may be used for some 
stimulus and political pressure may be built up to push for 
a more generous interpretation in application or for a more 
generous official reinterpretation.  
Reference to adverse cyclical conditions might help to 
increase leeway even further (4), although this could create 
the danger of a stop-go investment policy, if cyclical condi-
tions improve as can be expected under an investment 
programme. Probably the most convincing way to increase 
member states’ fiscal space in the short run would be to use 
the provision concerning a severe downturn in the Euro 
area or the EU to justify a temporary deviation from the 
consolidation path, thus allowing for a substantial European 
Investment Programme. The Commission has made an 
explicit comparison with the 2008 European Economic 
Recovery Plan (European Commission 2008) to give a 
conditional example of the potential use of this provision: 
it “should remain limited to exceptional, carefully circum-
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scribed situations to minimise the risk of moral hazard.” 
(European Commission 2015: 17). In fact, one may well 
argue that the Euro area is still in such an exceptional situ-
ation after years of recession, stagnation and low inflation 
while monetary policy is at the lower bound. 
All of this could further be supported if realistically 
high multiplier values were used in assessing the budg-
etary impact of additional investment which may not be 
significantly negative or even positive (3). Reconsider-
ation of the Commission’s method of cyclical adjustment 
(6) – e.g. to be more in line with the OECD method and 
results – may create further leeway as it might increase the 
cyclical part of the budget deficit, thus reducing the struc-
tural deficit (Truger 2015b). In fact, one may well argue 
that the negative output gap calculated by the Commission 
underestimates the bad cyclical condition of the Euro area 
economy by as much as 4.3 percentage points ( Jarocinski 
and Lenza 2016) in 2015. Applying standard budgetary 
semi-elasticity, this would first of all substantially change 
the structural balance calculations by about 2.2 percentage 
points, creating substantial leeway for the countries under 
the preventive arm of the SGP. As fiscal effort calcula-
tions would also be affected positively this would also help 
countries under the excessive deficit procedure. Finally, 
the dramatically more negative cyclical condition would 
create more leeway to use the exceptional clause under the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure.
Using some of these measures, it should be possible to 
implement a fiscal stimulus programme for public investment 
in the definition deemed necessary in the dimension of 1-2 
% of GDP for several years. 
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6. Outlook: Can there be a minimum consensus?
Most parts of the euro area have seen eight years of deep 
economic crisis. Despite all efforts by the European 
Commission and the ECB growth prospects have not 
improved substantially since mid-2014. Obviously, a change 
in  macroeconomic policy strategy is needed. Reform 
proposals that require thorough institutional changes – 
although clearly necessary in the medium term – are far 
too ambitious in the current political situation. Therefore, 
this article has proposed an extremely pragmatic short-
term strategy to improve growth and employment and 
thereby contribute to saving the Euro system. Using the 
arguments from the Golden Rule of public investment 
as a lowest common denominator, fiscal policy is to boost 
public investment in whatever suitable pragmatic definition 
in order to support the recovery and buy time for the more 
ambitious medium-term institutional reforms.
But will even such a small-scale pragmatic solution be polit-
ically feasible in the current situation in the Euro area? This 
is difficult to predict. In principle, promoting some deficit-
financed public investment should hardly be impossible 
given that the Golden Rule arguments stem from tradi-
tional public finance. However, even the minimum consensus 
necessary for such a pragmatic approach may not exist now: 
The German finance ministry even refuses to boost public 
investment despite structural budget surpluses, despite large 
needs for infrastructure (maintenance) and even though there 
is evidence that the additional investment could be fully self-
financing, and this in a macroeconomic constellation where 
Germany spends 9 per cent less than it produces. No wonder 
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that neighbouring countries blame Germany harshly for its 
fiscal policy stance. If this kind of deep disagreement about 
basic macroeconomic questions on the part of key political 
players persists, the Euro will most probably be doomed. 
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Macroeconomic Imbalances in 
Europe: a mistaken concept?
Stefan Collignon
In 2011, European authorities introduced the macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure (MIP) in response to the Euro crisis. It 
aims to identify, prevent and address the emergence of poten-
tially harmful macroeconomic imbalances that could adversely 
affect economic stability in member states and in the Euro 
Area as a whole. Yet, because the procedure focuses largely, 
although not exclusively, on reducing current account deficits, it 
has become a major argument for justifying excessive austerity 
policies in Europe, and it has negatively affected social stability.
The new MIP instrument was inspired by the excessive deficit 
procedure that frames the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for 
fiscal policy. The European Commission produces every year an 
alert mechanism report (AMR), which analyses the economies 
of all EU countries. Countries whose situation requires deeper 
analysis are then subjected to an in-depth review (IDR) and, 
if they are considered to have excessive imbalances, they will 
receive policy recommendations for reducing them1. 
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When the Maastricht Treaty was negotiated, current 
account positions were never discussed as a significant policy 
indicator. The prevailing view was, as Ingram (1973, p. 10) 
put it long before: “Intracommunity payments become anal-
ogous to interregional payments within a single country”. 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002, p. 148) looked at rising 
current account deficits in Greece and Portugal in the early 
years of Monetary Union (MU) and found: “They are exactly 
what theory suggests can and should happen when countries 
become more closely linked in goods and financial markets”. 
All this changed during the Euro Crisis when a new 
revisionist literature emerged. It was observed that all crisis 
countries in the South had run very large current account 
deficits, which were explained by large budget deficits in 
Greece and Portugal and by excess investment in real estate 
in Ireland and Spain.  This literature argued that the euro 
had been badly constructed, because it had ignored the 
current account positions of member states. For example, 
Holinski et al. (2010, p. 10) claimed that the persistent trade 
deficits in the South feed the accumulation of foreign debt 
and “this process is unsustainable and will eventually lead to 
exploding foreign debt levels”. The European Commission 
soon adopted this view and invented the MIP. 
However, as every economics student learns in her/his 
first year, correlations are not causes. The correlation between 
current account deficits and the crisis does not explain what 
caused the crisis. The MIP commits the logical fallacy of 
treating regional imbalances between member states of the 
Monetary Union as if they were caused by payments between 
foreign countries with foreign currencies. It reduces macroe-
conomic policy objectives narrowly to only one variable, when 
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in fact a broader and more integrative approach is need. While 
it is certainly useful to prevent excessive imbalances in a broad 
sense, one must question whether the way the new procedure 
is applied has not been doing more harm than good. 
The foreign country fallacy
In countries with different currencies, monitoring current 
accounts is a reasonable policy approach. They indicate the 
net borrowing (if negative) or net lending of foreign currency. 
Excessive deficits lead to the loss of foreign exchange 
reserves, the weakening of the exchange rate and could ulti-
mately necessitate a default on debt denominated in foreign 
currency. This has often happened in Latin America. Within 
the European single market, this would be highly disruptive 
and would warrant a procedure that ensures the stability 
of exchange rates between the Euro and currencies of EU 
member states outside the Euro Area.
However, within the Euro Area, the economic reality 
is very different. Payments within the Union, say between 
Greece and Germany, are not made in foreign currency, 
however estranged the citizens of the two countries may 
seem, but in domestic currency. Payments are made in Euros 
by firms, households and governments. These economic 
actors obtain their Euros by using previously saved cash, or 
by borrowing from banks or financial markets. Ultimately, 
all Euros come from the European Central Bank. The ECB 
regulates the aggregate money supply in accordance with its 
mandate to preserve price stability, and the banking system 
distributes these Euros across the Monetary Union. There 
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may be problems in the smoothness of this distribution due 
to the insufficient degree of Banking Union, but this does 
not invalidate the functioning of the system. 
It follows that, say, when a Greek taxi driver wants to buy 
a German car, he borrows from a Greek bank or a German 
leasing company and these financial institutions obtain the 
(base) money necessary for making the loan from the ECB.2 
There is no need to exchange Greek against German currency 
at a “permanently fixed exchange rate”, nor does anyone 
need to earn “German Euros”,3 because national currencies 
do not exist. Euros in Greece and Euros in Germany are the 
same domestic currency. A loan in Greece may be financed 
by the Greek banking system borrowing from the ECB, in 
which case it increases the money supply in the Euro Area, 
or by borrowing Euros held by, say, a German bank, in which 
case the money supply in the Euro Area remains stable. 
However, in both cases the stock of money (a liability) 
increases in Greece, although in the second case the stock 
of money diminishes while financial wealth claims increase 
in Germany. Yet, our taxi driver needs to repay the loan; he 
must balance his increased liabilities in Greece by higher real 
assets, and this means he needs higher income. In aggregate, 
economic growth is required to service all outstanding debt. 
This is where the difference between multiple currency 
areas and monetary union becomes clear. An importer in 
Poland needs Euros to pay for German cars, which implies 
that she/he would have to change Zlotys against Euros. 
Some agents in the Euro Area must wish to obtain Polish 
currency to make payments in Poland. The ECB does not 
supply Euros to Poland; these will become available in 
Poland when Polish exports into the Euro Area generate 
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income in Euros or European investors lend money to Polish 
borrowers (capital imports). Polish importers will then be 
able to use these Euros to make payments to their suppliers 
or to service foreign debt (capital outflows). The aggregate 
of these reciprocal movements between Polish demand for 
foreign currency and foreign demand for Zlotys is recorded 
in the balance of payments.  A deficit in the current account 
position means Poland is borrowing foreign currency from 
the rest of the world in order to pay for an excess of imports, 
which means in aggregate the country is building up a net 
debtor position that needs to be paid back in time. The only 
way to sustain foreign debt and guarantee its repayment is, 
therefore, to turn the current account balance into surplus 
– unless there is a sustained inflow of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and similar non-debt capital. 
By contrast, in the Euro Area, the economic mechanism 
is similar to a sovereign country, which has its own currency. 
Trade deficits between member states are regional imbal-
ances, because all payments are made in domestic currency. 
A currency union is first of all a payment union, because 
money is a means of payment. Take our Greek taxis driver 
who needs to pay back his loan. He must make a profit and 
earn Euros by selling his services, so that he is able to service 
the debt. But he does not need tourists bringing in Euros 
from Germany (although he may appreciate this source of 
profit). Even if he had only local people as customers, he 
can pay his bank in the domestic currency, in Euros. His 
higher income will be a source of funds. This implies that 
he increases the asset side in his balance sheet and this will 
match the liabilities, which are growing because he has 
to service his debt.  He can of course repay his bank loan, 
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which would shrink his own and the bank’s balance sheet, so 
that money supply (the level of bank deposits) will fall in the 
Euro Area as a whole. On the other hand, if he has borrowed 
from a German bank, the repayment reduces the stock of 
financial claims in Germany and replaces them with cash, 
which is a liability of the Central Bank; as a consequence, 
money supply in Greece is down and in Germany up, but 
overall money supply in the Euro Area remains constant. 
Clearly, this situation is sustainable as long as the growth 
of income is sufficient to cover the interest on outstanding 
debt, because the balance sheet remains solvent. 
Thus, in the aggregate of the Greek economy, there is no 
need for Greek current accounts to be in balance or surplus, 
because in Monetary Union, the counterpart of the apparent 
current account deficits is an automatic money flow either 
through the banking system or through the creation of money 
by the central bank. There is no “foreign” debt that needs 
to be serviced by net exports in the tradable sector. What 
is needed, however, is that aggregate income increases suffi-
ciently for Greek debt to be serviced. In other words, Greece 
needs economic growth, and it does not matter whether this 
growth is generated by exports or by domestic demand.
This condition of sustainable equilibrium is often written 
y ≥ r, where y stands for the growth rate and r for the 
interest rate. If this condition is not met, the dynamics of 
debt, whether private or public and whether individual or 
aggregate, requires additional funds; otherwise the debtor 
will have to default. For example, if this condition is not 
met for government, it must generate a primary budget 
surplus (i.e. tax income minus spending) that is sufficient to 
sustain the debt.4 This may require austerity measures, say, by 
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reducing public consumption, but the important point is that 
such adjustment does not necessarily involve balanced current 
accounts. I shall come back to this in the next section.
There remains the danger of liquidity crises.  As long as 
Greek banks have access to liquidity from the ECB, they are 
able to provide the funds for making payments. This is the 
fundamental difference to a multi-currency system, because the 
definition of a currency union is that all banks in the area have 
unlimited access to the so-called discount window of the central 
bank. If this window is closed, a country is effectively expelled 
from the Monetary Union. This would be a political decision 
of constitutional quality and is not subject to the European 
Central Bank’s discretion. Greece and Cyprus came very close 
to such a situation, but the system was sustained by the special 
emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) facility. The problem is 
the insufficient degree of integration of the European banking 
system. In an ideal world, banks would have highly diversified 
client portfolios, which ensure that the default of one debtor 
can be absorbed by the profits from other clients. However, 
European banks have significant “home biases”, which means 
they lend more to local companies and governments than 
to the rest of the Euro Area. Now, if a particular region, say 
Greece or Spain, is affected by a negative shock, which pushes 
these local clients into defaults and/or liquidation, the profit-
ability of local banks can be seriously impaired. Investors may 
then shift their assets into safer institutions and regions. Such 
capital flight can lead to the collapse of regional asset prices, 
which will then seriously handicap regional growth conditions. 
This dynamics has been one of the major drivers behind the 
Euro crisis (Collignon, Esposito, & Lierse, 2013). In order to 
make the European Monetary Union robust, the European 
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Banking Union needs to be completed with a collective deposit 
insurance system (Gros, 2015).
The austerity trap
The focus on current account imbalances is therefore a 
mistake. The consequences are dire. If the policy prescription 
is to reduce the current account deficit, the only way to do so 
is austerity. We know from national income identities that 
the current account balance (CA) is the sum of the savings-
investment balance (S-I) and the government budget 
position (T-G):
 (1) CA = (S – I) + (T- G)
S stands here for household savings, I for investment, T 
for tax income, and G for government spending. Hence, 
reducing a current account deficit requires raising the savings 
rate or lowering investment or increasing taxes and lowering 
government spending. Now, each of these policy variables 
may be useful to achieve particular policy objectives, but the 
requirement to balance the current account position for each 
member state in the monetary union is counterproductive, 
because it ignores the interdependencies in the payment 
union and may therefore generate a violation of the equi-
librium condition y ≥ r. 
If we take the income variables only in the context of a 
sovereign single currency state, high domestic savings would 
build up financial wealth, while high investment would 
generate higher growth. Lower taxes may stimulate demand, 
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but if the economy is booming, the excess revenue ought 
to be used to pay back previous debt. By making national 
current accounts the policy target in the unified Monetary 
Union, one treats what is effectively a region of the Euro 
Area as a separate, autonomous and independent unit and 
ignores the spill-over effects between economic sectors 
and regions. Assuming that the Euro Area as a whole has 
a balanced current account, we can decompose equation (1) 
into two sectors standing for region 1 and 2:
 (2) CA = CA1 + CA2 = 0     CA1 = - CA2
whence
  (3) (S1 – I1) + (T1- G1) = -(S2 – I2) - (T2- G2)
It is then obvious that the current account position of 
one region is the mirror of another region. If the household 
savings in one region are insufficient to finance local 
corporate investment, the savings balance from another 
region will provide the funds. It is often argued that the Euro 
Area does not function as a fully integrated currency union 
because it lacks fiscal transfers. Amongst governments, a 
“transfer union” would imply that the budget surplus of one 
government finances the deficit of another government: 
   (4) (T1- G1) = - (T2- G2)     “Transfer Union”
But clearly, a transfer union or fiscal federalism is not the 
only possible way for transferring funds in Monetary Union, 
because the savings-investment balance in the private sector 
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may fulfil this function. The proper policy mix among these 
variables is conditional on the specific economic envi-
ronment in a given region and in the Euro Area as a whole. 
The focus on current account imbalances does not allow such 
differentiated assessment. What is needed is a more differ-
entiated assessment of the effect that each of these variables 
has on economic growth. 
Flow of funds in the Euro Area
The appropriate tool for such analysis is the flow of funds 
statistic. It records the cash flow across different economic 
sectors and can be disaggregated from the Euro Area level 
down to member states, regions and economic sectors.  Typi-
cally, simplified textbook models assume four functional 
sectors: households save and lend, the corporate sector borrows 
and invests and ideally the government balances its budget 
and there is no need to borrow or lend abroad. However, in 
reality substantial distortions may occur – sometimes for a long 
time. Households may borrow excessively, especially during a 
real estate boom. Banks may not be lending to corporations 
given the levels of expected returns, risks, uncertainty, and the 
constraints imposed by rules and regulations. Corporations 
may need to reduce the leverage of their balance sheets and save 
profits rather than invest. If a region has been hit by a negative 
demand shock, it might be appropriate for governments to 
stimulate demand by spending more. Flow of fund statistics 
can provide a clearer picture of what kind of policy response 
is needed. Figure 1 shows the flow of funds for seven member 
states of the Euro Area, as well as for the UK and the USA. 
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Figure 1. Flow of Funds in selected countries
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Note: UBLA is the current account deficit; UBLC is net lending of the 
corporate sector; UBLG is the government budget position; UBLH is 
the net lending (+) by households.
On aggregate, the Euro Area shows the normal textbook 
features, whereby households save and lend to corporations, 
immediately after the start of Monetary Union and before 
the financial crisis broke in the USA. Since then household 
savings have increased substantially and the corporate 
sector no longer borrows but pays back debt and delev-
erages balance sheets. Only governments are still borrowing 
funds, although fiscal consolidation after 2011 has slowed 
down this only remaining source of aggregate demand. Not 
surprisingly, the current account position of the Euro Area 
with the rest of the world has risen into surplus. Hence, it is 
clear that the focus on reducing current account imbalances 
has sharpened austerity, handicapping growth and the return 
to full employment. 
Our flow of funds analysis for the United States shows 
that public borrowing has been the driver of economic 
growth in the US economy during the Obama years, 
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while the corporate sector has used profits to deleverage 
debt rather than to invest. It remains to be seen whether 
Trumponomics will change these dynamics. Financial 
deregulation may encourage taking out more corporate debt, 
even if it takes time, but the most likely effect of the new 
policy mix with protectionism, increased public spending 
and reduced taxation is stagflation with rapidly deteriorating 
current accounts.
If we look at individual member states, we find that the 
patterns in Italy, Spain and Portugal resemble the Euro 
Area, at least in recent years. France is the only country 
that functions as in the textbook model: there households 
save, corporations borrow. Yet, because the government 
also borrows, national savings need to be complemented by 
savings from abroad. If we take the French trade balance as 
a proxy for the current account position, we see in Figure 2 
that most of the French external deficit originates in intra-
European trade, while external net exports compensate 
approximately for a quarter of these net imports. A closer 
look at the data (not shown here) reveals that during the 
austerity years, French demand and therefore imports 
temporarily (2011-2014) declined, but most of all lack of 
demand from other member states, i.e. French exports, stag-
nated. France fulfils a crucial function in the Euro Area 
today: it is the only country which absorbs the excess savings 
from other member states. By using current account statistics 
rather than flow of funds this fact remains hidden.
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Figure 2. France: Trade Balance
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The most distorted country of all is Germany. Here, all 
sectors are saving and lending; no sector is borrowing. It is 
interesting that before the Global Financial Crisis, Germany 
was the main provider of funds for the European Union, 
but when austerity reduced the demand for funds, Germany 
switched lending to non-European countries and benefited 
from demand coming from a world that was not handi-
capped by austerity. See Figure 3. Thus, Germany is a savings 
machine that lends to the rest of the world and prevents other 
European regions from growing through exports because it 
does not buy. In fact, Germany is the prime channel through 
which the Euro Area accumulates foreign exchange reserves 
and financial claims on the rest of the world, but this financial 
wealth does not spread to other member states. Yet, the 
enormous contribution that Germany makes to the growing 
imbalances in Europe goes largely undetected by the macro-
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economic imbalance procedure, because, on the one hand, the 
thresholds (of +6% and -4%) for surpluses and deficits are 
asymmetric, and on the other hand, it is not clear that the 
cause is insufficient investment by German corporations.
Figure 3. Germany: Trade Balance
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Regarding outside EU countries, we observe from the flow 
of funds in Figure 1 that the UK’s rapid economic growth 
in recent years is fuelled by a consumer boom. This is unsus-
tainable. The household sector as a whole is not saving but 
borrowing amounts similar to the government. Perversely, the 
only sector that generates savings is the corporate sector, but 
it uses these funds to deleverage balance sheets. Given these 
insufficient household savings, the UK has to borrow abroad. 
The consumer boom translates into a huge trade deficit with 
the EU, and a smaller one with the rest of the world. See 
Figure 4.  However, the situation has improved after the 
crisis with respect to non-European trade balances. Figure 5 
shows that, because of reduced demand, British exports have 
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suffered from austerity in Europe, but have picked up since 
excessive austerity has ended in 2016, while exports to the 
rest of the world have improved during this period. Thus, 
European austerity has inverted the trade incentives for the 
British economy, and this may well have contributed to the 
public disenchantment that has led to Brexit.
Figure 4. United Kingdom: Trade Balance
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Figure 5. British Exports
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The competitive imbalances
A better way to detect macroeconomic imbalances is by 
looking at the flow of funds than at current account statistics. 
However, simple economic wisdom tells us that lenders 
ought to put their savings where it yields the highest return. 
This is why competitiveness matters. Financial markets asses 
the investment opportunities, but the macro environment of 
competitiveness will determine where returns on capital are 
attractive. In its MIP, the European Commission uses unit 
labour costs as a measure for competitiveness. However, it 
is well known that this indicator does not indicate compet-
itive positions in levels, but only the cumulative dynamics 
following the base year. This greatly reduces its usefulness.
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A proper assessment requires an index that measures 
the levels of labour cost competitiveness. This can be done 
by calculating and comparing a specific country’s wage cost 
against the benchmark level at which the returns on capital 
in all regions and sectors would be equal to the average of 
the Euro Area.5 The wage compensation, which would 
generate the same return on capital in a given country or 
sector as in the Euro Area average, I call equilibrium wage. 
Note, however, that we must not confuse this equilibrium 
wage with the neoclassical idea of a market-clearing wage 
at the natural rate of unemployment. If wage costs are above 
this equilibrium level, the return on capital is less than the 
Euro average, therefore indicating a competitive handicap. 
The wage competitiveness indicator is then calculated as the 
ratio of actual wages relative to this benchmark equilibrium 
wage. Labour compensations below this level generate 
competitive advantages and ought to attract investment and 
support faster growth. 
An interesting feature of this equilibrium wage is that it 
is determined by relative capital productivities and techno-
logical progress.6 It therefore links wage-setting policies to 
economic growth and supply-side policies. For example, the 
increase in capital productivity (and its mirror image, the 
reduction in the capital-output ratio) explains Germany’s 
improved equilibrium wage in the first Euro-decade and 
the opposite effect in Greece after the Euro crisis imposed 
austerity (Collignon, 2016).
Figure 6 shows the development of actual and equi-
librium wages for some selected Euro member states. In 
Germany, the competitive disadvantage of the 1990s has 
been overcome by improvements in the productivity of 
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the capital stock7 that were faster than in the Euro Area, 
so that the equilibrium wage increased. Actual wages also 
started to accelerate, especially after the crisis, although not 
enough to erase the advantage. This is very different when 
compared to other countries. In Spain and Ireland the equi-
librium wage stagnated before the crisis, but has picked up 
since. While nominal wages have stagnated in both coun-
tries, the evolution of the equilibrium wage has improved 
competiveness in Ireland and lowered the disadvantages in 
Spain. In France and Italy we detect a tendency of long-run 
stagnation for the equilibrium wage, which is not fully 
interiorized in wage bargaining. This reflects supply-side 
weaknesses and insufficient improvements in capital produc-
tivity. Greece is a sad story: nominal wages have dramatically 
fallen, but the equilibrium wage level even more, so that the 
return on capital in Greece is rapidly deteriorating. This is 
largely a consequence of the harsh austerity policies, which 
have reduced domestic demand and economic growth at a 
rate faster than that by which existing capital capacities are 
destroyed. Hence, Greece proves that austerity is not neces-
sarily an instrument for improving competitiveness. 
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Figure 6. Actual and equilibrium labour 
compensation, 1994-2016 
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The gap between actual and equilibrium labour compen-
sation is our measure for competitiveness. Figure 7 shows 
this gap for EU member states as well as UK, USA and 
Japan. A negative gap indicates a return on capital above 
the Euro Area average, which potentially improves the 
conditions for economic growth. Now, because our gap is 
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the difference between actual and equilibrium wages, the 
exchange rate cancels out. A currency devaluation only 
affects our competitiveness index to the extent that it affects 
the current account balance between different currency areas. 
It is a fascinating insight that the biggest imbalances in 
wage competitiveness are occurring in the small mostly 
Eastern new member states, where the productivity of the 
capital stock has improved most rapidly during the tran-
sition from plan to market. However, because of excessive 
wage restraint, actual wages are 30-40 percent below the 
equilibrium level inside the Euro Area and even more in the 
rest of the EU. Wage levels in Italy, France, Spain, Austria 
and Greece are uncompetitive, because nominal wages are 
growing faster than the equilibrium level. This represents 
mainly insufficient growth in productivity. German wage 
levels are 4 per cent below equilibrium, which matters 
because Germany is a large economy, but the distortion 
is hardly as bad as Germany-bashers claim. Germany 
contributes to distortions in Europe not so much by low 
wages, but by excessive savings and insufficient spending.
With respect to wage levels in the United States and 
Japan, the Euro Area is too expensive and this is because 
capital productivity is too low. Because we calculate capital 
productivity as nominal GDP to the nominal value of the 
aggregate capital stock, the underutilisation of productive 
capacities and the capital stock due to excessive austerity 
has damaged European competitiveness and contributed 
to macroeconomic imbalances between member 
states. Devaluing the Euro would only change this if it 
contributed to higher productivity, which depends on the 
degree of openness and the degree of capacity utilization. 
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What Europe needs is an economic strategy that restores 
adequate and balanced growth. Protectionist policies would 
not improve economic conditions.
Figure 7. Wage gap between actual and equilibrium 
wages (in percent of equilibrium wage)
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Overcoming regional imbalances in the Euro Area
This article has argued that the Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure as it is presently set up in the European Union is 
inadequate and even counterproductive for avoiding signif-
icant distortions among Euro member states. The excessive 
focus on balancing current accounts imposes austerity that 
reduces productivity improvements and thereby amplifies 
competitiveness problems. While current accounts are 
meaningful for serving exchange stability within the single 
market, they are meaningless in the single currency area. 
Instead, it is necessary to sustain economic growth at levels 
which allow servicing debt contracted in Euros. 
This links economic growth and wage bargaining to 
effective demand management and supply-side reforms 
which ought to focus on improving productivity and 
assuring balanced growth across countries and regions 
in the Euro Area. Such balanced economic performance 
requires instruments that allow greater force and discretion 
than the rule-based intergovernmental policy making which 
is presently practiced in Europe. In-depth reviews and 
alert mechanisms cannot force unwilling actors to correct 
what is going wrong. It would be necessary to give policy 
competences with proper budget funds to a centralized 
body like the European Commission – properly controlled 
by the European Parliament – that would allow targeted 
investment and structural reforms especially in weak 
economic areas.
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Notes
1. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-
euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/
eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/macroe-
conomic-imbalance-procedure/dealing-macroeconomic-imbalances_en 
Notice also the increasing bureaucratization of linguistic styles in the 
European Union. SGP, MIP, AMR and IDR, Six Pack etc. are labels that are 
wielded skilfully by a small circle of experts, but unintelligible for ordinary 
citizens. One is reminded of the old Soviet Union.
2. Base money is money created as credit given by the central bank to 
commercial banks. Book money is a multiple of base money created by 
bank loans.
3. Such fanciful talk is found in: (Sinn & Wollmershaeuser, 2011).
4. For an in-depth analysis of public debt dynamics under the rules of the 
European Stability and Growth Pact see (Collignon, 2012)
5. We define nominal equilibrium wages as the total labour compensation 
level, at which the average return on the capital stock in a given economy 
is equal to the average return in the Euro Area as a whole. The return 
on capital is the ratio of non-wage value added relative to the historic 
value of the aggregate capital stock of a country or sector. For details see 
(Collignon, 2016);  (Collignon & Esposito, 2017).
6. (Collignon & Esposito, 2017) show empirical evidence.
7. We use the data provided by Ameco and Eurostat for capital productivity 
that calculate capital productivity as the 30-year cumulated value of net 
investment. This is a nominal value. The return is the operating surplus 
(value added minus wages). These data incorporate price effects as well 
as physical productivity as incorporated in technological progress.
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Coordinating wages in the 
European Monetary Union: 
practical experiences and 
lessons to be learned 
Ronald Janssen
Trade union initiatives to set up the coordination of collective 
bargaining rounds go back as far as the early 1990s. The 
European Metal Federation (EMF), as it was then called, was 
probably the frontrunner. Concerned by the fact that one of 
their affiliates, in particular in the Netherlands, had accepted 
a cut in real wages by agreeing to a nominal wage increase 
lower than inflation, the EMF reacted by setting up an 
internal committee to discuss, compare and evaluate collective 
bargaining in the metal sectors around Europe. In order to 
avoid competitive wage moderation, the EMF put forward 
the criterion that collectively bargained wage increases were to 
amount to the sum of inflation and a fair share of productivity. 
This was followed, in 1998, by the so-called Doorn-Initiative, 
where trade unions from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg set up their own coordination platform and 
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pledged to bring wages in line with the sum of inflation plus 
productivity growth. A year later, at its congress in Helsinki, 
the entire ETUC followed suit and organised their own 
European wide collective bargaining committee, using the 
same formulae as the Doorn group.
It is interesting to elaborate on the formal reasons why the 
ETUC congress decided to engage in bargaining coordination. 
Three objectives were mentioned: With the introduction of the 
euro, currency devaluations were no longer possible and the 
ETUC wanted to avoid replacing them with wage competition 
among members of the euro area. Recent history has shown 
that this concern about wage devaluations being used as a 
surrogate for currency devaluation was well-founded. A second 
objective was to ensure workers from Central and Eastern 
European countries would get their fair share of the benefits of 
European Union enlargement: If, thanks to integration within 
the internal market, productivity were to increase in Central 
and Eastern Europe, then real wages should go up similarly. 
Third, and tellingly, the ETUC also made a link between wage 
coordination and the price stability mandate of the new central 
bank of Europe, the ECB, by claiming that such coordination 
among trade unions of Euro Area member states was desirable 
and necessary to avoid policy conflicts that could damage 
economic growth by having wage actors and monetary policy 
actors pulling the economy in two opposing directions. 
The first decade of Monetary Union: The reality
The first and also the latter motivation testify to the fact 
that actors such as the ETUC and its trade unions were 
Coordinating wages in the European Monetary Union: 
practical experiences and lessons to be learned
303
well aware of the implications of monetary union (MU): 
Members of a monetary union cannot go their own different 
ways. If they do so, tensions within the system build up and 
sooner or later, the union will be confronted with the fact 
that a single monetary policy with its single interest rate and 
its single exchange rate has become entirely inappropriate 
for the majority of its members. 
Unfortunately, this is exactly what happened during the 
first decade of MU: On the one hand, member states such 
as Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece were “riding” the 
cheap capital boom that MU was offering. Upon joining 
MU, risk premiums in interest rates disappeared and capital 
flooded into their economies. Cheap and easy capital was 
then allowed to trigger a debt-driven economic boom, either 
through a housing price bubble (Spain, Ireland), or through 
a public expenditure spree (Greece). The economy boomed 
and so did inflation. This, in turn, accelerated the boom as 
the combination of robust inflation and a relatively low 
single nominal interest rate set by the ECB resulted in real 
interest rates that were too low for these economies. 
On the other hand, the core economies of MU (read: 
Germany) opted to stick to and even intensify the model 
of “competitive disinflation”. Policy-makers put downwards 
pressure on wages by weakening labour market institutions 
(Hartz reforms) and by threatening trade unions with inter-
vention in collective bargaining should they opt out of “job 
alliances” at company level. The latter, together with firms 
increasingly cancelling their membership of employer asso-
ciations that had bargaining rights, resulted in German trade 
unions widely accepting company-level opening clauses in 
sector agreements. All of this worked to depress or even 
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virtually cancel wage dynamics. From 2000 to 2007, for 
example, real wage growth in Germany was minimal and 
average nominal unit wage cost growth was zero. As a result, 
inflation was pushed down as well and whereas Germany, 
before MU, was evolving close to a 2% inflation target, 
inflation in the mid-2000s went down to 1% and in some 
years even lower. As with the peripheral economies, the 
single monetary regime accelerated these disinflationary and 
depressive forces by setting a single interest rate that, in this 
case, remained too high.
While this scenario of economic divergence went on for 
almost an entire decade, imbalances began building up. 
Year after year, Spanish and Irish households and firms 
as well as the Greek sovereign happily took on ever more 
debt, debt that was (macro-economically) necessary to 
finance their high current account deficits. On the other 
side of the game, Germany saw its current account (which 
was slightly negative at the start of EMU) steadily grow 
into a giant surplus that peaked in 2008 and this despite an 
enormous appreciation of the euro against the dollar and 
other currencies.
Sooner or later, however, reality had to catch up. Once 
financial markets (finally?) realised that debt and financial 
positions among households, corporations, banks and 
governments in the “debtor” countries were unsustainable, 
the whole finance system ground to a halt. Capital became 
bottled up in the core and stopped flowing to the rest of 
MU. With the financial sector effectively going on strike, 
the economy in a major part of MU (the deficit countries) 
collapsed. In short, the euro crisis was born and the Euro 
Area became split between “creditor” and “debtor” nations. 
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The signature of imbalances 
While, as described above, wages also played a role in 
building up huge imbalances in current account and debt 
positions, it is not entirely clear whether they were a causal 
factor or whether wage developments were driven by other 
factors. Formally, policy-makers rapidly decided on the first 
approach by falling back on the traditional, mainstream 
argument of competitiveness. In this view, wages in the 
deficit countries had, for some reason (“irresponsible” trade 
unions), spiralled out of control. This damaged competi-
tiveness, thus harming exports and substituting domestic 
production with imports so that current account deficits 
soared. These external deficits had to be financed, however, 
and this was done by private sector actors (households, 
corporations) indebting themselves through the banking 
sector. In this view, the Great Financial Crisis or the euro 
crisis at least is not so much a financial crisis but in the first 
place a crisis of competitiveness and wages.
Another view, however, is that the causes go the other 
way and that wages in the deficit countries did not simply 
explode on their own but were a symptom triggered by 
another factor. In this view, the real driving force of imbal-
ances in deficit countries was massive capital flows that 
entered the economy, thereby causing a debt-financed, asset 
bubble-based boom which increased both inflation as well 
as the current account deficit. The external deficit increased, 
not so much because of falling exports but because of rising 
import demand. With inflation (and housing prices) going 
through the roof, wage dynamics were also pushed up. In 
fact, an argument can be made that, had it not been for 
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responsible social partners and coordinated wage bargaining 
setting (low) maximum limits to wage demands, imbalances 
would have been much worse. In Spain for example, national 
agreements on framing wage negotiations were used to set a 
(lower) maximum on wage increases, thereby also taking the 
ECB’s price stability objective into account. If it had not been 
for this practice of coordination, wage dynamics in Spain 
would probably have been much more dynamic. In this view, 
wages and bargaining in the deficit countries are more of a 
consequence, not the cause of the euro crisis. Several pieces 
of research, sometimes from unexpected quarters such as the 
ECB and the Banque de France (Gaulier/Vicard, 2013) or 
the IMF (Chen et al. , 2012) , back up this latter view and 
argue that the signature of imbalances in the Euro Area is 
indeed financial, in other words that capital flows, not dete-
riorating competitiveness, constituted the driving force.
To reiterate: these capital flows did not come out of the 
blue. On the supply side, capital flows were helped along by 
the strategy of wage restraint in Germany which boosted 
profit margins but not reinvestment. This resulted in massive 
but idle corporate cash, cash that was subsequently chan-
nelled through the interbank system into a financial bubble 
in other members of the Euro Area. Viewed from the other 
side of the equation (the deficit countries), there was also a 
pull or demand side factor: The euro’s introduction signifi-
cantly reduced risk premiums in interest rates on Spanish, 
Portuguese, Greek bonds, thereby creating more demand 
for credit and capital in the deficit economies. In some cases 
(Spain for example), national policy was not helpful either 
as the housing boom was further fuelled by easing regula-
tions on land use, thereby making more land available for 
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construction purposes. Moreover, the single monetary policy 
regime worked to extend these destabilising forces. In the 
booming economies, the fall in nominal interest rates asso-
ciated with the disappearance of the risk premium was 
intensified by rising inflation so that the real interest rate 
went down even further. In Germany, the opposite was the 
case. Falling and extremely low inflation came on top of 
what was already a relatively over-strict nominal interest rate 
(set by the ECB) and worked to push up the real interest 
rate as well. 
Despite the evidence supporting the alternative view 
that capital flows rather than wage competitiveness was at 
the core of the crisis, Euro Area policy-makers decided to 
blame wages and ignore the mismanagement of finance and 
capital flows: Excesses in wages had gotten the euro into 
trouble so wages were seen as the way to get the euro out 
of the crisis, especially since national currency devaluations 
could no longer be used to restore competitive positions. 
What undoubtedly also played a role in this policy choice 
of ‘internal devaluation’ was the pressure coming from the 
ECB to provide financial support to crisis countries only if 
their governments undertook structural reforms to weaken 
the bargaining position of workers and trade unions.
The failure of internal devaluation
It is an understatement to claim that this policy of squeezing 
wages was not a huge success. Internal devaluation, together 
with fiscal austerity, seriously depressed domestic demand in 
several Euro Area member states and this spilled over into 
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the rest of the Eurozone. A double-dip recession was trig-
gered and, in the end, it took the Euro Area almost a decade 
to simply get back to the pre-crisis level of economic activity. 
(Bibow and Flassbeck 2017).  There are three reasons for 
this dismal record of internal devaluation: 
1) While wage moderation was supposed to restore 
competitiveness by flowing into lower prices, in Spain, 
Greece or Portugal a substantial part of wage squeezes 
simply fuelled higher profit margins. Given that the deficit 
countries were facing a sudden stop in capital flows, this 
does not come as a big surprise. Indeed, with the financial 
sector going on ‘strike’, many companies, in particular SMEs 
were hit by a credit squeeze. Banks already confronted with 
reduced access to market funding and with capital losses on 
their sovereign debt portfolios, became much more selective 
in rolling over corporate loans and extending new credit. 
Being shut off from credit, business decided to look for an 
alternative source of finance and found it in the form of 
substantially increased profits that were retained as internal 
finance. In this respect, internal devaluation can be seen as 
a (poor) substitute for financial policy: In the absence of a 
functioning banking system, workers in the deficit countries 
were pressed into taking over the role of bankers as wages 
were used as an instrument for internal finance.  However, 
the real wage cuts this implied boomeranged as business 
had to confront an additional weakening of demand for 
their goods and services. Instead of squeezing wages, the 
correct policy reply would have been to fix the Euro Area 
monetary transmission mechanism to make sure credit to 
business flowed again, including in the ‘deficit’ countries. 
Starting from mid-2012 (with Mario Draghi’s pledge to do 
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‘anything it takes to save the euro’), efforts to unlock credit 
were gradually taken up by the ECB, ultimately resulting in 
the launching of full quantitative easing (QE) from 2015 
onwards. By that time, however, the policy of internal deval-
uation had already inflicted serious damage. 
2) Internal devaluation also relies on the assumption that 
price adjustments play a determining role in correcting intra-
euro trade imbalances. The idea is that wage compression 
would help relocate economic activity from the core Euro Area 
to its Southern part, thus raising exports and compressing 
imports in the latter. But this idea ignores the fact that there are 
pronounced structural differences between the different Euro 
Area economies. Germany, in particular, is heavily specialised 
in highly complex, high value-added production. Here, it is 
not the price but the quality and the know-how that matter 
for competitiveness. This implies that squeezing wages in the 
“deficit” countries does not dent Germany’s competitive edge 
much as the areas of specialisation are very different and as 
goods produced in Germany are in high demand irrespective 
of their price. A clear confirmation of this structural difference 
can be seen from the fact that the German current account 
surplus, despite almost ten years of internal wage devalu-
ation in the South of the Euro Area, has increased further 
and reached the stunning record of almost 9.2% of GDP in 
the second quarter of 2016. Despite intra-euro rebalancing 
in the form of internal wage devaluation, Germany simply 
shifted imbalances and started to export even more to the rest 
of the world outside the Euro Area (where demand was not 
depressed). This testifies to the real strength of the German 
economy which lies in producing complex and quality goods 
and services in high demand globally (machinery, chemicals, 
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transport and network equipment, engineering) and not in 
cheap wages (Felipe/Kumar, 2011, Abdon et al., 2010, Storm, 
2016). Euro Area members implementing internal devalu-
ation, instead of correcting the external surplus of the core, 
ended up competing against each other, thereby exporting 
unemployment and depressed demand to each other and 
other Euro Area trading partners not as structurally strong 
as Germany. 
3) A third reason for failure, also known in economic theory 
as the problem of debt deflation, is that the real burden of debt 
increases. While internal devaluation is pushing wages down, 
workers and their households still have to service a debt load 
that does not change in nominal terms. The rigidity of nominal 
debt, combined with falling wages, then crowds out spending 
on goods and services, thus delivering yet another blow to 
aggregate demand and economic activity. Or alternatively, if 
households start defaulting on debt that they find harder to 
service, this creates additional pressure in the banking sector. 
As the portfolio of non-performing loans starts to expand and 
banks are forced to register provisions for these, the capacity of 
banks to extend credit to the economy receives another blow. 
These problems are particularly serious for economies that are 
already highly indebted like the Euro Area deficit countries. 
Increased price competitiveness then comes at the expense 
of aggravating debt overhang problems. These concerns can 
occasionally be identified in IMF papers where it can be read 
that there is a ‘risk that an internal devaluation accomplished 
by low or falling inflation in deficit countries could aggravate 
debt overhang problems’ and that ‘this could undermine 
domestic demand, especially if sovereign/bank real economy 
adverse links remain active’ (Tressel et al.  2014, p. 23).
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EMU at present: Time to reboot coordination 
of collective bargaining?
Meanwhile, after several years of intervention and struc-
tural reforms in collective bargaining systems, policy-makers 
have got what they wished for. Wage dynamics across the 
entire Euro Area have broken down, with the most recent 
numbers showing that average wages went up by a mere 
1.3% in 2016. And while pay rises in France and Spain are 
even slightly below this level (around 1%), workers in Italy 
and Belgium are confronting nominal wage freezes. The Euro 
Area economy may have recovered somewhat from the Great 
Financial Crisis but for wages there is no recovery in sight 
(see TUAC, 2017). 
Graph 1: Nominal Compensation per employee 
(change in per cent against previous year)
Source: OECD Economic Outlook November 2016, statistical annex
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This raises two concerns. 
Extremely weak wage dynamics eventually show up in core 
inflation. With wages increasing by a mere 1.3% and with 
productivity increasing at around 0.5%, this leaves unit wage 
costs rising at a rate of about 0.8%. There is no pressure from 
wage costs on business to raise prices at rates compatible with 
the price stability target of the ECB (2%); on the contrary, 
too slow wage growth is sustaining the trend of missing the 
inflation target (see Graph 2). In fact, leaving aside volatile 
oil prices, core inflation in the Euro Area is currently still 
at around 1%, thus almost exactly corresponding with the 
sluggish dynamics seen in unit wage costs. Even those policy-
makers (ECB, OECD, IMF) who in the past have been the 
most aggressive in pushing wages down have recently been 
seen to warn against excessively low wage increases as these 
would be disinflationary (for an overview see Janssen 2016). 
Graph 2: Nominal unit Wage Costs, annual change
Source: AMECO
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Besides pushing many Euro Area economies to the brink 
of deflation, a second concern is that the policy of internal 
devaluation may ultimately spiral out of control. This risk 
can be identified by looking back at wage cost trends since 
the start of MU. From the graph below, one can see that the 
different parts of MU tend to switch places over time. In the 
first ten years, the deficit countries experienced unit wage 
cost dynamics above the trend compatible with price stability 
(which boils down to a 2% increase each year) whereas wage 
costs in France (and Belgium) neatly followed the price 
stability line. In Germany, however, unit wage costs simply 
stagnated and were thus way below the price stability line. 
However, from the Great Financial Crisis onwards, member 
states swapped places (as can be seen from the slopes of the 
lines in the graph). German unit wage cost dynamics started 
to move back towards being more in line with price stability. 
Meanwhile, the original deficit countries along with others 
such as France not only adopted the pre-crisis German wage 
model of stagnating unit wage costs but, in several cases, 
went even further by reducing unit wage costs. Here, the risk 
to be aware of is that, as the competitive wage position that 
Germany  secured  during the first decade of MU is being 
steadily eroded, the pressure to implement a renewed round 
of wage moderation  may again start building up. In the event 
of a negative shock that pushes up unemployment (Trump 
inflicting damage on world trade and the German export 
machine?), the argument that the German economy needs 
to rebuild its wage competitive advantage may again become 
pervasive. If this were to happen, if Germany again joins the 
‘wage devaluation’ club, then the policy of ‘internal devaluation’ 
would really turn into a Euro Area-wide policy, with all the 
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consequences of further disinflation and severely depressed 
demand across the entire zone (see also Janssen, 2015). 
Graph 3: Wage Moderation spiralling out of control? 
Long term trends in nominal unit labour costs 
Source: AMECO
Conclusion
Coordination of collective bargaining in MU is important. 
The absence of successful wage coordination can indeed be 
seen as one of the underlying causes of the euro crisis, as a 
strategy of wage moderation in one part of the Euro Area 
ended up not in more investment there but in capital flowing 
into other parts. This, in turn, resulted within the latter econ-
omies in rising asset prices and in an economic boom that 
was debt-financed but that ultimately ended in a bust.
At the same time, attempts to coordinate collective 
bargaining or, as seems to be the Commission approach, to 
“impose” wages policy through expert councils on produc-
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tivity need to avoid the trap of adopting the narrative of 
wage competiveness, in which all of us have to become 
more competitive against the rest of us. Such an approach 
is dangerous both from an economic perspective ( risk of 
deflation and of undermining overall demand across the 
Euro Area) as from a political perspective – there is no better 
way to ‘divide and rule’ workers across Europe than claiming 
that jobs in country A depend on poaching them through 
wage moderation from country B. 
Coordination of wage bargaining should instead focus more 
on macroeconomic objectives such as the need to keep wages 
in line with the price stability target of the ECB and on their 
role as an engine for aggregate demand. Current conditions in 
the Euro Area (sub-optimal low core inflation, weak recovery 
held back by a lack of demand) may present an opportunity 
to give bargaining coordination a fresh start. The question 
is whether trade unions and social partners in general will 
seize this opportunity of taking on the role of a ‘caretaker’ in 
ensuring that wage dynamics across Euro Area national econ-
omies is compatible with the ECB’s price stability target. 
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European coordination of 
collective wage bargaining 
in times of crisis
Torsten Müller
European interventionism as a new policy style
During the crisis, European policy-makers gradually set 
up a new system of European economic governance, which 
paved the way for a new policy style of European interven-
tionism (Müller 2015, Schulten and Müller 2015). This new 
policy style is characterized by three main features. The first 
is a shift in decision-making powers from the national to the 
European level, enabling European policy-makers to directly 
influence policies at national level. This also applies to policy 
areas in which the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) explicitly rules out any EU competences, 
such as social policy and wages and collective bargaining. 
The second is the strengthening of executive bodies such as 
the European Commission, the Economic and Financial 
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Affairs Council (ECOFIN) and the Governing Board of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) vis-à-vis the arenas 
for parliamentary action – both at European and national 
level (Oberndorfer 2013). And the third is the strong focus 
on so-called ‘supply-side economics’ based on austerity 
policies, deregulation and internal devaluation as the central 
elements of European crisis management. 
In principle, attempts by the EU to influence national 
wage policies are nothing new – even though Article 153 
(5) of the TFEU explicitly excludes any competence for it 
in this area. The Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, for 
example, which have been regularly issued by the European 
Commission and the European Council since 1993, have 
always included demands for more moderate and more 
dispersed wage developments (Hein and Nichoj 2007). 
These demands illustrate that already at that time the 
European institutions followed the dominant paradigm 
of a competition-oriented wage policy. However, due to 
their non-binding character, their practical implications on 
national wage policies remained very limited. 
This situation changed fundamentally in 2010 with the 
new system of European economic governance which 
established two main channels of intervention in national 
collective bargaining. The first relies on the European 
Semester and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure 
(MIP) that enable the Commission and Council to issue 
‘recommendations’ to the member states in the field of 
wages and collective bargaining. The more binding char-
acter of these recommendations results from the possibility 
of imposing financial sanctions on member states that 
repeatedly fail to implement them. With regards to content, 
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the interventions focus almost exclusively on moderate 
wage developments and the decentralization of collective 
bargaining in order to increase the downward flexibility of 
wages (see table 1). 
The second channel relies on the quid pro quo of “struc-
tural reforms” for financial support provided by the ESM 
and based on a so-called Memorandum of Understanding 
between national governments of those countries requiring 
financial aid and the Troika (consisting of the Commission, 
the European Central Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund – and since 2015 also the ESM). Compliance with the 
imposed reform programmes is subject to inspection by the 
Troika which may, in the event of non-compliance, threaten 
to stop that financial support. 
The ultimate benchmark for the “reform policies” propa-
gated by the European institutions in its country-specific 
recommendations and/or Troika policies was a decentralised, 
company-based bargaining system because that seems to 
allow companies to adjust better to varying economic devel-
opments (Schulten and Müller 2015: 337). Already in the 
Euro-Plus pact adopted in March 2011, the 17 signatory 
member states were required to undertake detailed moni-
toring of their own collective bargaining arrangements in 
order to assess whether they allow for “adequate” wage flex-
ibility at company level. 
The new system of European economic governance 
therefore marks a paradigm shift in the EU’s approach from 
the acceptance of free collective bargaining to direct political 
intervention in national bargaining outcomes and procedures. 
Table 1 illustrates that a majority of EU member states were 
subjected to this kind of interventionism by receiving instruc-
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tions concerning wage developments and/or “reforms” of their 
collective bargaining systems either through country-specific 
recommendations under the European Semester or require-
ments imposed by the Troika (Schulten et al. 2017: 40).
Table 1: European intervention in wage policy 2011-2016
Country-Specific Recommendations in the framework of the European Semester
Decentralisation of collective bargaining Belgium, Finland, Italy, Spain
Reform/abolition of automatic wage 
indexation
Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus
Moderate development of minimum 
wages
Bulgaria, France, Portugal, Slovenia
Wage restraint/nominal wage devel-
opment in line with real productivity
Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Croatia, 
Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain
Wage development in line with produc-
tivity growth/to boost domestic demand
Germany
Avoidance of high wages at lower end of 
wage scale
Sweden, Slovenia
Country-Specific Agreements between the Troika and national governments in the 
framework of Memorandums of Understanding
Decentralisation of collective bargaining Greece, Portugal 
Restrictive criteria for the extension of 
collective agreements
Greece, Portugal
Cutting/freezing of minimum wage Greece, Ireland Portugal
Wage freeze/cuts in public sector Greece, Ireland, Portugal
Wage freeze in private sector Greece
Nominal wage development in line with 
real productivity
Portugal, Cyprus
Source: Schulten et al. 2017: 41
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All these measures are based on the firm belief that the 
current crisis is first and foremost one of (cost) competitiveness 
in which wages and labour costs play the central role (Schulten 
and Müller 2015). Hence, the economic imbalances between 
the trade-surplus and trade-deficit countries are viewed as 
being primarily the result of diverging trends in wages and 
unit labour costs. Since in a European monetary union deficit 
countries can no longer improve their cost competitiveness 
by nominal devaluation of their national currency, “internal 
devaluation”, a euphemism for lowering wage costs, is urged by 
European policy makers as a way out of the crisis. 
The new system of EU economic governance, therefore, has 
de facto established a means of external political coordination 
of wages and collective bargaining which essentially aims to 
enforce moderate supply-side oriented wage policies in a bid 
to improve national cost competitiveness. This model has not 
only exerted a downward pressure on wages, but it has also 
undermined various core elements of the trade unions’ capacity 
to act, such as collective bargaining autonomy/coverage (for an 
overview see Müller and Platzer 2016; Lehndorff et al. 2017).
Against this background, the trade unions in Europe and 
in particular the European Trade Unions Confederation 
(ETUC) have emphasised the need to develop an auton-
omous and demand-oriented alternative model of collective 
bargaining coordination. This serves two purposes: First, it 
averts a market-driven downward wage spiral, in which trade 
unions from different countries are placed in competition 
with each other; second, it is an integral part of a broader 
alternative wage- and demand-led growth model, in which 
higher wages boost internal demand, thus generating growth 
and employment. 
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Political framework conditions of 
autonomous coordination
The implementation of such an alternative model faces two 
fundamental problems. First of all, even though the negative 
consequences of current EU crisis management have 
demonstrated the need for an autonomous alternative model 
of coordination, the measures introduced in an attempt to 
manage the crisis have at the same time undermined the 
institutional prerequisites for the successful implementation 
of such an alternative approach. In other words, the very 
actors and institutions needed for an alternative model of 
coordination have been weakened. 
The increasing decentralization of collective bargaining 
has hollowed out the unions’ capacity to coordinate wages 
and collective bargaining at national level. This has meant 
that the unions in many countries were no longer powerful 
enough to push through joint European strategies vis-á-vis 
the employers. Even before the crisis, many affiliates were 
in no position to comply with the wage coordination rules 
agreed within European trade union federations at sectoral 
and cross-sectoral level; under the crisis-induced regime of 
austerity and internal devaluation, of course, this became 
even more difficult, if not impossible to achieve. 
Another factor hampering the successful implementation 
of an alternative autonomous coordination of collective 
bargaining is the current lack of political support for such 
an approach. This not only applies at European level but also 
at national level where the political context is increasingly 
fraught. Most recent examples are developments in the UK, 
Finland and France where in 2016 national governments 
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initiated measures to curb trade union rights and to decen-
tralize collective bargaining. These examples illustrate that 
the political and institutional framework conditions for an 
autonomous coordination of collective bargaining have also 
deteriorated in those countries that so far have largely been 
spared from direct European interventions in the field of 
wages and collective bargaining. 
Linked to these developments is the second fundamental 
political dilemma which trade unions face in their efforts to 
coordinate collective bargaining cross-nationally. On the one 
hand, union federations such as the ETUC emphasise the 
importance of collective bargaining autonomy and reject for 
good reasons any political intervention. On the other hand, 
however, practical experience illustrates that such interven-
tions are taking place anyway with far-reaching implications 
at national level. This leaves two basic options: first, root-and-
branch opposition or, second, the attempt to influence the 
interventions in order to prevent the worst implications in 
the short run and achieve a change of policies in the long run.
Intra-trade union prerequisites for 
autonomous coordination
The autonomous European coordination of collective 
bargaining within European trade union federations essen-
tially relies on the cooperation and willingness of the national 
affiliates. This means that the European federations have no 
means to force these to comply with the coordination rules/
guidelines agreed at European level or to sanction non-
compliance. They rely entirely on the moral commitment of 
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their affiliates to follow the European rules. However, one 
essential prerequisite for this is the federations’ capacity to 
aggregate the diverse interests of their affiliates and the crisis 
has rendered this more difficult. The fact that the crisis and 
efforts to manage it affected the various countries in different 
ways meant that each affiliate has very different needs and 
expectations towards the federations. For the trade unions 
in Greece, Portugal and Spain that were hardest hit by the 
crisis and ensuing measures, the key priority was no longer 
wage increases but the defence of the existing system of 
multi-employer bargaining and job-creation. 
The ETUC as the cross-sectoral European trade union 
federation faces the additional problem that negotiations 
in national multi-employer bargaining systems usually take 
place at sectoral level so that national trade unions some-
times question the ETUC’s legitimacy and competences in 
coordinating collective bargaining at European level. The 
ETUC, therefore, emphasises its role in supporting the 
coordinating activities of the sectoral federations. However, 
at the same time, the new European system of economic 
governance has strengthened the ETUC’s coordinating 
role by providing it with new possibilities to exert political 
influence within the consultation procedures foreseen in the 
European Semester.
The ETUC’s new coordination approach
This is the context in which the ETUC affiliates discussed 
the development of a new autonomous coordination 
approach as an alternative to the political coordination 
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imposed by the European institutions and national govern-
ments. One vital prerequisite was that the new approach take 
into account the affiliates’ need for concrete measures and 
instruments to come to terms with the effects of the crisis 
and its management. The ETUC therefore had to address 
two fundamental questions: What would a differentiated 
solution look like that could take into account the affiliates’ 
country-specific demands and problems? And: could the 
ETUC develop guidelines that are at the same time both 
flexible and credible enough to allow it and its affiliates to 
achieve more concrete and realistic results?
In October 2013, the ETUC Executive Committee 
adopted a new method of ‘coordination of collective 
bargaining and wages in the EU economic governance’ 
(ETUC 2013), which was confirmed at the last ETUC 
Congress in 2015 (ETUC 2015). This new approach consists 
of three central elements: the adoption of joint collective 
bargaining guidelines; seeking to influence the decision-
making processes of the European Semester; and developing 
a structured and continuous exchange of information as an 
essential prerequisite for the formulation of joint positions 
and strategies. 
The first point is reflected in the March 2012 ETUC Reso-
lution which identified four collective bargaining priorities:
• coordinating wage policies by applying the so-called 
‘golden wage rule’ whereby pay increases should (at least) 
cover inflation and productivity increases while at the 
same time allowing enough flexibility (both upwards and 
downwards) to take into account country- and sector-
specific circumstances – implicitly, however, the golden 
wage rule has often been considered as specifying a 
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minimum floor for wage claims.
• formulating a common position on defensive agreements 
and opening clauses, emphasizing that these should only 
be temporary measures; 
• developing joint positions on minimum wages and 
collective bargaining coverage; and finally
• coordinating the fight against wage discrimination with a 
focus on reducing the gender wage gap.
The second and essentially new element of the ETUC’s 
coordination approach focuses on strengthening the 
involvement of trade unions in European economic 
governance. Within the annual European Semester cycle 
there are opportunities at both national and European levels 
to influence the policies pursued by the Commission and 
Council. At national level, trade unions can seek to influence 
the National Reform Programmes in the field of economic 
policy and the Stability and Convergence Programmes 
in the field of fiscal policy. Every April, national govern-
ments are requested to develop a reform programme, in 
which they spell out how they try to fulfil the economic and 
fiscal objectives defined in the Europe 2020 strategy. The 
second opportunity presents itself at European level, when 
the Commission uses these national reform and stability 
programmes to formulate the annual country-specific 
recommendations usually published in May. After a debate 
in the European Parliament, these recommendations are 
adopted by the Council in June or July. The key objective of 
the ETUC’s coordination approach is to ensure that trade 
unions are involved at every stage of the formulation of the 
country-specific recommendations both at national and 
European level. 
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Improving the unions’ organizational capacities
The third element of the coordination approach is the 
„toolkit“, which was developed by the ETUC’s Collective 
Bargaining Coordination Committee as a means of 
improving the exchange of information among the affil-
iates. Transparency and information are key organizational 
preconditions for coordinating collective bargaining across 
borders. The core element of this toolkit is an interactive and 
password-protected website on which affiliates can access all 
the relevant information on the ETUC’s strategic priorities 
in the field of collective bargaining. 
Concerning the European Semester, the toolkit comprises 
three areas: first, more general information on the European 
Semester, including the national affiliates’ response to the 
country-specific recommendations for their country. On the 
basis of these responses, the ETUC compiles a European 
report on all the country-specific recommendations in the 
field of wages and collective bargaining. Second, information 
is gathered about the national affiliates’ attempts to influence 
the formulation of the National Reform Programmes. 
The objective here is to support the national affiliates by 
reporting best practice examples and to put pressure on the 
Commission to live up to their promise of improving the 
involvement of trade unions. The third element is infor-
mation on planned or actual interventions upon trade union 
rights by national governments.
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One step beyond: the ETUC’s campaign 
for a pay rise in Europe
The coordination approach confirmed at the last ETUC 
Congress represents a pragmatic response to the immediate 
and diverse needs of its affiliates. Its main objective is to 
enable flexible adaption to the new economic, political and 
institutional environment that has emerged out of the crisis. 
In terms of content, the increased efforts to influence the 
decision-making process within the European economic 
governance at all levels are a new approach. In terms of 
procedures, complementing traditional coordination via 
abstract guidelines with more hands-on elements such as 
the ‘toolkit’ is innovative as well. The overarching objective 
therefore is to move from standardized ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
solutions to more tailor-made approaches that can better 
accommodate affiliates’ specific needs. 
Nonetheless, the ETUC is sticking to the principle of 
wage coordination via guidelines such as the “golden wage 
rule”, whereby wage increases should aim to at least cover 
the ECB’s target inflation and productivity increases. In the 
context of the current crisis this is a very important political 
message – despite all the practical problems in implementing 
this approach. By maintaining the principle of a solidaristic 
coordination of wages in Europe, the trade unions highlight 
that there is an alternative to the ‘competitive’ wage policy 
propagated within current crisis management.
Moreover, the ETUC has recognized the need to go 
beyond traditional channels of coordination by mobilizing its 
affiliates in pursuit of a campaign for higher wages. Hence, 
in February 2017, it launched “Europe needs a pay rise – it’s 
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time for our recovery”. The campaign’s key objective can be 
seen in the promotion of a more expansive wage policy as 
part of a broader macro-economic re-orientation towards a 
wage-led growth model. This more expansive wage policy 
takes the ‘golden wage rule’ as the starting point and adds – 
if possible – a re-distributive component on top. In doing so 
the campaign pursues three more concrete objectives: (1) to 
reverse the trend of decreasing real wages in many European 
countries – and in particular in the southern and central 
eastern European countries; (2) to realise a re-distribution 
of income and wealth from capital back to labour; and (3) 
to reduce the wage inequalities that exist among different 
groups of workers as regards gender, sector and types of 
employment – the particular aim here is to achieve a dispro-
portionate increase of wages for low-paid workers.
However, without the appropriate institutional under-
pinning the coordinated pursuit of such a more expansive 
and solidaristic wage policy is impossible. To this end, three 
basic components are required: appropriate minimum wages; 
all-encompassing multi-employer bargaining systems (at 
sectoral and/or cross-sectoral level); and strong trade unions 
(Schulten et al. 2017). Despite a more dynamic development 
of real minimum wages across Europe and, in particular, in 
central and eastern European countries during the last two 
years, their level is frequently still very low so that workers 
cannot make a living from what they earn and often have to 
rely on additional support from the state. Thus, an important 
element of an expansive and solidaristic wage policy is to 
ensure appropriate minimum wage levels – in accordance with 
national customs and practices – that enable workers to live in 
dignity with a decent standard of life and to share in society. 
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Since there is clear empirical evidence of a pay premium 
for workers whose wages are determined by collective agree-
ments, another important institutional requirement for the 
pursuit of an expansive and solidaristic wage policy consists 
of ensuring high collective bargaining coverage through the 
support of multi-employer bargaining systems. The spread 
and strength of multi-employer bargaining depends on two 
factors: (1) the existence of powerful and all-encompassing 
bargaining parties – on both the employers’ and the trade 
union side – that can ensure a high bargaining coverage 
through their organizational strength; (2) state support 
for multi-employer bargaining – for instance through the 
administrative extension of collective agreements. The latter 
is particularly important in those sectors in which trade 
union density is not sufficient to ensure high collective 
bargaining coverage.
Any strategy for increasing pay in Europe therefore must 
include two elements: the pursuit of an expansive and soli-
daristic wage strategy in bargaining rounds and creating 
the right kind of institutional framework conducive to this 
strategy. The latter includes above all a reversal of the current 
European crisis management aiming at a radical decentrali-
zation – and in some cases dismantling – of multi-employer 
bargaining systems and an end to the recurrent attacks 
on unions’ capacity to act by restricting the right to strike 
and increasing the opportunities for non-union groups of 
employees to conclude company agreements.
Under the current political circumstances the imple-
mentation of such a new wage policy may sound utopian. 
However, the newly launched ETUC campaign for a pay 
rise across Europe represents an important step in taking 
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the traditional coordination approach one step further 
than customary “labour diplomacy” by essentially lobbying 
European institutions for a more demand-side oriented and 
more socially oriented crisis management – and combining 
this with a mobilisation across the entire movement of 
affiliates and the wider public for alternative policies and 
a counter-narrative supporting trade union strategies and 
objectives (Müller and Platzer 2017).
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A feasible conceptual 
and institutional reform 
agenda for macroeconomic 
coordination and convergence 
in the euro area
Willi Koll und Andrew Watt
There is general agreement on one thing: the institutional 
underpinning of the single European currency is not fit for 
purpose. If that were not obvious earlier, then the specific 
crisis that hit the Euro Area after it had already begun to 
recover from the Great Recession, and the failure, since then, 
to resolve it effectively have rendered it abundantly clear. 
What is highly disputed, however, is the direction in which 
institutional change should proceed and, given that, the 
specific focus and proposals required.
This contribution shares with most of those in this 
volume a belief that the Euro Area needs to be reformed 
in the direction of a greater integration of important fields 
of economic policy-making. We do not propose an entirely 
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comprehensive reform package. The focus here is on the issue 
of mechanisms to achieve real and nominal convergence 
among the Euro Area countries. This is not everything, but it 
is, we argue, a conditio sine qua non for effective governance of 
the single currency. A third characteristic of this contribution 
is that we do not adopt an approach that asks what would 
be the optimal policy solutions to existing problems. Rather, 
we attempt to weigh demands of effective economic policy-
making against the political constraints of getting reforms 
capable of generating noticeably better results than at present 
within a reasonable time-span; our approach is therefore one 
of conceptual and institutional incrementalism.
We briefly set out the rationale for the focus on conver-
gence, and examine some of the recent institutional 
developments and likely constraints on further reform. We 
then set out a reform program that we believe achieves a 
balance between equally crucial considerations of effec-
tiveness and feasibility.
The starting point of any therapy is diagnosis. An 
extremely condensed statement of what might be considered 
the Achilles Heel of the currency union as currently consti-
tuted is that the pro-cyclical forces within each member 
state are stronger than the equilibrating forces. This leads to 
lop-sided economic development and a build-up of imbal-
ances that can only be resolved through periodic crisis. 
Thus balanced, steady growth is impossible. An important 
immanent pro-cyclical driving force is the real interest rate. 
For a given nominal interest rate set for the whole currency 
union by the ECB, the real interest rate in a given member 
state is determined by the pace of price and wage inflation. 
The higher the rate of economic activity or of domestic 
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demand, with respect to ‘potential output’, the faster prices 
and nominal wages tend to rise and the lower the real interest 
rate. In economies with sluggish demand growth, leading 
to a disinflationary or even deflationary environment, real 
interest rates are high. This, however, is the exact opposite 
of what is required to bring the economy back towards equi-
librium. Diverging internal demand, prices and interest rates 
interact in cumulative fashion and tend to send economies 
onto diverging paths.
There are numerous forces acting in the opposite direction, 
bringing countries back on a convergent path. First there 
is the real exchange-rate channel. Countries with higher 
(lower) inflation rates suffer a loss of (enjoy a gain in) inter-
national competitiveness, which dampens (stimulates) 
demand. Another automatic mechanism kicks in via the 
built-in fiscal stabilizers: faster real and nominal growth 
tends to raise taxation while reducing government spending, 
with the opposite occurring in sluggish economies. A third 
factor is also primarily fiscal (but may also incorporate 
macro-prudential and other regulatory changes); it is the 
discretionary management of aggregate demand by govern-
ments to keep it broadly in line with supply. Finally, there are 
more direct attempts to steer the path of prices and, especially, 
nominal wages and thereby unit labour costs through the use 
of guidelines, social pacts and other measures for which we 
will use the generic term (nominal) “incomes policies”.
Yet these countervailing forces proved to be too weak or 
– in the case of the third factor, discretionary policy – an at 
times exacerbating force. Economic developments in the 
Euro Area up until the crisis were accordingly characterized 
by divergence, most obviously manifesting themselves in the 
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creation of ever-larger current account imbalances. Domestic 
demand boomed in countries such as Greece and Spain while 
it was sluggish in core countries, most notably in Germany. 
Nominal unit labour costs and prices rose substantially faster 
than the ECB target in the former; in Germany nominal unit 
labour costs were essentially flat for much of the pre-crisis 
period. Current account deficits grew inexorably towards 
10% of GDP (as much as 15% in Greece), while Germany 
accumulated ever-larger surpluses. This was reflected in 
a build-up of net financial liabilities in the former and net 
foreign assets in the latter (see Herr in this volume). 
Lacking a safety valve in the form of exchange-rate 
adjustment, the Euro Area crisis took the form of a sudden 
stop in credit flows, followed by a wrenching adjustment 
crisis. This was made worse by the failure to rebalance based 
on symmetric adjustment in both deficit and surplus coun-
tries; while surplus countries have picked up only recently, 
the current account deficit countries embarked immediately 
after the crisis on austerity, demand deflation and internal 
devaluation. The result was a close-to deflationary overall 
situation, stagnant demand and output growth and an 
increasing dependence on a rising current account surplus of 
the Euro Area as a whole with the rest of the world. 
Given the limited institutionalization of the Euro Area, in 
particular the lack of substantial cross-border fiscal transfers 
and the (belated and incomplete only) provision of a lender 
of last resort capacity, competitive differentials and macroeco-
nomic imbalances were a “disease” that proved almost fatal for 
the entire project. The remedy, in a nutshell, is to strengthen 
the countervailing forces.  The impact of the real exchange 
rate channel and the automatic stabilizers are, in the short- 
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and medium-run, not susceptible to policy influence. The 
former depends on import and export shares in output (and 
their regional structure), the latter, to a first approximation, 
on the size of the public sector in the economy1. The most 
promising ways to bring about balanced development and 
convergence are to strengthen, and improve, the interaction 
between national demand management and incomes policies. 
Institutional reform since the crisis
The years since the outbreak of the crisis have seen 
substantial institutional development and redesign. Unfor-
tunately, though, these reforms have not resolved the 
fundamental problem of the weakness of instruments that 
can be deployed to bring about convergence and thus facil-
itate balanced growth. Some developments – such as the 
creation of the European Stability Mechanism, develop-
ments in the monetary policy field (like Outright Monetary 
Policy (OMT)), or Banking Union – are important in their 
own right and may be vital in dealing with future crises (see 
Grabau and Joebges as well as Schuberth in this volume). 
They are not designed, however, to bring about the required 
medium-run convergence. 
Worse, the rules governing national fiscal policy have 
been significantly tightened, primarily through the so-called 
Fiscal Compact. Yet this has merely intensified an undue 
preoccupation with (cyclically adjusted) budgets and with 
government debt ratios (see Priewe and Truger in this 
volume). The rules still fail to provide appropriate constraints 
on national fiscal policy for it to focus – where possible, 
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in combination with incomes policy – on what should be 
its key function in a monetary union: keeping aggregate 
nominal demand broadly in line with the development of 
productive capacity and, as a corollary, helping to reduce 
internal macroeconomic imbalances and inflation differen-
tials to a minimum. 
Lastly, one institutional development has been conceived 
with the explicit aim of limiting divergence: the Macroeco-
nomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP). Modelled procedurally 
on the fiscal governance framework, this involves evalu-
ation of the potential for macroeconomic imbalances in each 
member state by the European Commission via a scoreboard 
of relevant indicators, such as unit labour cost growth, the 
current account and net international investment position and 
various credit-related indicators. For each numerical trigger, 
values have been defined. Countries identified as suffering 
from or being at considerable risk of such imbalances are 
subject to more intensive, also qualitative monitoring. Corre-
sponding recommendations are issued to member states. As 
under the fiscal rules, member states that persistently fail 
to comply with recommendations and whose imbalances 
continue to increase can ultimately face sanctions.
The philosophy underpinning the MIP is very much in 
line with the analysis of the crisis and the risks to balanced 
growth adumbrated above. To that extent, the introduction 
of the MIP marks an important step forward. However, it 
suffers from some serious drawbacks. First, it exists alongside 
fiscal rules which may well mandate countries to pursue a very 
different fiscal policy from that implied by the MIP. Second, 
the numerical values attached to the indicators in the score-
board clearly reveal the asymmetrical nature of the exercise. 
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For the indicator nominal unit labour cost growth, most obvi-
ously, there is only an upper, no lower bound. The triggers with 
respect to the current account are (minus) 3% for deficits but 
6% for surpluses. Clearly, the focus is on bringing about policy 
change in buoyant economies with rising current account 
deficits. This imparts a potentially dangerous deflationary and 
anti-growth bias to the whole framework.
What is also noteworthy is that some elements of the 
institutional framework have not enjoyed reform in the wake 
of the crisis. We consider two of them to be particularly 
relevant. The first is the overall framework for the coordi-
nation of economic policy established by Article 121 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
from 2007 and particularly the Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines of the Member States and the European Union 
(BEPGs). The second is a little-known institution, the 
Macroeconomic Dialogue of the EU. As these are important 
elements in the reform concept presented in the last section, 
we describe each in turn here in its current form.2
Long before the introduction of the Euro, Treaty provisions 
that go back to the Rome Treaty setting up the European 
Economic Community – and now set out in Article 121 
TFEU – have, in principle, provided the conceptual and legal 
framework for economic policy coordination. Member states 
are to see economic policy as a matter of common interest 
and to ensure their coordination in the Council, with a view 
to achieving the broad goals of the EU set out in Article 3 
of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU); these include 
sustainable economic growth, full employment and price 
stability. Moreover, the BEPGs – which involve a moni-
toring, reporting and policy recommendation system similar 
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to that of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and now the 
MIP – provide, again in principle, the operational means to 
bring about a consistent macroeconomic policy-mix in the 
member states oriented towards these broad welfare goals. 
More specifically, the BEPGs have consistently insisted on 
the importance of wages adhering to a “golden rule”, that 
is real wages growing in line with (medium-run) produc-
tivity and nominal wages so as to be compatible with price 
stability. Moreover, the BEPGs have always taken account of 
the interdependence and thus the required coordination of 
the macroeconomic policies by saying that in general – given 
a mix of national fiscal and incomes policies compatible 
with price stability – monetary policy is called upon to do 
as much as it can to create conditions favorable for growth 
and employment. From a member state point of view, this 
includes, if necessary, a more or less expansionary stance, and 
should be reflected in the Country Specific Recommenda-
tions (CSR). 
However, despite numerous tweaks to the procedures, the 
BEPGs have in practice taken a back seat to the fiscal rules. 
No country has seriously been threatened with sanctions, 
although these are foreseen in the Treaty, for failure to adjust 
economic policy to bring it in line with the BEPGs.
A more recent, and even less well-known, institution is 
the Macroeconomic Dialogue of the EU (EUMED), estab-
lished at the behest of the European Council in Cologne 
in 1999.  It brings together top-level representatives of the 
social partners (European Trade Union Confederation and 
three employer federations), the monetary authorities (the 
ECB plus one non-Euro Area central bank), a “Troika” of 
representatives of the ECOFIN Council (among them the 
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president of the MED) and two representatives of the EU 
Commission. The goal is, while respecting the autonomy 
of actors, to improve mutual understanding among actors 
with a view to achieving a better balance between incomes 
policies (essentially: wage developments), monetary and 
fiscal policy stances.
In terms of the analysis sketched above over governance 
deficits and reform needs, it is obvious that the EUMED 
brings together the relevant actors and has the right thematic 
orientation: towards a consistent macroeconomic policy-
mix among the three main relevant policy fields. However, 
located solely at EU level, it lacks both a specific orien-
tation to the special needs of the Euro Area countries and, 
more fundamentally, an underpinning by representatives of 
national actors in each member state. For both incomes and 
fiscal policy, the national level is decisive. Meanwhile, until 
the crisis at least, the ECB was focused solely on Euro Area 
aggregates and had little interest in national developments. 
In short, it lacks the necessary clout.
A feasible reform strategy
Alongside reforms that have already occurred, two institu-
tional developments foreseen in the so-called Five Presidents’ 
Report on completing Europe’s economic and monetary 
union (European Commission 2015) are also relevant here. 
The report proposed to set up so-called competitiveness 
councils in each member state. They were to have a mandate 
to examine competitiveness issues in each country and to 
make expert recommendations to national governments. 
Saving the Euro – redesigning Euro Area economic governance
344
This proposal received a hostile reception, however, not 
least from national and European level trade unions which 
saw the councils as focusing one-sidedly on wage develop-
ments and threatening policy interventions in collective 
bargaining institutions and practices that, in many coun-
tries, are the legally autonomous responsibility of unions and 
employer federations. In the recommendation subsequently 
made by the EU Commission and accepted by the Council 
a change of name to “productivity boards” was accompanied 
by a substantial widening of thematic focus – to incorporate 
much broader issues determining productivity trends. At the 
same time, the initially foreseen competence of the boards 
was substantially watered down: they are now envisaged as 
playing a solely analytical role without the power to issue 
recommendations. In addition, the Five Presidents’ Report 
foresaw the swift introduction of a Fiscal Board to serve 
in an advisory capacity on fiscal issues. Here, too, the remit 
is limited, but the institution is potentially important in 
bringing together independent expertise.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs of 
the European Parliament recently presented a blueprint for 
a far-reaching overhaul of the economic governance regime 
of the Euro Area (Rapporteur Guy Verhofstadt, European 
Parliament 2016). Its goal is to bring together fiscal and 
monetary instruments in a genuinely common European 
economic policy. To this end, the fiscal procedures focusing 
on deficits and debts, the MIP and the CSR are to be 
melded into a single so-called ‘convergence code’. Overall 
responsibility will be accorded to an EU finance minister 
who is simultaneously one of only two vice-presidents of the 
EU Commission. On the basis of a collaborative procedure 
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between member states and European-level institutions, 
this finance minister will ultimately make economic policy 
recommendations to each member state. These recommen-
dations will be backed up by the threat of serious sanctions. 
Unlike the current system of – unused – financial penalties, 
the sanctions envisaged, following the approach of the 
Five Presidents’ Report, amount to a denial or withdrawal 
of access to European ‘public goods’, notably to a putative 
common fiscal capacity for stabilization purposes. 
Lastly, the EU Commission published a ‘White Paper 
on the Future of Europe’ including five scenarios. Scenario 
5 (‘Doing much more together’) is the most ambitious one. 
Regarding the macroeconomic dimension, it says: “Within 
the euro area, but also for those Member States wishing to 
join, there is much greater coordination on fiscal, social and 
taxation matters, as well as European supervision of financial 
services. Additional EU financial support is made available 
to boost economic development and respond to shocks at 
regional, sectoral and national level.” This needs to be seen 
against the background of the Five Presidents’ Report, in 
which a necessary precondition for setting up a macroeco-
nomic stabilization function for the euro area is convergence 
towards similarly resilient national economic structures. 
Scenario 3 (‘Those who want more do more’) could also 
be considered relevant for the considerations that follow to 
the extent that the Euro Area countries are considered as a 
group that needs further integration without this necessarily 
binding the non-members.
We consider the Verhofstadt proposals to constitute 
a coherent set of policy proposals to address the crucial 
concerns facing the Euro Area. The changes would neces-
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sitate quite substantial revision of the Treaties, however, 
involving a full ratification process by all member states. For 
this reason, a communitarization of economic policy on this 
scale does not appear to be a realistic political option at the 
present juncture. 
Rather, in order to make progress towards the goals set by 
the Five Presidents’ Report and the White Paper, we propose 
a pathway of pragmatic conceptual and institutional devel-
opment that takes existing regulations and institutions as a 
basis. It appears politically feasible, while at least substan-
tially improving the coordination of member state economic 
policies with a view to achieving the necessary convergence 
and reducing the potential for imbalances, tensions and 
crises. A more detailed exposition is in preparation (Koll/
Watt 2017, see also Koll 2016). The main elements can be 
summarized as follows.
• The framework for the coordination of national economic 
policy is obtained by revitalizing the procedures in Article 
121 TFEU (in conjunction with Articles 120 and 119). 
This means that the BEPGs play the role of key coor-
dination instrument. Conceptually they encompass the 
entire macroeconomic policy mix, and thus ensure trans-
parency and coherence in a similar way to the idea of a 
convergence code proposed by the European Parliament. 
• Complying with the rules of the BEPGs as described 
above will be helpful in meeting the fiscal rules and the 
MIP. Nevertheless, reforming the SGP in a way conducive 
to macroeconomic stabilization and ensuring that the 
MIP operates ina symmetric way would improve the effi-
ciency of the policy-mix in a consistent and goal-oriented 
manner and will be required sooner or later.
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• The next element is to bring together at the level of the 
Euro Area macroeconomic expertise whose analyses can 
be put in the service of policy coordination. To this end, 
we propose that the Fiscal Board, already established in 
the wake of the Five Presidents’ Report, should serve 
as the nucleus for an institution that is developed in a 
number of dimensions. Most importantly, its thematic 
area of competence needs to be substantially extended. 
Rather than focusing on budgetary issues more or less 
in isolation, its remit should be extended to the macro-
economic policy-mix as a whole. In other words, its focus 
should be the interaction between monetary, fiscal and 
‘incomes’ policies (that is nominal wage developments, 
also paying regard to functional income distribution). 
• Membership of the Board should be substantially 
increased, not only to allow for the much broader 
thematic reach proposed here, but also to ensure a degree 
of pluralism in theoretical approaches. The key task of 
this institution – which could be termed ‘Advisory Board 
for Macroeconomic Convergence’ – would be to produce 
quantitative macroeconomic scenarios for the Euro Area 
as a whole. 
• In the current juncture, this also means thorough analysis 
of the continuing crisis and strategies to overcome it. These 
chart in a quantitative form alternative paths and these 
can be based on a range of different assumptions, that, 
however, all take account of the interactions between Euro 
Area monetary policies and fiscal and incomes policies at 
national level. In so doing, this offers a counterweight to 
a likely tendency of national boards (see next bullet point) 
to ignore the external impacts of national economic policy 
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decisions on other actors, and indeed to consciously rely 
on ‘race-to-the-bottom’-type strategies that are destructive 
for the European economy in aggregate. As the proposed 
name indicates, the role of the Board is purely analytical 
and advisory; it does not issue recommendations.
• Corresponding National Convergence Boards would be 
set up. These represent an institutional development of 
the already agreed Productivity Boards. Their remit and 
main task match those of the Euro Area-level Board. They 
should elaborate country-specific, forward-looking quan-
titative scenarios. Clearly monetary policy will here take 
the form of an exogenous factor and the focus will be on 
the interaction between fiscal and incomes policies. Here, 
too, the role is purely analytical.
• The point of the analyses and scenarios developed by the 
Euro Area and national convergence boards is to provide a 
coherent basis, taking account of relevant macroeconomic 
feedback effects, for action by governments and social 
partners, action that is coordinated via the BEPGs. What 
is needed is an appropriate mediation body. Here we 
propose to take as a basis the European Macroeconomic 
Dialogue (EUMED) whose basic features, and limita-
tions, were described above. This is because, whatever its 
limitations, it has the required thematic focus and brings 
together the decisive actors around the table.
• However, the EUMED has as its point of reference the 
EU as a whole. The new body needs to be tailored to the 
specific needs of the Euro Area and at the same time be 
given the necessary underpinning at national level that 
is currently lacking. This will require substantial devel-
opment of the basic EUMED architecture along the 
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following lines: 
 º First, a Macroeconomic Dialogue must be established 
at the level of the Euro Area (EUROMED). A prag-
matic and effective way to achieve this would be to 
informally extend, at least twice a year, the meetings 
of the Eurogroup by bringing in representatives of the 
peak European social partner organizations. Unlike 
in the EUMED where member states are only repre-
sented by a “Troika” of ECOFIN Council, this would 
ensure full representation (finance minister) of all the 
Euro Area member states. 
 º Second, in each member state a Macroeconomic 
Dialogue at National Level (MEDNAT) is to be set 
up, also with top-level representatives of monetary (the 
national central bank) and fiscal policy as well as the 
social partners.
• In both the EUROMED and the MEDNATs, the report 
of the respective convergence board serves as the point of 
departure for an evaluation of and a cooperative orien-
tation of the relevant policies within the macroeconomic 
policy-mix.3 
• Discussions within the different MEDs would be geared 
to maintaining the autonomy and independence of the 
various actors. Results should give guidance in formu-
lating the final BEPGs. 
• At the same time, actions and policies are framed 
according to agreed basic guidelines. Clearly central is the 
need to limit the size of both negative and positive output 
gaps (while seeking to expand productive potential). 
Nominal wages and profits should increase is a way that 
is consistent with balanced non-inflationary growth and, 
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where appropriate, they should help to correct any macro-
economic (current account) imbalances that have arisen, 
again in a symmetrical fashion. 
• A notable benefit of this institutional enrichment and 
deepening is that national actors’ ‘ownership’ of the 
country-specific recommendations that come out of this 
inclusive and consultative process is substantially greater 
than now. Already there is provision in the treaty for 
sanctions in the case of repeated failure to respect recom-
mendations. This principle is to be retained, while at the 
same time more effective instruments need to be designed, 
along the lines of those envisaged in the Verhofstadt 
report (withdrawal of access to public goods). 
The conceptual and institutional reforms that we have 
briefly set out here all take as their basis existing institutions. 
No changes to the treaties are initially required (although 
reform of the fiscal rules would be necessary at some point). 
The reforms would by no means solve all problems relating 
to economic governance but they would mark a mile-
stone on a path towards achieving the degree of coherence 
and convergence that EMU requires if it is to achieve the 
required combination of dynamism and stability. 
Notes
1. In fact coordinated steps could be taken to strengthen national auto-
matic stabilisers (Watt 2011). Cross-border stabilization is also possible 
e.g. in the form of an EU unemployment insurance fund, but we do not 
develop this further here.
2. A more thorough treatment of both can be found in Koll 2013.
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3. In the case of monetary policy in the narrow sense, at national level this 
is more or less a given; however national macroprudential policy from 
the national central bank (where appropriate in conjunction with other 
government agencies) can be an important tool for maintaining balanced 
economic developments and for correcting imbalances.
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